state law claim in Arizona

2003The preemption clause “is conspicuous for its breadth” and “[i]ts ‘deliberately expansive’ language was designed to ‘establish ... plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), superseded on other grounds, Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 , 113 S.Ct. 2063 , 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). ¶ 8 The United States Supreme Court has explained that a state law claim “relates to” a benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 ,

2003The preemption clause “is conspicuous for its breadth” and “[i]ts ‘deliberately expansive’ language was designed to ‘establish ... plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), superseded on other grounds, Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 , 113 S.Ct. 2063 , 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). ¶ 8 The United States Supreme Court has explained that a state law claim “relates to” a benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 ,

2003The preemption clause “is conspicuous for its breadth” and “[i]ts ‘deliberately expansive’ language was designed to ‘establish ... plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), superseded on other grounds, Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 , 113 S.Ct. 2063 , 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). ¶ 8 The United States Supreme Court has explained that a state law claim “relates to” a benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 ,

2003The preemption clause “is conspicuous for its breadth” and “[i]ts ‘deliberately expansive’ language was designed to ‘establish ... plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), superseded on other grounds, Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 , 113 S.Ct. 2063 , 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). ¶ 8 The United States Supreme Court has explained that a state law claim “relates to” a benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 ,

2003The preemption clause “is conspicuous for its breadth” and “[i]ts ‘deliberately expansive’ language was designed to ‘establish ... plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), superseded on other grounds, Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 , 113 S.Ct. 2063 , 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). ¶ 8 The United States Supreme Court has explained that a state law claim “relates to” a benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 ,

2003The preemption clause “is conspicuous for its breadth” and “[i]ts ‘deliberately expansive’ language was designed to ‘establish ... plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), superseded on other grounds, Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 , 113 S.Ct. 2063 , 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). ¶ 8 The United States Supreme Court has explained that a state law claim “relates to” a benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 ,

2025As we recognized in Quinn, federal and state qualified immunity employ very similar standards – “whether [the official] violated established law or unreasonably disregarded the unlawful nature of his conduct.” Id. at 86 ¶¶ 37, 39. ¶31 Third, discovery in the federal court could have been reasonably expected to have embraced the state law claim, as the claims arise from the same sequence of events. ¶32 Fourth, the claims are closely related.

2022Standards Enf’t, 519 U.S. at 325 ; Bafford, 994 F.3d at 1031 . ¶24 Where state laws regulate “areas where ERISA has nothing to say,” even when they have “incidental effect on ERISA plans,” those state law claims are not preempted by ERISA.

2022Id. at 1030–32. ¶20 Analyzing the “connection with” prong, the Bafford court explained that a state law claim is preempted under that ground if it “bears on an ERISA-regulated relationship,” such as the relationship between the plan and its members, between the plan and the employer, or between the employer and its employees.

2022Id. at 1031–32; see Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 1082–83.

2022Decision of the Court raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress." Id.

2022As Inspired Development explains, "the reasoning in Jang turned on the system-wide conflict that could arise in the federal courts if regional circuits reached different conclusions about validity." 938 F.3d at 1365 .

2018Plaintiffs may, however, base a negligence claim on conduct by the officer that is independent of the intentional use of physical force. ¶2 We also hold that at trial on such a battery claim, expert witnesses cannot suggest to the jury that Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), which sets forth factors pertinent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force cases, is the legal standard for deciding the applicability of § 13-409.

2018Plaintiffs may, however, base a negligence claim on conduct by the officer that is independent of the intentional use of physical force. ¶2 We also hold that at trial on such a battery claim, expert witnesses cannot suggest to the jury that Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), which sets forth factors pertinent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force cases, is the legal standard for deciding the applicability of § 13-409.

2017Opinion of the Court to, federal requirements.” Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 .

2016Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655-56 ; see Satterly, 204 Ariz. at 177, ¶ 8 (stating that in determining whether a state law claim is preempted because it “relates to” an ERISA plan, the Supreme Court has “[m]ore recently . . . looked to ERISA’s objectives when undertaking this analysis.”); Bui v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. Inc., 310 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002) (given the difficulty in construing the expansive language of the ERISA conflict preemption clause, application of the clause has evolved “to a more pragmatic interpretation, in which courts seek to preserve the goals of Congress wh

2015A state law stands as an obstacle to a federal law “[i]f the purpose of the [federal law] cannot otherwise be accomplished — if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 , 120 S.Ct. 2288 , 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912)). ¶ 23 The state-law immunity AMMA provides does not frustrate the CSA’s goals of *125 conquering drug abuse or controlling drug traffic.

2015A state law stands as an obstacle to a federal law “[i]f the purpose of the [federal law] cannot otherwise be accomplished — if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 , 120 S.Ct. 2288 , 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912)). ¶ 23 The state-law immunity AMMA provides does not frustrate the CSA’s goals of *125 conquering drug abuse or controlling drug traffic.

2015A state law stands as an obstacle to a federal law “[i]f the purpose of the [federal law] cannot otherwise be accomplished — if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 , 120 S.Ct. 2288 , 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912)). ¶ 23 The state-law immunity AMMA provides does not frustrate the CSA’s goals of *125 conquering drug abuse or controlling drug traffic.

2015A state law stands as an obstacle to a federal law “[i]f the purpose of the [federal law] cannot otherwise be accomplished — if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 , 120 S.Ct. 2288 , 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912)). ¶ 23 The state-law immunity AMMA provides does not frustrate the CSA’s goals of *125 conquering drug abuse or controlling drug traffic.

2015Like the people of Michigan, the people of Arizona “chose to part ways with Congress only regarding the scope of acceptable medical use of marijuana.” Ter Beek, 846 N.W.2d at 539 .

1998Appellants nevertheless argue that A.R.S. § 19-122(A) permits “any citizen,” not just those of the affected city, town, or county, to challenge the clerk’s refusal to forward petitions and to file suit to uphold a referendum petition, citing City of Flagstaff v. Mangum, 164 Ariz. 395 , 793 P.2d 548 (1990), for the proposition that, in the absence of local legislation prescribing the manner for exercising the referendum power, state law applies.

1998Appellants nevertheless argue that A.R.S. § 19-122(A) permits “any citizen,” not just those of the affected city, town, or county, to challenge the clerk’s refusal to forward petitions and to file suit to uphold a referendum petition, citing City of Flagstaff v. Mangum, 164 Ariz. 395 , 793 P.2d 548 (1990), for the proposition that, in the absence of local legislation prescribing the manner for exercising the referendum power, state law applies.