state law claim in Arkansas

2011Goforth, 338 Ark. at 71 , 991 S.W.2d at 583 .

2011Goforth, 338 Ark. at 71 , 991 S.W.2d at 583 .

2009Upon review, the Fifth Circuit framed the issue as “whether railroad crossings fit within the purview of ‘transportation by rail carriers,’ thereby evincing Congress’ intent to preempt state-law claims relating to ownership of the closings.” Id. at 446 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (b)).

2005Co., 105 Wash. App. 832, 836 , 22 P.3d 260, 262 (2001) (stating that language of 49 U.S.C. § 10501 is “clear, broad, and unqualified” and “grants the STB jurisdiction over the listed activities”); Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510 , 496 A.2d 151 (1985) (holding that where no abandonment proceedings before the ICC had been commenced, nor any ICC authorization for the Vermont Railway to discontinue service, a declaratory-judgment action in state court that easement granted for railroad purposes had been abandoned interfered with ICC’s power to determine abandonment).

2005Co., 105 Wash. App. 832, 836 , 22 P.3d 260, 262 (2001) (stating that language of 49 U.S.C. § 10501 is “clear, broad, and unqualified” and “grants the STB jurisdiction over the listed activities”); Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510 , 496 A.2d 151 (1985) (holding that where no abandonment proceedings before the ICC had been commenced, nor any ICC authorization for the Vermont Railway to discontinue service, a declaratory-judgment action in state court that easement granted for railroad purposes had been abandoned interfered with ICC’s power to determine abandonment).

2005Co., 105 Wash. App. 832, 836 , 22 P.3d 260, 262 (2001) (stating that language of 49 U.S.C. § 10501 is “clear, broad, and unqualified” and “grants the STB jurisdiction over the listed activities”); Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510 , 496 A.2d 151 (1985) (holding that where no abandonment proceedings before the ICC had been commenced, nor any ICC authorization for the Vermont Railway to discontinue service, a declaratory-judgment action in state court that easement granted for railroad purposes had been abandoned interfered with ICC’s power to determine abandonment).

2002This is a state law requirement, the purpose of which is to" insure financial responsibility for a minor's use of a vehicle." Kyser v. Porter, 261 Ark. 351 , 548 S.W.2d 128 (1977).

2002This is a state law requirement, the purpose of which is to" insure financial responsibility for a minor's use of a vehicle." Kyser v. Porter, 261 Ark. 351 , 548 S.W.2d 128 (1977).

1999In English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990), the Supreme Court, in holding that a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by the federal law applicable to the circumstances of that case, pointed out four circumstances for preemption.

1996As in Johnson v. State, supra, the state law claim in Andujar was never joined in the federal lawsuit.

1996In discussing the issue, the court said in regard to the “pendent jurisdiction” approved by the United States Supreme Court in the United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs case, supra, and codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 , that this jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right” and that the federal court would have been competent to decide the pendent state claims only if the court, “in its discretion, agreed to assume jurisdiction over them.” 659 So. 2d at 1217-18 .

1993See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988); Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1990) (where the court found state law claims for mental anguish, emotional distress, and additional financial hardship arising out of rejection of a claim for benefits preempted by ERISA); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 633 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981) (where the court found a state law claim for tortious interference with contract regarding benefit plans preempted by ERISA).

1993See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988); Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1990) (where the court found state law claims for mental anguish, emotional distress, and additional financial hardship arising out of rejection of a claim for benefits preempted by ERISA); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.1981) (where the court found a state law claim for tortious interference with contract regarding benefit plans preempted by ERISA).

1993See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988); Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1990) (where the court found state law claims for mental anguish, emotional distress, and additional financial hardship arising out of rejection of a claim for benefits preempted by ERISA); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.1981) (where the court found a state law claim for tortious interference with contract regarding benefit plans preempted by ERISA).

1993See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988); Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1990) (where the court found state law claims for mental anguish, emotional distress, and additional financial hardship arising out of rejection of a claim for benefits preempted by ERISA); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 633 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981) (where the court found a state law claim for tortious interference with contract regarding benefit plans preempted by ERISA).