state law claim in District of Columbia

2024See id. (explaining that federal jurisdiction over a state-law claim exists if the claim “necessarily raises” a federal issue that is “actually disputed and substantial,” and if a federal court may entertain the claim “without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state power”). 25 IV.

2024See id. (explaining that federal jurisdiction over a state-law claim exists if the claim “necessarily raises” a federal issue that is “actually disputed and substantial,” and if a federal court may entertain the claim “without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state power”). 25 IV.

2008See id. at 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877 .

2008Id. at 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877 .

1995In King, we analogized plaintiff’s "common law claim accompanying her sex discrimination claim as ‘pendent,’ similar to a state law claim that might be pendent to a federal claim if 'derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact.’ United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 [, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 ] ... (1966).” 640 A.2d at 665 In Gibbs , the Court characterized pendent claims as those which a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try ... all in one proceeding.” 383 U.S. at 726 , 86 S.Ct. at 1139 .

1995In King, we analogized plaintiff’s "common law claim accompanying her sex discrimination claim as ‘pendent,’ similar to a state law claim that might be pendent to a federal claim if 'derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact.’ United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 [, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 ] ... (1966).” 640 A.2d at 665 In Gibbs , the Court characterized pendent claims as those which a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try ... all in one proceeding.” 383 U.S. at 726 , 86 S.Ct. at 1139 .

2023The fact of a state law violation does not resolve whether a plaintiff has been 12 deprived of due process.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); Log Creek, LLC v. Kessler, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (N.D.

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lary v. Tom Taylor Agency, 878 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (noting that in a similar case “we rejected the proposition that states must actively ‘opt in’ with respect to the TCPA’s enforcement provisions in order for private parties to be able to seek damages or penalties under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)”); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, 306 (2003) (noting that “a person may file a TCPA action in state court as long as the state has not prohibited it”); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 646-47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (joining the majority

2008See Lingle, supra, 486 U.S. at 407 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 (examining in the § 301 preemption analysis the elements of a state remedy in order to determine whether the claim could be resolved without interpreting the CBA); see also Allis-Chalmers, supra, 471 U.S. at 213-16 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 (examining the CBA and analyzing the state tort remedy in order to determine whether § 301 preempted application of the tort remedy).

2008See Lingle, supra, 486 U.S. at 407 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 (examining in the § 301 preemption analysis the elements of a state remedy in order to determine whether the claim could be resolved without interpreting the CBA); see also Allis-Chalmers, supra, 471 U.S. at 213-16 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 (examining the CBA and analyzing the state tort remedy in order to determine whether § 301 preempted application of the tort remedy).

2000Housing Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1123 (10th Cir.1999) (affirming dismissal of federal claims for lack of jurisdiction and subsequent dismissal of state claims under § 1367(c)); Baltin v. Alaron Trading Coi'p., 128 F.3d 1466 , 1473 n. 18 (11th Cir.1997) (“Because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim, we also hold that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).”); Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir.1997) (same); Logan v. Lill

2000Housing Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1123 (10th Cir.1999) (affirming dismissal of federal claims for lack of jurisdiction and subsequent dismissal of state claims under § 1367(c)); Baltin v. Alaron Trading Coi'p., 128 F.3d 1466 , 1473 n. 18 (11th Cir.1997) (“Because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim, we also hold that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).”); Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir.1997) (same); Logan v. Lill

2000Housing Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1123 (10th Cir.1999) (affirming dismissal of federal claims for lack of jurisdiction and subsequent dismissal of state claims under § 1367(c)); Baltin v. Alaron Trading Coi'p., 128 F.3d 1466 , 1473 n. 18 (11th Cir.1997) (“Because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim, we also hold that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).”); Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir.1997) (same); Logan v. Lill

1993That is what Kidd did in this case when she filed her formal sex discrimination complaint with the Office of Human Rights on September 1, 1988. [10] Our holding in this case says nothing about exhaustion of administrative remedy requirements under the Human Rights Act. [11] Although not entirely congruent, it is useful to analogize appellee's common law claim accompanying her sex discrimination claim as "pendent," similar to a state law claim that might be pendent to a federal claim if "derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 , 86 S.C

1992“Discretionary refusal by a federal court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state claim does not bar further litigation of the state claim in state court.” Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1046 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 903, 909 (1982). 15 The fact, however, that a federal court most likely will dismiss a state law claim— a prediction based on the results of earlier cases — is not enough to assure litigants that the court “clearly” will decline to exercise “discretionary” power to keep the case.

1992“Discretionary refusal by a federal court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state claim does not bar further litigation of the state claim in state court.” Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1046 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 903, 909 (1982). 15 The fact, however, that a federal court most likely will dismiss a state law claim— a prediction based on the results of earlier cases — is not enough to assure litigants that the court “clearly” will decline to exercise “discretionary” power to keep the case.