13 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueckgreen2 sentences1994Section 301 pre-emption arises “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract....” Id. at 220 , 105 S.Ct. at 1916 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 221 . 1994Section 301 pre-emption arises “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract....” Id. at 220 , 105 S.Ct. at 1916 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 221 . | 2 | 3 |
Shawn Ezell v. Kansas City Southern Rwy Co.green2 sentences2018See Ezell, 866 F.3d at 300 & n.6 (noting that “[i]n some cases, it may be difficult to discern whether a particular state law or claim is better characterized as an economic or safety regulation” and deciding that a negligence-per se personal injury claim based on a Mississippi antiblocking statute was 26 barred by the ICCTA). 2018See Ezell , 866 F.3d at 300 & n.6 (noting that "[i]n some cases, it may be difficult to discern whether a particular state law or claim is better characterized as an economic or safety regulation" and deciding that a negligence-per se personal injury claim based on a Mississippi antiblocking statute was barred by the ICCTA). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 627420green2 sentences2018Iowa 2015) (“Plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that noncompliance with state regulations implicates the Due Process Clause, and the court is aware of none.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 840 F.3d 987 ; see also Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d 712 , 717 (8th Cir. 2013) (“It is clear . . . that, without more, the mere violation of a state law or rule does not constitute a federal due process violation.”). 2018Iowa 2015) ("Plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that noncompliance with state regulations implicates the Due Process Clause, and the court is aware of none."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds , 840 F.3d 987 ; see also Williams v. Nix , 1 F.3d 712 , 717 (8th Cir. 1993) ("It is clear ... that, without more, the mere violation of a state law or rule does not constitute a federal due process violation."). | 1 | 1 |
Guyton v. FM LENDING SERVICES, INC.green1 sentence2012Guyton, 681 S.E.2d at 474-75 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoungreen2 sentences2002Yamaha Motor, 516 U.S. at 213 , 116 S.Ct. at 627 , 133 L.Ed.2d at 590 (emphasis added) (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1781 , 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 349 (1970)). 2002Yamaha Motor, 516 U.S. at 213 , 116 S.Ct. at 627 , 133 L.Ed.2d at 590 (emphasis added) (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1781 , 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 349 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.green2 sentences2002Yamaha Motor, 516 U.S. at 213 , 116 S.Ct. at 627 , 133 L.Ed.2d at 590 (emphasis added) (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1781 , 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 349 (1970)). 2002Yamaha Motor, 516 U.S. at 213 , 116 S.Ct. at 627 , 133 L.Ed.2d at 590 (emphasis added) (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1781 , 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 349 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
Petersen v. Davenport Community School Districtgreen1 sentence2001Dist., 626 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 2001) (holding that even if a board of education acted beyond its authority, this state law violation would not give rise to a § 1983 claim). | 1 | 1 |
Conaway v. Webster City Products Co.green1 sentence1994So “long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 410, 108 S.Ct. at 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 421 ; see also Conaway, 431 N.W.2d at 799-800 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994So “long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 410, 108 S.Ct. at 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 421 ; see also Conaway, 431 N.W.2d at 799-800 . 1994So “long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 410, 108 S.Ct. at 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 421 ; see also Conaway, 431 N.W.2d at 799-800 . | 3 | 1988–1994 |
Hansen v. Seabee Corp.
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 237 . 2014Id. at 237 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Gary Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids
green
2 sentences2018Iowa 2015) (“Plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that noncompliance with state regulations implicates the Due Process Clause, and the court is aware of none.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 840 F.3d 987 ; see also Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d 712 , 717 (8th Cir. 2013) (“It is clear . . . that, without more, the mere violation of a state law or rule does not constitute a federal due process violation.”). 2018Iowa 2015) ("Plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that noncompliance with state regulations implicates the Due Process Clause, and the court is aware of none."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds , 840 F.3d 987 ; see also Williams v. Nix , 1 F.3d 712 , 717 (8th Cir. 1993) ("It is clear ... that, without more, the mere violation of a state law or rule does not constitute a federal due process violation."). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Neuendorf
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 746-47 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ann C. Meade v. Frank O. Meade
green
1 sentence2013The PKPA’s state law standard asserts: “[I]n order to retain exclusive responsibility for modifying its prior order the first state must still have custody jurisdiction as a matter of its own custody law.” Meade, 812 F.2d at 1477 ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (referring to subsection (c)(1)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Evans v. Evans
green
1 sentence2013In addition, for another state to modify a prior order, the initial state must no longer have jurisdiction or the initial state must have declined to exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2); Evans, 668 F.Supp. at 641 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs
red
2 sentences1995The federal court in this case might have considered the state-law claim in the exercise of its pendent jurisdiction based on "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 , 86 S.Ct. at 1139 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 228 . 1995The federal court in this case might have considered the state-law claim in the exercise of its pendent jurisdiction based on "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 , 86 S.Ct. at 1139 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 228 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.