state law claim in Connecticut

1999More specifically, "where the resolution of a state law claim depends on an interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted, . . . [but] `purely factual questions' about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not `requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement.'" Id., 261 , quoting, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , 405-07 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988).

1999More specifically, "where the resolution of a state law claim depends on an interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted, . . . [but] `purely factual questions' about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not `requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement.'" Id., 261 , quoting, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , 405-07 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988).

2003Indeed, the Second Circuit has recognized that "[t]he principles for deciding when a state-law claim is preempted by the LMRA are more easily expressed than applied. [W]here the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the claim is [preempted]." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Foy v. Pratt Whitney Group , 127 F.3d 229 , 233 (2d Cir. 1997). "[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute [however] the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law li

1999In Foy v. Pratt Whitney Group , 127 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1997), the second circuit reversed the District Court that held that where the carties were covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the nature and scope of the duty owed in a negligence claim "[arose] out of and . . . [were] circumscribed by the collective bargaining agreement. that appellate court found thet "[r]eference to the [collective bargaining agreement] . . . may be needed, but state law will play no part in determining what the parties agreed to in the [collective bargaining agreement] . . ." Id., 235 .

2020Id., 568–72, citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (c) (6) (iii) (2008).33 The plaintiffs in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, supra, 564 U.S. 608–609, also alleged the absence of adequate warning labels.

2020Id., 568–72, citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (c) (6) (iii) (2008).33 The plaintiffs in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, supra, 564 U.S. 608–609, also alleged the absence of adequate warning labels.

2003Indeed, the Second Circuit has recognized that "[t]he principles for deciding when a state-law claim is preempted by the LMRA are more easily expressed than applied. [W]here the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the claim is [preempted]." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Foy v. Pratt Whitney Group , 127 F.3d 229 , 233 (2d Cir. 1997). "[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute [however] the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law li

2003Indeed, the Second Circuit has recognized that "[t]he principles for deciding when a state-law claim is preempted by the LMRA are more easily expressed than applied. [W]here the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the claim is [preempted]." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Foy v. Pratt Whitney Group , 127 F.3d 229 , 233 (2d Cir. 1997). "[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute [however] the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law li

2001Conn. 1995). “[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon the analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim . . . or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” (Citation omitted.) Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S. Ct. 1904 , 85 L.

2001Conn. 1995). “[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon the analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim . . . or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” (Citation omitted.) Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S. Ct. 1904 , 85 L.

2022In support of this contention, the defendants rely on this court’s statement in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 365 , that § 52-572q (d) ‘‘defines to whom the duty of providing an adequate warning runs, namely, to the appropriate party, which in the case of a prescription drug would be the prescribing physician.’’ Id., 383; see id., 384 (‘‘as a matter of law, the prescribing physician of a prescription drug is the person best able to take or recommend precautions against the harm’’); see also Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., supra, 278 Conn. 317 (extending learned intermediary doctrin

2020The court in Graham first discussed the IDEA and its exhaustion requirements. ‘‘The [IDEA] is a federal statute that ‘ensures that children with disabilities receive needed special education services.’ Fry v. Napo- leon Community Schools, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 , 197 L.

2020The court in Graham first discussed the IDEA and its exhaustion requirements. ‘‘The [IDEA] is a federal statute that ‘ensures that children with disabilities receive needed special education services.’ Fry v. Napo- leon Community Schools, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 , 197 L.

2019In Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transportation , 559 F.3d 96 , 108 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit concluded that a state agency order to close a private rail crossing was not preempted by the railroad act.

2019As a result, those regulations **258 effectively set the terms under which railroads are to participate in the improvement of crossings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also has examined whether a state law claim was preempted by the railroad act.

2015Finally, the petitioner has failed to seek appellate review of this issue pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

2015Finally, the petitioner has failed to seek appellate review of this issue pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

2003CT Page 1049 An interesting case, though not on all fours with this case, is Alberton's, Inc. v. Carrigan , 982 F.2d 1478 (C.A. 10, 1993) where the court refused to find § 301 preemption of the state law claim in the context of the factual setting of that case.

1999More specifically, "where the resolution of a state law claim depends on an interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted, . . . [but] `purely factual questions' about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not `requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement.'" Id., 261 , quoting, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , 405-07 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988).

1999"We do hold that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." It is the defendants position that the claims for negligence do require interpretation of agreement and therefore are preempted.

1996Because the issue of preemption is a matter of federal law; Times Mirror Co. v. Division of Public Utility Control, 192 Conn. 506, 510 , 473 A.2d 768 (1984); we are bound by the decision in Bleiler under the supremacy clause of article six of the United States constitution.

1996Because the issue of preemption is a matter of federal law; Times Mirror Co. v. Division of Public Utility Control, 192 Conn. 506, 510 , 473 A.2d 768 (1984); we are bound by the decision in Bleiler under the supremacy clause of article six of the United States constitution.

1996Id., 567 . 6 Because federal jurisdiction over a state law claim can arise through the preemption of that state law claim, the Second Circuit entertained the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ claim was preempted by ERISA.

1993Id., 430 U.S. 304 , 97 S.Ct. at 1065 .

1993Id., 430 U.S. 304 , 97 S.Ct. at 1065 .

1993Thus, the state-law remedy in this case is `independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of `independent' that matters for 301 preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement. ". . . [E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is `independent' of the agreement for 301 pre-

1992The United States Supreme Court had previously held that 301 pre-empts a state law claim if "resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining] agreement." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 , 220 (1985), quoted in Baldracchi, supra, 104 .