state law claim in Kentucky

13 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

Case	Followed	Cited
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepciongreen scotus · 2011 · cited in 2 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2012–2017 2 sentences 2012In explaining why this is so, the Court began by noting that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010)). 9 The Court also cited to Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 358 , 128 S.Ct. 978 , 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008), which preempted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before arbitration, where the Court emphasized that “[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to a 2012In explaining why this is so, the Court began by noting that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010)). 9 The Court also cited to Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 358 , 128 S.Ct. 978 , 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008), which preempted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before arbitration, where the Court emphasized that “[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to a	1	2
Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.green ca5 · 2011 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020As to specific 6 parallel claims, the Fifth Circuit has held “claims for negligent failure to warn or negligent manufacturing of a device are not preempted, provided that such claims are premised entirely on violation of the applicable federal requirements.” Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 770 (5th Cir. 2011).	1	1
Richard Stengel v. Medtronic Incorporatedgreen ca9 · 2013 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020The Ninth Circuit has held “the MDA does not preempt a state-law claim for violating a state-law duty that parallels a federal-law duty under the MDA.” Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2013).	1	1
Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc.green ca10 · 2015 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020Instead, we may find the state law claim preempted only if there exists a device-specific federal requirement Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335, 1340 (10th Cir. 2015).	1	1
Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.green scotus · 2010 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012In explaining why this is so, the Court began by noting that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010)). 9 The Court also cited to Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 358 , 128 S.Ct. 978 , 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008), which preempted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before arbitration, where the Court emphasized that “[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to a 2012In explaining why this is so, the Court began by noting that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010)). 9 The Court also cited to Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 358 , 128 S.Ct. 978 , 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008), which preempted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before arbitration, where the Court emphasized that “[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to a	1	1
Preston v. Ferrergreen scotus · 2008 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012In explaining why this is so, the Court began by noting that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010)). 9 The Court also cited to Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 358 , 128 S.Ct. 978 , 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008), which preempted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before arbitration, where the Court emphasized that “[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to a 2012In explaining why this is so, the Court began by noting that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010)). 9 The Court also cited to Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 358 , 128 S.Ct. 978 , 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008), which preempted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before arbitration, where the Court emphasized that “[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to a	1	1
Smith v. Massachusettsgreen scotus · 2005 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See 534 S.W.2d 453 (Ky.1976). 27 Yet, we must reject the idea that the common law concept in Allen applies to midtrial, court-decreed acquittals because similar doctrines were both recognized and distinguished by the Court in Smith, 543 U.S. at 471 , 125 S.Ct. 1129 (“It may suffice for an appellate court to announce the state-law rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal occurred at a stage in the trial where the defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not possibly have caused him prejudice.”); cf. Price, 538 U.S. at 643 n. 2, 123 2009See 534 S.W.2d 453 (Ky.1976). 27 Yet, we must reject the idea that the common law concept in Allen applies to midtrial, court-decreed acquittals because similar doctrines were both recognized and distinguished by the Court in Smith, 543 U.S. at 471 , 125 S.Ct. 1129 (“It may suffice for an appellate court to announce the state-law rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal occurred at a stage in the trial where the defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not possibly have caused him prejudice.”); cf. Price, 538 U.S. at 643 n. 2, 123	1	1
United States v. Vito Lorusso and Joseph Errantegreen ca2 · 1982 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009United States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 54 (2nd Cir.1982), United States v. Byrne, 203 F.3d 671, 674 (9th Cir.2000)).	1	1
Allen v. Waltergreen ky · 1976 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009See 534 S.W.2d 453 (Ky.1976). 27 Yet, we must reject the idea that the common law concept in Allen applies to midtrial, court-decreed acquittals because similar doctrines were both recognized and distinguished by the Court in Smith, 543 U.S. at 471 , 125 S.Ct. 1129 (“It may suffice for an appellate court to announce the state-law rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal occurred at a stage in the trial where the defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not possibly have caused him prejudice.”); cf. Price, 538 U.S. at 643 n. 2, 123	1	1
United States v. Charles Frederick Byrnegreen ca9 · 2000 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009United States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 54 (2nd Cir.1982), United States v. Byrne, 203 F.3d 671, 674 (9th Cir.2000)).	1	1
Maher v. Gagnegreen scotus · 1980 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998Under the prevailing test, § 1988 fees may be awarded to a party who prevails on a state law claim pleaded in conjunction with a “substantial” federal constitutional claim if the constitutional and the state law claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” This test for pendant jurisdiction was articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), and its use in the present context was contemplated by Congress as indicated by the legislative history of 1998Under the prevailing test, § 1988 fees may be awarded to a party who prevails on a state law claim pleaded in conjunction with a “substantial” federal constitutional claim if the constitutional and the state law claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” This test for pendant jurisdiction was articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), and its use in the present context was contemplated by Congress as indicated by the legislative history of	1	1
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.green scotus · 1992 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997See, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515-517 , 112 S.Ct. at 2617 . 1997See, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515-517 , 112 S.Ct. at 2617 .	1	1
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.green scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989Even if dispute resolution under the collective bargaining agreement and the state tort claim would require addressing the same set of facts, “as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 , 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1988). 1989Even if dispute resolution under the collective bargaining agreement and the state tort claim would require addressing the same set of facts, “as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 , 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1988).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto green scotus · 1996 2 sentences 2015A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the text of § 2].’ 517 U.S. at 685 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 . 2015A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the text of § 2].’ 517 U.S. at 685 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 .	1	2015–2015
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood green scotus · 1993 2 sentences 2011We, on the other hand, are persuaded by the well reasoned dissent in Nickels , in part because of its close adherence to the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Eastenvood, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 a case involving the preemption by a FRSA regulation of a state law claim. 2011We, on the other hand, are persuaded by the well reasoned dissent in Nickels , in part because of its close adherence to the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Eastenvood, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 a case involving the preemption by a FRSA regulation of a state law claim.	1	2011–2011
Uttecht v. Brown green scotus · 2007 2 sentences 2010Harris acknowledges that a potential juror “who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause.” Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (citation omitted). 2010Harris acknowledges that a potential juror “who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause.” Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (citation omitted).	1	2010–2010
Price, Warden v. Vincent green scotus · 2003 2 sentences 2009See 534 S.W.2d 453 (Ky.1976). 27 Yet, we must reject the idea that the common law concept in Allen applies to midtrial, court-decreed acquittals because similar doctrines were both recognized and distinguished by the Court in Smith, 543 U.S. at 471 , 125 S.Ct. 1129 (“It may suffice for an appellate court to announce the state-law rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal occurred at a stage in the trial where the defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not possibly have caused him prejudice.”); cf. Price, 538 U.S. at 643 n. 2, 123 2009See 534 S.W.2d 453 (Ky.1976). 27 Yet, we must reject the idea that the common law concept in Allen applies to midtrial, court-decreed acquittals because similar doctrines were both recognized and distinguished by the Court in Smith, 543 U.S. at 471 , 125 S.Ct. 1129 (“It may suffice for an appellate court to announce the state-law rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal occurred at a stage in the trial where the defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not possibly have caused him prejudice.”); cf. Price, 538 U.S. at 643 n. 2, 123	1	2009–2009
Taylor Ag Industries v. Pure-Gro green ca9 · 1995 1 sentence 2007This would transfer the regulatory locus from the Secretary of Transportation to the state courts-a result the BIA was clearly intended to foreclose, [footnote omitted] See Taylor AG Indus, v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 , 561 n. 3 (9th Cir.1995) (preemption analysis “focuses not on whom the legal duty is imposed, but on whether the legal duty constitutes a state law requirement” already covered by federal law).	1	2007–2007
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth green ky · 1991 1 sentence 2006The state law claim in Hunter was based on a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance under Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 814 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.1991), overruled in “part on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky.2001).	1	2006–2006
Lawson v. Commonwealth green ky · 2001 1 sentence 2006The state law claim in Hunter was based on a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance under Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 814 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.1991), overruled in “part on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky.2001).	1	2006–2006
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs red scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1998Under the prevailing test, § 1988 fees may be awarded to a party who prevails on a state law claim pleaded in conjunction with a “substantial” federal constitutional claim if the constitutional and the state law claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” This test for pendant jurisdiction was articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), and its use in the present context was contemplated by Congress as indicated by the legislative history of 1998Under the prevailing test, § 1988 fees may be awarded to a party who prevails on a state law claim pleaded in conjunction with a “substantial” federal constitutional claim if the constitutional and the state law claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” This test for pendant jurisdiction was articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), and its use in the present context was contemplated by Congress as indicated by the legislative history of	1	1998–1998
Hagans v. Lavine green scotus · 1974 2 sentences 1998Under the prevailing test, § 1988 fees may be awarded to a party who prevails on a state law claim pleaded in conjunction with a “substantial” federal constitutional claim if the constitutional and the state law claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” This test for pendant jurisdiction was articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), and its use in the present context was contemplated by Congress as indicated by the legislative history of 1998Under the prevailing test, § 1988 fees may be awarded to a party who prevails on a state law claim pleaded in conjunction with a “substantial” federal constitutional claim if the constitutional and the state law claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” This test for pendant jurisdiction was articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), and its use in the present context was contemplated by Congress as indicated by the legislative history of	1	1998–1998
Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux green scotus · 1987 2 sentences 1992For a state law claim to satisfy the commonsense understanding of the phrase “to regulate instance” the claim must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry. 481 U.S. at 50 , 107 S.Ct. at 1554 . 1992For a state law claim to satisfy the commonsense understanding of the phrase “to regulate instance” the claim must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry. 481 U.S. at 50 , 107 S.Ct. at 1554 .	1	1992–1992

Where else courts name it

CA 514 (1944–2026) TX 133 (1983–2025) IL 100 (1985–2026) OH 61 (1983–2026) NY 44 (1987–2026) WA 33 (1988–2025) MI 33 (1928–2025) IN 32 (1986–2026) NJ 31 (1989–2024) AL 29 (1981–2023) MA 27 (1978–2024) PA 26 (1982–2026) MD 26 (1984–2025) FL 24 (1987–2025) CO 23 (1989–2025) GA 23 (1982–2023) MO 21 (1903–2025) CT 20 (1991–2022) NC 20 (1987–2025) WI 20 (1980–2025) LA 19 (1974–2025) MT 19 (1987–2020) OR 19 (1982–2026) OK 18 (1991–2025) NM 18 (1990–2022) MN 17 (1961–2014) AZ 17 (1984–2025) KS 16 (1993–2022) VA 16 (1993–2026) SC 14 (1987–2019) KY 13 (1989–2020) IA 13 (1988–2018) WV 11 (1985–2020) TN 11 (1991–2025) ID 11 (1986–2025) MS 10 (1997–2018) DC 10 (1992–2024) ME 9 (1983–2021) NE 8 (1993–2023) HI 8 (1992–2016) AR 7 (1993–2011) AK 7 (1994–2025) UT 7 (1983–2017) WY 6 (1997–2023) SD 5 (1990–2008) ND 5 (1993–2013) DE 4 (2009–2023) VI 3 (2012–2026) VT 3 (1990–2013) RI 2 (1986–1986) NV 2 (1990–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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