state law claim in New York

2014Even if resolution of a state-law claim “involve[s] attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination . . . such paral lelism [does not mandate preemption]” (Lingle, 486 US at 408 ).

2014Even if resolution of a state-law claim “involve[s] attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination . . . such paral lelism [does not mandate preemption]” (Lingle, 486 US at 408 ).

2014Section 301, however, does not preempt state claims when state law confers an independent statutory right to bring a claim (Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US at 123 [“(section) 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”]; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v Norris, 512 US 246, 260 [1994] [“Clearly, §301 does not grant the parties to a (CBA) the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law”]). “ ‘[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is “independent” of the

2014Section 301, however, does not preempt state claims when state law confers an independent statutory right to bring a claim (Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US at 123 [“(section) 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”]; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v Norris, 512 US 246, 260 [1994] [“Clearly, §301 does not grant the parties to a (CBA) the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law”]). “ ‘[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is “independent” of the

2014Section 301, however, does not preempt state claims when state law confers an independent statutory right to bring a claim (Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US at 123 [“(section) 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”]; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v Norris, 512 US 246, 260 [1994] [“Clearly, §301 does not grant the parties to a (CBA) the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law”]). “ ‘[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is “independent” of the

2014Section 301, however, does not preempt state claims when state law confers an independent statutory right to bring a claim (Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US at 123 [“(section) 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”]; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v Norris, 512 US 246, 260 [1994] [“Clearly, §301 does not grant the parties to a (CBA) the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law”]). “ ‘[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is “independent” of the

2014Section 301, however, does not preempt state claims when state law confers an independent statutory right to bring a claim (Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US at 123 [“(section) 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”]; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v Norris, 512 US 246, 260 [1994] [“Clearly, §301 does not grant the parties to a (CBA) the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law”]). “ ‘[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is “independent” of the

2014Section 301, however, does not preempt state claims when state law confers an independent statutory right to bring a claim (Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US at 123 [“(section) 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”]; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v Norris, 512 US 246, 260 [1994] [“Clearly, §301 does not grant the parties to a (CBA) the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law”]). “ ‘[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is “independent” of the

2014A defendant’s reliance on the CBA is not enough to “inject[ ] a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim” (Caterpillar Inc. v Williams, 482 US 386, 399 [1987]).

2014A defendant’s reliance on the CBA is not enough to “inject[ ] a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim” (Caterpillar Inc. v Williams, 482 US 386, 399 [1987]).

2012The case of Rombom v United Air Lines, Inc. ( 867 F Supp 214 [1994]), cited by the Fourth Circuit in Smith , is the source of a three-part test articulated by then-District Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor that has been generally applied by district courts in the Second Circuit to determine whether a state-law claim relates to a “service” within the meaning of the ADA (see Farash v Continental Airlines, Inc., 574 F Supp 2d 356, 363 [2008], affd 337 Fed Appx 7 [2d Cir 2009]; In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F Supp 2d 299, 315-316 [2005]).

2012The case of Rombom v United Air Lines, Inc. ( 867 F Supp 214 [1994]), cited by the Fourth Circuit in Smith , is the source of a three-part test articulated by then-District Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor that has been generally applied by district courts in the Second Circuit to determine whether a state-law claim relates to a “service” within the meaning of the ADA (see Farash v Continental Airlines, Inc., 574 F Supp 2d 356, 363 [2008], affd 337 Fed Appx 7 [2d Cir 2009]; In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F Supp 2d 299, 315-316 [2005]).

2012The case of Rombom v United Air Lines, Inc. ( 867 F Supp 214 [1994]), cited by the Fourth Circuit in Smith , is the source of a three-part test articulated by then-District Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor that has been generally applied by district courts in the Second Circuit to determine whether a state-law claim relates to a “service” within the meaning of the ADA (see Farash v Continental Airlines, Inc., 574 F Supp 2d 356, 363 [2008], affd 337 Fed Appx 7 [2d Cir 2009]; In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F Supp 2d 299, 315-316 [2005]).

2012The case of Rombom v United Air Lines, Inc. ( 867 F Supp 214 [1994]), cited by the Fourth Circuit in Smith , is the source of a three-part test articulated by then-District Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor that has been generally applied by district courts in the Second Circuit to determine whether a state-law claim relates to a “service” within the meaning of the ADA (see Farash v Continental Airlines, Inc., 574 F Supp 2d 356, 363 [2008], affd 337 Fed Appx 7 [2d Cir 2009]; In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F Supp 2d 299, 315-316 [2005]).

2003(See Jou-Jou Designs v International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, Local 23-25, 94 AD2d 395, 403-404 [1st Dept 1983], affd 60 NY2d 1011 [1983].) 3.

2003Rather, defendants were concededly motivated by their desire to win their union affiliation campaign. ( Compare Missigman v USI Northeast, Inc. , 131 F Supp 2d 495, 514-515 [SD NY 2001].) In any event, where a state court plaintiff could have filed an unfair labor practice claim with the NLRB based on the same facts as those underlying his state law claim (e.g., plaintiff could have complained to the NLRB of defendants' alleged disruption of Duane Reade's customer service), and where asserting jurisdiction over a state law claim requires the court to address the same issues as the NLRB would r

2003(Compare Missigman v USI Northeast, Inc., 131 F Supp 2d 495, 514-515 [SD NY 2001].) In any event, where a state court plaintiff could have filed an unfair labor practice claim with the NLRB based on the same facts as those underlying his state law claim (e.g., plaintiff could have complained to the NLRB of defendants’ alleged disruption of Duane Reade’s customer service), and where asserting jurisdiction over a state law claim requires the court to address the same issues as the NLRB would resolve in adjudicating the unfair labor practice claim, the court’s jurisdiction must yield to the NLRB’

2003Rather, defendants were concededly motivated by their desire to win their union affiliation campaign. ( Compare Missigman v USI Northeast, Inc. , 131 F Supp 2d 495, 514-515 [SD NY 2001].) In any event, where a state court plaintiff could have filed an unfair labor practice claim with the NLRB based on the same facts as those underlying his state law claim (e.g., plaintiff could have complained to the NLRB of defendants' alleged disruption of Duane Reade's customer service), and where asserting jurisdiction over a state law claim requires the court to address the same issues as the NLRB would r

2026Network, Inc. , 683 F3d 424, 429 [2d Cir]).

2025See Monumental Blunders, Inc. v CBS Corp., No. 00 Civ. 220(DLC), 2000 WL 777893 , at *3 (SDNY) ("Section 301 preempts not only claims directly alleging that a party has violated a provision of the collective bargaining agreement but also those state-law actions that require interpretation or substantial analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement."); IBEW v Hechler, 481 US 851 , 859 n.3 ( 1987) ("when a state-law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement, a plaintiff may not evade the pre-emptive force of§ 301 of the LMRA by casting the su

2017The parties’ differing versions of the events leading up to plaintiff’s arrest, including whether plaintiff produced a driver’s license and registration, present a triable issue of fact whether the individual defendants had probable cause to arrest him (see Mendez v City of New York, 137 AD3d 468, 471 [1st Dept 2016]) and to impound and search his car (see People v Francis, 12 Misc 3d 781, 785 [Sup Ct, NY County 2006]).

2017The parties’ differing versions of the events leading up to plaintiff’s arrest, including whether plaintiff produced a driver’s license and registration, present a triable issue of fact whether the individual defendants had probable cause to arrest him (see Mendez v City of New York, 137 AD3d 468, 471 [1st Dept 2016]) and to impound and search his car (see People v Francis, 12 Misc 3d 781, 785 [Sup Ct, NY County 2006]).

2014“Under New York law, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are synonymous” (Fincher v County of Westches ter, 979 F Supp 989, 998 [SD NY 1997]).

2012Defendants’ federal preemption claim is unavailing, as the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 USC § 185 ) has preclusive effect only when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon the analysis of a CBA (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v Lueck, 471 US 202, 220 [1985]).

2011Intl., Inc. v Altai, Inc., 982 F2d 693, 716 [2d Cir 1992].) Preemption will not, however, apply where “an extra element is required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action.” (Computer Assoc., 982 F2d at 716 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord National Basketball Assn. v Motorola, Inc., 105 F3d 841, 850 [2d Cir 1997].) Thus, a state law claim will not be preempted “if the ‘extra element’ changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copy

2011Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the third cause of action as alleged a New York common-law claim of false arrest and false imprisonment insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 315 [2004, Smith, J., concurring]).

2011(Computer Assoc., 982 F2d at 717; Orange County Choppers, Inc. v Olaes Enters., Inc., 497 F Supp 2d 541, 556 [SD NY 2007].) In the instant action, there is no dispute that the first prong of the preemption test — the “subject matter” requirement — is met.

2011Awareness or intent, for instance, are not extra elements that make a state law claim qualitatively different.” (Briarpatch Ltd,., 373 F3d at 306 [citations omitted].) In contrast, an extra element sufficient to avoid preemption may be found where the state law claim is based on breaches of confidential relationships or of fiduciary duties, or on use of trade secrets.

2011Awareness or intent, for instance, are not extra elements that make a state law claim qualitatively different.” (Briarpatch Ltd,., 373 F3d at 306 [citations omitted].) In contrast, an extra element sufficient to avoid preemption may be found where the state law claim is based on breaches of confidential relationships or of fiduciary duties, or on use of trade secrets.

2011Moreover, the City may be held vicariously liable under the state law claim for torts committed by Labrada acting within the scope of his employment (see Eckardt v City of White Plains, 87 AD3d at 1051 ; Ashley v City of New York, 7 AD3d 742, 743 [2004]).