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17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueckgreen2 sentences2012“When resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a claim under section 301 of the LMRA, or wholly dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law.” Karnewie-Tuah, 757 N.W.2d at 720 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1916 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)); see also Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 714 , 717 n. 2 (Minn.1987) (“State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims 2012“When resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a claim under section 301 of the LMRA, or wholly dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law.” Karnewie-Tuah, 757 N.W.2d at 720 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1916 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)); see also Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 714 , 717 n. 2 (Minn.1987) (“State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims | 1 | 3 |
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.green2 sentences1996Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2249 (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10 , 108 S.Ct. at 1883 (discussing Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preemption)). 1996Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2249 (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10 , 108 S.Ct. at 1883 (discussing Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preemption)). | 1 | 2 |
Wallin v. Minnesota Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2014Thus, this court in Wallin concluded that allowing plaintiffs to use the more lenient federal-commencement rule would encourage forum shopping and would allow “plaintiffs to self-insure against delayed personal or mail service by uniformly advancing federal question claims in every situation where a state law claim is approaching the statute of limitations period.” 598 N.W.2d at 400-01 (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc.green1 sentence2012“When resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a claim under section 301 of the LMRA, or wholly dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law.” Karnewie-Tuah, 757 N.W.2d at 720 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1916 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)); see also Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 714 , 717 n. 2 (Minn.1987) (“State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims | 1 | 1 |
Stafford v. True Temper Sportsgreen1 sentence2008Stafford v. True Temper Sports, 123 F.3d 291, 296 (5th Cir.1997) (holding state law defamation claim preempted by section 301 of the LMRA); Bagby v. Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Zimmer Radio of Mid-Missouri, Inc. v. Lake Broadcasting, Inc.green2 sentences2001The Zimmer court found that a state-law claim for tortious interference with business expectancy “related to a business expectation in a property right [upgrade order] created by the FCA” and, therefore, the FCA “places the exclusive responsibility for [upgrade determinations] with the FCC.” Id. at 405, 406 . 2001Zimmer, 937 S.W.2d at 405 . | 1 | 1 |
Blackburn v. Doubleday Broadcasting Co.green1 sentence2001See Blackburn, 353 N.W.2d at 555 (“[T]he preemption question turns on whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the purposes of the Federal Communications Act and the common-law remedy at issue.”); Fetterman, 689 A.2d at 292 . | 1 | 1 |
Obendorfer v. Gitano Group, Inc.green1 sentence1996See Obendorfer v. Gitano Group, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 950 , 957 & n. 3 (D.N.J.1993); Winn v. North Am. | 1 | 1 |
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.green1 sentence1991As a rule, courts allow preemption of state tort claims in cases where a state law creates a “state imposed regulatory scheme superimposed on the federal scheme.” Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659 (holding that state tort claims based on a state-imposed duty to warn are impliedly preempted because they allow a state court to reevaluate the adequacy of the federal duty to warn in each case); see also Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 , 187 (3rd Cir.1986) (federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state damage actions which challenge the adequacy of the warnings or the propr | 1 | 1 |
Richard Leander Ferebee, Jr. v. Chevron Chemical Companygreen1 sentence1991Only one case, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C.Cir.1984), has explicitly allowed state tort claims for damages arising from the failure to warn even though the actions create stricter standards under state law than the federal law required. | 1 | 1 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.green1 sentence1991As a rule, courts allow preemption of state tort claims in cases where a state law creates a “state imposed regulatory scheme superimposed on the federal scheme.” Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659 (holding that state tort claims based on a state-imposed duty to warn are impliedly preempted because they allow a state court to reevaluate the adequacy of the federal duty to warn in each case); see also Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 , 187 (3rd Cir.1986) (federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state damage actions which challenge the adequacy of the warnings or the propr | 1 | 1 |
Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc.green1 sentence1991As a rule, courts allow preemption of state tort claims in cases where a state law creates a “state imposed regulatory scheme superimposed on the federal scheme.” Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659 (holding that state tort claims based on a state-imposed duty to warn are impliedly preempted because they allow a state court to reevaluate the adequacy of the federal duty to warn in each case); see also Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 , 187 (3rd Cir.1986) (federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state damage actions which challenge the adequacy of the warnings or the propr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Marriage of Angell v. Angell
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 36 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
William Robert Dare Gary Petillo v. State of California Dept. Of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2004Podruch’s heavy reliance on an ADA decision, Dare v. State of California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir.1999), is, in any event, misplaced. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee
green
2 sentences2003In Buckman, the Supreme Court held that federal law preempts the state law claim where "the existence of these federal enactments is a critical element." 531 U.S. at 353 , 121 S.Ct. at 1020 . 2003In Buckman, the Supreme Court held that federal law preempts the state law claim where "the existence of these federal enactments is a critical element." 531 U.S. at 353 , 121 S.Ct. at 1020 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001The United States Supreme Court has cautioned, In the absence of an. express congressional command, state law is pre-empted *564 if that law actually conflicts with federal law or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field “ ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). 2001The United States Supreme Court has cautioned, In the absence of an. express congressional command, state law is pre-empted *564 if that law actually conflicts with federal law or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field “ ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Fetterman v. Green
green
1 sentence2001See Blackburn, 353 N.W.2d at 555 (“[T]he preemption question turns on whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the purposes of the Federal Communications Act and the common-law remedy at issue.”); Fetterman, 689 A.2d at 292 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Appletree Square 1 Ltd. Partnership v. W.R. Grace & Co.
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Livadas v. Bradshaw
green
1 sentence1996Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2249 (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10 , 108 S.Ct. at 1883 (discussing Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preemption)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Perry v. Thomas
green
2 sentences1995A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2.” 482 U.S. 483 , 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 , 2527 n. 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) (emphasis in original). 1995A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2.” 482 U.S. 483 , 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 , 2527 n. 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Cambridge State Bank v. James
green
2 sentences1994Id. at 652-54 . 1994Id. at 652-54 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25
green
2 sentences1986This balancing approach is derived from Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 , 97 S.Ct. 1056 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977). 1986This balancing approach is derived from Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 , 97 S.Ct. 1056 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Hoben
green
2 sentences1961In State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436 , 98 N. W. (2d) 813 (filed August 21, 1959), we held that a person charged with a violation of a traffic regulation defined in Minn. St. c. 169 is entitled to a jury trial as a matter *250 of right in the court in which he is initially charged, and that the procedure is to be the same whether he is charged with a violation of the state law or a violation of a municipal ordinance covering the same offense. 1961In State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436 , 98 N. W. (2d) 813 (filed August 21, 1959), we held that a person charged with a violation of a traffic regulation defined in Minn. St. c. 169 is entitled to a jury trial as a matter *250 of right in the court in which he is initially charged, and that the procedure is to be the same whether he is charged with a violation of the state law or a violation of a municipal ordinance covering the same offense. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.