state law claim in Alabama

2011See also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (“[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.”).’ “Saunders v. State, 10 So.3d 53, 75-76 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), cert. denied, Saunders v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2433 , 174 L.Ed.2d 229 (2009).” Johnson v.State, [Ms. CR-99-1349, October 2, 2009] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2009).

2011See also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (“[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.”).’ “Saunders v. State, 10 So.3d 53, 75-76 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), cert. denied, Saunders v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2433 , 174 L.Ed.2d 229 (2009).” Johnson v.State, [Ms. CR-99-1349, October 2, 2009] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2009).

2011See also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (“[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.”).’ “Saunders v. State, 10 So.3d 53, 75-76 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), cert. denied, Saunders v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2433 , 174 L.Ed.2d 229 (2009).” Johnson v.State, [Ms. CR-99-1349, October 2, 2009] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2009).

2010See also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (‘[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.’).” 10 So.3d at 75-76 . “[A] blanket declaration of support of or opposition to the death penalty is not necessary for a trial judge to disqualify a juror.” Ex parte Whisenhant, 555 So.2d 235, 241 (Ala.1989). “[I]n order to determine whether the trial judge’s exercise of discretion [

1984See, also, Educators' Investment Corp. of Ala., Inc. v. Autrey, supra .

1981See, also, Educators' Investment Corp. of Ala., Inc. v. Autrey, supra. 5 Inherent in such substantive principles of jurisprudence is a determination, in this case by this Court, of whether or not the moving party was precluded from asserting both state and federal theories of recovery in the initial federal court proceedings.

1989The question presented on remand is whether Mays's state-law defamation claim arising out of disciplinary action taken against him by his employer, Reynolds, "is 'independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement [between Reynolds and the union to which Mays belonged] in the sense of 'independent' that matters for § 301 preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." Lingle , 486 U.S. at ___ , 108 S.Ct. at 1882 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 420 (footnote omitted).

1989The question presented on remand is whether Mays's state-law defamation claim arising out of disciplinary action taken against him by his employer, Reynolds, "is 'independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement [between Reynolds and the union to which Mays belonged] in the sense of 'independent' that matters for § 301 preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." Lingle , 486 U.S. at ___ , 108 S.Ct. at 1882 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 420 (footnote omitted).

2023See Davila, 542 U.S. at 210 . 31 1200485 Because of these clear differences between defensive preemption and complete preemption, courts should be careful not to conflate or mingle the two in their analysis.

2014“The laws of the United States are as much a part of the law of Alabama as its own local laws.” Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., 240 Ala. 277, 282 , 198 So. 706, 710 (1940).

2014“The laws of the United States are as much a part of the law of Alabama as its own local laws.” Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., 240 Ala. 277, 282 , 198 So. 706, 710 (1940).

2010See also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (‘[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.’).” 10 So.3d at 75-76 . “[A] blanket declaration of support of or opposition to the death penalty is not necessary for a trial judge to disqualify a juror.” Ex parte Whisenhant, 555 So.2d 235, 241 (Ala.1989). “[I]n order to determine whether the trial judge’s exercise of discretion [

2010See also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (‘[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.’).” 10 So.3d at 75-76 . “[A] blanket declaration of support of or opposition to the death penalty is not necessary for a trial judge to disqualify a juror.” Ex parte Whisenhant, 555 So.2d 235, 241 (Ala.1989). “[I]n order to determine whether the trial judge’s exercise of discretion [

2010In International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 470 So.2d 1215, 1216 (Ala.1985), this Court held that “under the circumstances of th[at] case,” the issue of federal preemption that was presented was an affirmative defense. 10 Also, cf. Charles Alan Wright et al., 19A Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction, Reporter’s Notes D.: Removal on the Basis of Complete Preemption, 699, 701 (2009) (discussing the hurdle to removal posed by the “master-of-the-complaint doctrine” where, on its face, a complaint purports to assert only a claim under state law and noting that, “[i]n the ordinary case in

2010Also, the Davis Court itself explained that it was not deciding that the state-law claim before it had in fact been preempted by federal law but was addressing only the question whether the assertion that the state-law claim is "subject to preemption” must be properly preserved in the trial court in order for it to be reviewed on appeal. 470 So.2d at 1216 n. 2.

2009In other words, but for the duty of fair representation implied in the union-employee re *218 lationship, inherent in federal labor law, no cause of action exists for legal malpractice against a nonlawyer, based on the nonlawyer’s ‘failing to adequately represent the plaintiffs’ in a litigated ‘discrimination’ suit.” 571 So.2d at 1102 (citations omitted).

2007See also Lowery v. Thomas , 575 So.2d 1030 , 1032 (Ala. 1990) ("If the [federal civil-rights] claim and the state law claim arise out of a `common nucleus of operative fact,' then in determining the plaintiffs status as a `prevailing party' under § 1988 it is immaterial upon which claim or claims the judgment is based, unless the [federal] claim is specifically denied.").

2000Upon the Court taking judicial notice of that, the City would rest.” (R. 85.) We addressed a similar factual situation in Peters v. City of Phenix City, 589 So.2d 800, 800-01 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), as follows: “The appellant raises several issues on appeal; however, we need only address the City’s failure to prove and plead the ordinance by which it adopted § 32-5A-191, Code of Alabama 1975, the violation for which the appellant was prosecuted.

1996While it is true that the first wife’s state law claim was preempted, it is also true that the claim, “though it purported] to be grounded in state law, ‘[was] necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress.’” Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, 868 F.2d 430, 432 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins.

1996Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 , 107 S.Ct. 1542,1548 , 95 L.Ed.2d 55, 65 (1987)).

1996Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 , 107 S.Ct. 1542,1548 , 95 L.Ed.2d 55, 65 (1987)).

1994Co., 898 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).