state law claim in Michigan

2020In Lingle, 486 US at 401 , the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff- employee’s state-law claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim was not preempted by § 301.

1994However, as demonstrated in Lingle , the Supreme Court seemed to have narrowed the gates of preemption by changing the focus to whether resolution of the state-law claim requires interpreting or construing the collective-bargaining agreement. 2 Lingle, supra at 407 .

2024The first factor counsels against retroactive application of Posey to cases on collateral review. 2 The state-law test was derived from the pre-Teague federal retroactivity test in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 ; 85 S Ct 1731 ; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), which was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard in Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314 ; 107 S Ct 708 ; 93 L Ed 2d 649 (1987); however, it remains viable as the state-specific standard.

2024The first factor counsels against retroactive application of Posey to cases on collateral review. 2 The state-law test was derived from the pre-Teague federal retroactivity test in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 ; 85 S Ct 1731 ; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), which was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard in Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314 ; 107 S Ct 708 ; 93 L Ed 2d 649 (1987); however, it remains viable as the state-specific standard.

2024The first factor counsels against retroactive application of Posey to cases on collateral review. 2 The state-law test was derived from the pre-Teague federal retroactivity test in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 ; 85 S Ct 1731 ; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), which was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard in Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314 ; 107 S Ct 708 ; 93 L Ed 2d 649 (1987); however, it remains viable as the state-specific standard.

2024The first factor counsels against retroactive application of Posey to cases on collateral review. 2 The state-law test was derived from the pre-Teague federal retroactivity test in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 ; 85 S Ct 1731 ; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), which was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard in Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314 ; 107 S Ct 708 ; 93 L Ed 2d 649 (1987); however, it remains viable as the state-specific standard.

2017For the catchall provision to apply, “(1) the defendant must have been convicted of a state-law violation or a municipal-ordinance violation, (2) the violation must, ‘by its nature,’ constitute a ‘sexual offense,’ and (3) the victim of the violation must be under 18 years of age.” Golba, 273 Mich App at 607 , quoting People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 647 ; 649 NW2d 123 (2002), overruled on other grounds by People v Lee, 489 Mich 289 .

2017For the catchall provision to apply, “(1) the defendant must have been convicted of a state-law violation or a municipal-ordinance violation, (2) the violation must, ‘by its nature,’ constitute a ‘sexual offense,’ and (3) the victim of the violation must be under 18 years of age.” Golba, 273 Mich App at 607 , quoting People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 647 ; 649 NW2d 123 (2002), overruled on other grounds by People v Lee, 489 Mich 289 .

2018Instead, "Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court's original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction...." Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota , 534 U.S. 533 , 540, 122 S.Ct. 999 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002).

2018Instead, "Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court's original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction...." Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota , 534 U.S. 533 , 540, 122 S.Ct. 999 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002).

2018Morris v. Giovan , 225 Ariz. 582 , 585, 242 P.3d 181 (Ariz. App. 2010).

2018Morris v. Giovan , 225 Ariz. 582 , 585, 242 P.3d 181 (Ariz. App. 2010).

2018Linkletter was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard for retroactivity in Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), but we recognized the Hampton / Linkletter standard's continued viability as the state-specific standard in People v. Sexton , 458 Mich. 43 , 60-61, 580 N.W.2d 404 (1998).

2018Linkletter was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard for retroactivity in Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), but we recognized the Hampton / Linkletter standard's continued viability as the state-specific standard in People v. Sexton , 458 Mich. 43 , 60-61, 580 N.W.2d 404 (1998).

2017For the catchall provision to apply, “(1) the defendant must have been convicted of a state-law violation or a municipal-ordinance violation, (2) the violation must, ‘by its nature,’ constitute a ‘sexual offense,’ and (3) the victim of the violation must be under 18 years of age.” Golba, 273 Mich App at 607 , quoting People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 647 ; 649 NW2d 123 (2002), overruled on other grounds by People v Lee, 489 Mich 289 .

2017For the catchall provision to apply, “(1) the defendant must have been convicted of a state-law violation or a municipal-ordinance violation, (2) the violation must, ‘by its nature,’ constitute a ‘sexual offense,’ and (3) the victim of the violation must be under 18 years of age.” Golba, 273 Mich App at 607 , quoting People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 647 ; 649 NW2d 123 (2002), overruled on other grounds by People v Lee, 489 Mich 289 .

1988There, the Court stated: We do hold that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim, see Avco Corp v Aero Lodge 735, 390 US 557 [ 88 S Ct 1235 ; 20 L Ed 2d 126 ] (1968), or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law. [Lueck, 471 US 220 .

1988There, the Court stated: We do hold that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim, see Avco Corp v Aero Lodge 735, 390 US 557 [ 88 S Ct 1235 ; 20 L Ed 2d 126 ] (1968), or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law. [Lueck, 471 US 220 .

2025Henry v Laborers’ Local 1191, 495 Mich 260, 274-275 ; 848 NW2d 130 (2014). “[F]ederal law conflicts with state law where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 275 n 32 (quotation marks and citation omitted). -3- In Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951, 289 Mich App 132 , 139- 140; 796 NW2d 94 (2010), this Court discussed federal preemption: Whether a federal statute preempts a state-law claim is

2024Barnes, 502 Mich at 273 n 5. -3- As noted earlier, the first factor is afforded heightened weight over the second and third factor when it clearly favors retroactivity or prospectivity.

2018Linkletter was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard for retroactivity in Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314 ; 107 S Ct 708 ; 93 L Ed 2d 649 (1987), but we recognized the Hampton/Linkletter standard’s continued viability as the state-specific standard in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 60-61 ; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). 6 It is worth noting that “[t]he second and third factors can be dealt with together, because the amount of past reliance will often have a profound effect upon the administration of justice.” Hampton, 384 Mich at 677 . 7 amenable to prospective application.”7 People v Sexton, 45

2018Second, the state-law claim must be "so related" to the federal claim that it forms "part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." Id.

2014In Pierson Sand & Gravel, id. at 376 , the plaintiffs ultimately did not have any state claims pending because “[b]y the time plaintiffs filed the third amended complaint, they were asserting only [federal] claims, and had abandoned their prior state law claims.” However, the Court based its decision on its finding that the plaintiffs could have included a state law claim and the federal court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state claim after dismissing the federal claim before trial.

2014Id. at 382-387 .3 Here, plaintiff does not adequately refer to distinct and separate “state” causes of action (cf. footnote 3, infra).4 For this reason, we find Pierson Sand & Gravel sufficiently distinguishable.

2010Betty v Brooks & Perkins, 446 Mich 270, 276 ; 521 NW2d 518 (1994).

2010Betty v Brooks & Perkins, 446 Mich 270, 276 ; 521 NW2d 518 (1994).

2010Ambassador Bridge, 481 Mich at 36 .

2007We have found a number of unpublished cases in which this Court, after determining that § 301 governed a claim, held that dismissal was appropriate. 3 Also, in Cuffe v Gen Motors Corp (On *430 Remand), 180 Mich App 394, 395-396 ; 446 NW2d 903 (1989) , the trial court granted summary disposition of the plaintiffs claim on the basis that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs claim was preempted by § 301.

2007We have found a number of unpublished cases in which this Court, after determining that § 301 governed a claim, held that dismissal was appropriate. 3 Also, in Cuffe v Gen Motors Corp (On *430 Remand), 180 Mich App 394, 395-396 ; 446 NW2d 903 (1989) , the trial court granted summary disposition of the plaintiffs claim on the basis that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs claim was preempted by § 301.

1998Brownridge, supra at 748-749 , 321 N.W.2d 798 .

1997See Hi-Way Motor Co v Int'l Harvester Co, 398 Mich 330, 336 ; 247 NW2d 813 (1976); Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 208 ; 544 NW2d 727 (1996).

1997See Hi-Way Motor Co v Int'l Harvester Co, 398 Mich 330, 336 ; 247 NW2d 813 (1976); Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 208 ; 544 NW2d 727 (1996).

1997NYBCBS, supra, p 656 (“infinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-emption”); Teper v Park West Galleries, Inc, 431 Mich 202, 215-216 ; 427 NW2d 535 (1988) (holding that reference to an erisa plan in order to calculate damages in a wrongful discharge claim did not preempt the state-law claim).

1997NYBCBS, supra, p 656 (“infinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-emption”); Teper v Park West Galleries, Inc, 431 Mich 202, 215-216 ; 427 NW2d 535 (1988) (holding that reference to an erisa plan in order to calculate damages in a wrongful discharge claim did not preempt the state-law claim).