11 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Uttecht v. Browngreen2 sentences2015Finally, “a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.” Id. 2015Finally, “a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.” Id. | 2 | 2 |
Read v. Harveygreen2 sentences2012However, “the standard that must be met for success in a quiet title action” is that “the party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of that of his adversary.” Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369 , 209 P.3d 661, 666 (2009) (quoting Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Copper Min. 2012However, “the standard that must be met for success in a quiet title action” is that “the party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of that of his adversary.” Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369 , 209 P.3d 661, 666 (2009) (quoting Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Copper Min. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota
green
2 sentences2012In Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 , 122 S.Ct. 999 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) tolled a statute of limitations for a state law claim brought in state court against a state agency. 2012In Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 , 122 S.Ct. 999 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) tolled a statute of limitations for a state law claim brought in state court against a state agency. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Kim v. Dickinson Wright, PLLC
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 1072 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Elbert L. Hatchett and Laurestine Hatchett v. United States
green
1 sentence2009Id. at 886 ; see also 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 548.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick
green
1 sentence1996The Court noted that where there was “no express federal standard addressing” a particular aspect of performance then a state law claim may proceed. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1487 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.
green
2 sentences1988There, the Supreme court stated that "the state-law remedy ... is `independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of `independent' that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." 108 S.Ct. at 1882 . 1988There, the Supreme court stated that “the state-law remedy ... is ‘independent’ of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of ‘independent’ that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require' construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” 108 S.Ct. at 1882 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger
green
2 sentences1987This position was re-affirmed by the Court two years later, "... the Court of Appeals was correct in perceiving that Gibbs [pendent claim] and this case [ancillary claim] are two species of the same generic problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same state?" Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 , 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2401 , 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). 1987This position was re-affirmed by the Court two years later, "... the Court of Appeals was correct in perceiving that Gibbs [pendent claim] and this case [ancillary claim] are two species of the same generic problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same state?" Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 , 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2401 , 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers
green
2 sentences1986We do hold that when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 , 88 S.Ct. 1235 , 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), or dismissed as preempted by federal labor contract law." [2] In Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717 , 692 P.2d 361 (1984), we recognized that other duties may arise under state law. 1986We do hold that when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 , 88 S.Ct. 1235 , 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), or dismissed as preempted by federal labor contract law." [2] In Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717 , 692 P.2d 361 (1984), we recognized that other duties may arise under state law. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America
green
2 sentences1986We do hold that when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 , 88 S.Ct. 1235 , 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), or dismissed as preempted by federal labor contract law." [2] In Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717 , 692 P.2d 361 (1984), we recognized that other duties may arise under state law. 1986We do hold that when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 , 88 S.Ct. 1235 , 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), or dismissed as preempted by federal labor contract law." [2] In Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717 , 692 P.2d 361 (1984), we recognized that other duties may arise under state law. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America
green
2 sentences1986Quoting from Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523 , 602 P.2d 21 (1979), we reiterated the view that there is "no authority ... which insulates a union for its negligence and tortious conduct toward one of its members, i.e., if a member of a union was struck by a motor vehicle owned by the union and operated by one of its officials during the course of his employment with the union, we cannot believe the union would be insulated from liability on the basis that the only duty it owed toward its members was that of fair representation." [3] Where an order of a lower court is co 1986Quoting from Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523 , 602 P.2d 21 (1979), we reiterated the view that there is "no authority ... which insulates a union for its negligence and tortious conduct toward one of its members, i.e., if a member of a union was struck by a motor vehicle owned by the union and operated by one of its officials during the course of his employment with the union, we cannot believe the union would be insulated from liability on the basis that the only duty it owed toward its members was that of fair representation." [3] Where an order of a lower court is co | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences1986Recently in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) the United States Supreme Court held that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law. 1986Recently in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) the United States Supreme Court held that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.