state law claim in New Mexico

2016BNSF fails to acknowledge this point, and Waymire and its progeny diverge from this tradition. {29} Second, BNSF’s contention that Waymire and its progeny control the issue presented in this case overlooks that, in Easterwood, the Supreme Court expressly declined to address or decide whether FRSA pre-empts a state-law claim for breach of the duty to slow or stop a train to “avoid a specific, individual hazard.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675 n.15.

2016BNSF fails to acknowledge this point, and Waymire and its progeny diverge from this tradition. {29} Second, BNSF’s contention that Waymire and its progeny control the issue presented in this case overlooks that, in Easterwood, the Supreme Court expressly declined to address or decide whether FRSA pre-empts a state-law claim for breach of the duty to slow or stop a train to “avoid a specific, individual hazard.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675 n.15.

2016Spurlock, 594 F. App’x at 465 ; see Rule 12-607(A)(1) NMRA (allowing this Court to answer questions of law certified to it by a court of the United States). {11} “Our goal in answering a question certified by the federal courts is not to finally dispose of all relevant issues in a case” but is rather to resolve “unsettled matters of New Mexico law.” City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Elec.

2016Spurlock, 594 F. App’x at 465 ; see Rule 12-607(A)(1) NMRA (allowing this Court to answer questions of law certified to it by a court of the United States). {11} “Our goal in answering a question certified by the federal courts is not to finally dispose of all relevant issues in a case” but is rather to resolve “unsettled matters of New Mexico law.” City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Elec.

2011The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the proper procedure for a state court to determine whether Section 7 or 8 of the NLRA preempts a state law claim is as follows: “[A] court first must decide whether there is an arguable case for [preemption]; if there is, it must defer to the [NLRB], and only if the [NLRB] decides that the conduct is not protected or prohibited may the court entertain the litigation.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 397 , 106 S.Ct. 1904 , 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986).

2011The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the proper procedure for a state court to determine whether Section 7 or 8 of the NLRA preempts a state law claim is as follows: “[A] court first must decide whether there is an arguable case for [preemption]; if there is, it must defer to the [NLRB], and only if the [NLRB] decides that the conduct is not protected or prohibited may the court entertain the litigation.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 397 , 106 S.Ct. 1904 , 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986).

2022Children, Youth & Families Department v. Maisie Y., 2021-NMCA-023 , 489 P.3d 964 , we held that the state law requirement that the district court find abuse or neglect “on the basis of clear and convincing evidence,” § 32A-4-20(H), applies to adjudicatory proceedings concerning an Indian child.

2022Children, Youth & Families Department v. Maisie Y., 2021-NMCA-023 , 489 P.3d 964 , we held that the state law requirement that the district court find abuse or neglect “on the basis of clear and convincing evidence,” § 32A-4-20(H), applies to adjudicatory proceedings concerning an Indian child.

2012We determine that the rights to exclusive ownership of tangible property are not equivalent to the rights protected by the Copyright Act. {16} “[W]hen a state law violation is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or the like, the rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2012We determine that the rights to exclusive ownership of tangible property are not equivalent to the rights protected by the Copyright Act. {16} “[W]hen a state law violation is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or the like, the rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2011See Dominguez, 137 F.Supp.2d at 1267 (concluding that where the plaintiff was arguably covered by provisions of the NLRA and his state law claim arguably fell within the core purposes of the NLRA, dismissal was appropriate because the state law claim was preempted by the NLRA). {28} As the majority recognizes, if a disputed activity “is arguably subject to Section 7 or 8 of the NLRA, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive [jurisdiction] of the NLRB if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Majority Opinion, ¶ 14; Weise, 2008-NMCA-

2011See Dominguez, 137 F.Supp.2d at 1267 (concluding that where the plaintiff was arguably covered by provisions of the NLRA and his state law claim arguably fell within the core purposes of the NLRA, dismissal was appropriate because the state law claim was preempted by the NLRA). {28} As the majority recognizes, if a disputed activity “is arguably subject to Section 7 or 8 of the NLRA, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive [jurisdiction] of the NLRB if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Majority Opinion, ¶ 14; Weise, 2008-NMCA-

2008While this provision may be preempted by the FAA, see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 , 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 , 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) (“A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the FAA].”), it is clear evidence of the fundamental New Mexico policy of allowing consumers a means to redress their injuries via the class action device. {14} In New Mexico, we recognize that the class action was devised for “vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to

2008While this provision may be preempted by the FAA, see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 , 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 , 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) (“A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the FAA].”), it is clear evidence of the fundamental New Mexico policy of allowing consumers a means to redress their injuries via the class action device. {14} In New Mexico, we recognize that the class action was devised for “vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to

2007Id. {12} In reliance upon Buckman, Defendants contend that the portions of the first amended complaint which describe the certification process cannot provide a basis for Plaintiffs UPA claim because the alleged misrepresentations were essentially made to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a federal regulatory agency, by Defendants as regulated entities.

2005The state law claim does not arise due to the patient’s coverage, but “precisely because there is no ERISA plan coverage.” Memorial Hospital, 904 F.2d at 246 .

2005Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (holding that ERISA preempts a state law claim brought by a plan participant or beneficiary alleging improper processing of a claim for plan benefits) superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F.Supp. 419, 421 (N.D.Ill.1991); Ramirez v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762, 764 (5th Cir.1989) (same).

2005Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (holding that ERISA preempts a state law claim brought by a plan participant or beneficiary alleging improper processing of a claim for plan benefits) superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F.Supp. 419, 421 (N.D.Ill.1991); Ramirez v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762, 764 (5th Cir.1989) (same).

2001Felder, 487 U.S. at 141 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 .

2001Felder, 487 U.S. at 141 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 .

1999The agreement provides that the EEOC and the Division “each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges.” The agreement also provides for “dual filed charges.” Thus, the agreement contemplates that a person will be allowed to use federal EEOC procedures to set in motion the grievance procedures of the NMHRA to the limited extent that, if he or she initially files a complaint with the EEOC, that complaint will be deemed to have been properly filed with the Division as well. {14} Our holding in Sabella, 1996— NMSC-014, ¶ 12, 121 N.M. 596 , 915 P.2d 901 , em

1999The agreement provides that the EEOC and the Division “each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges.” The agreement also provides for “dual filed charges.” Thus, the agreement contemplates that a person will be allowed to use federal EEOC procedures to set in motion the grievance procedures of the NMHRA to the limited extent that, if he or she initially files a complaint with the EEOC, that complaint will be deemed to have been properly filed with the Division as well. {14} Our holding in Sabella, 1996— NMSC-014, ¶ 12, 121 N.M. 596 , 915 P.2d 901 , em

1998The Livadas Court stated that “Lingle makes plain in so many words that when liability is governed by independent state law, the mere need to ‘look to’ the collective-bargaining agreement for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by § 301.” 512 U.S. at 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (referring to Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n. 12, 108 S.Ct. 1877 ). “[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.

1998The Livadas Court stated that “Lingle makes plain in so many words that when liability is governed by independent state law, the mere need to ‘look to’ the collective-bargaining agreement for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by § 301.” 512 U.S. at 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (referring to Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n. 12, 108 S.Ct. 1877 ). “[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.

1995In D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 , 62 S.Ct. 676 , 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942), the Supreme Court adopted a state law rule which immunizes the FDIC against certain defenses.

1995In D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 , 62 S.Ct. 676 , 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942), the Supreme Court adopted a state law rule which immunizes the FDIC against certain defenses.