state law claim in Texas

2025Id. (footnote omitted). “[F]act scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness (even though they do not raise a federal constitutional claim) include the following: [] the suspect was ill and on medication,” “the suspect ‘lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights’[, and] [] the suspect was intoxicated, and he ‘did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report.’” Id. at 172-73 (quoting Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Tex. Crim.

2025Id. (footnote omitted). “[F]act scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness (even though they do not raise a federal constitutional claim) include the following: [] the suspect was ill and on medication,” “the suspect ‘lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights’[, and] [] the suspect was intoxicated, and he ‘did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report.’” Id. at 172-73 (quoting Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Hubbard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 42 F.3d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1995) (ERISA bars claims when “(1) the state law claim addresses an area of exclusive federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan; and (2) the claim directly affects the relationship between the traditional ERISA entities—the employer, the plan and its fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries”); see also Ambulatory Infusion Therapy Specialist, Inc. v. N. Am.

2008The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has propounded a two-pronged test whereby ERISA preempts a state law claim if “(1) the state law claim addresses an area of exclusive federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan; and (2) the claim directly affects the relationship between the traditional ERISA entities-the employer [in its role as administrator], the plan and its fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries.” Hubbard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 42 F.3d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Mayeaux v. La.

2025Co., 692 S.W.3d 112 , 124 n.4 (Tex. 2024) (“Under the ‘complete preemption doctrine,’ a state-law claim arises under federal law and can be removed to federal court if a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law claim.” (citing Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003))).

2024See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).

2019Under articles 38.21 and 38.22, fact scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness include the following: (1) the suspect was ill and on medication and that fact may have rendered his confession involuntary; (2) the suspect was mentally retarded and may not have “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” waived his rights; (3) the suspect “lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights”; (4) the suspect was intoxicated, and he “did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report”; (5) the suspect was confronted by the brother-in-law of his murder victim

2015Under articles 38.21 and 38.22, fact scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness include the following: (1) the suspect was ill and on medication and that fact may have rendered his confession involuntary; (2) the suspect was mentally retarded and may not have “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” waived his rights; (3) the suspect “lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights”; (4) the suspect was intoxicated, and he “did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report”; (5) the suspect was confronted by the brother-in-law of his murder victim

2015Thus, courts “may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.” Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“A state- law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [section 2].”). [11] [12] However, the purpose and language of the FAA require only that agreements to arbitrate be placed “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S.

2015Thus, courts “may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.” Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“A state- law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [section 2].”). [11] [12] However, the purpose and language of the FAA require only that agreements to arbitrate be placed “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S.

2008Haynes, 178 S.W.3d at 354 ; see also Davila, 542 U.S. at 210 , *115 124 S.Ct. at 2496 .

2008Haynes, 178 S.W.3d at 354 ; see also Davila, 542 U.S. at 210 , *115 124 S.Ct. at 2496 .

2012The Grable Court rejected the “expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the ‘arising under’ door.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 .

2012The Grable Court rejected the “expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the ‘arising under’ door.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 .

2008Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 , 121 S.Ct. 1322, 1327 , 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001).

2008Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 , 121 S.Ct. 1322, 1327 , 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001).

2018“The Copyright Act expressly preempts all causes of action falling within its scope, with few exceptions.” Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1995); see 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a) (providing that all claims that are equivalent to exclusive rights within scope of copyright are governed exclusively by Copyright Act).5 The Fifth Circuit has established a two-part test to determine if a state law claim is preempted.

2018“The Copyright Act expressly preempts all causes of action falling within its scope, with few exceptions.” Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1995); see 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a) (providing that all claims that are equivalent to exclusive rights within scope of copyright are governed exclusively by Copyright Act).5 The Fifth Circuit has established a two-part test to determine if a state law claim is preempted.

2008Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan , 338 F.3d 433 , 439–40 (5th Cir. 2003); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a) (providing for removal).

2008Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 439-40 (5th Cir.2003); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a) (providing for removal).

2012In Malik and its progeny, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has set forth the state law standard for ascertaining what those elements are: the elements of the offense are to be defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge which, for that particular case, "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).

2012In Malik and its progeny, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has set forth the state law standard for ascertaining what those elements are: the elements of the offense are to be defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge which, for that particular case, “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).3 For the jur

2009Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 779 (Tex.2006); Action Box Co., 130 S.W.3d at 252 n. 5 (“[T]he federal act preempts all otherwise applicable state laws ... the state law standard under the CPRC and the federal common law standard could not apply in the same case.... ”).

2009Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 779 (Tex. 2006); Action Box Co., 130 S.W.3d at 252 n.5 ("[T]he federal act preempts all otherwise applicable state laws . . . the state law standard under the CPRC and the federal common law standard could not apply in the same case . . . .").

2008Haynes , 178 S.W.3d at 354 ; see also Davila , 542 U.S. at 210 , 124 S. Ct. at 2496 .

2008Haynes, 178 S.W.3d at 354 ; see also Davila, 542 U.S. at 210 , *115 124 S.Ct. at 2496 .

2001I, § 19. "[W]e will analyze the [custody] issue from a federal constitutional perspective and presume that the state law standard is the same." Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254 n. 4.

2001I, § 19. “[W]e will analyze the [custody] issue from a federal constitutional perspective and presume that the state law standard is the same.” Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254 n. 4.

2018Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2015); Carson v. Dynegy, 344 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2003); Efremov v. GeoSteering, LLC, No. 01-16-00358-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2166 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 14, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2018Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2015); Carson v. Dynegy, 344 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2003); Efremov v. GeoSteering, LLC, No. 01-16-00358-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2166 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 14, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

1999Baker, 443 U.S. at 146-47 , 99 S.Ct. at 2695-96 (1979) (false imprisonment does not become fourteenth amendment violation simply because defendant is a state official); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 , 97 S.Ct. at 292 (medical malpractice not a constitutional violation merely because the patient is a prisoner).

1999Baker, 443 U.S. at 146-47 , 99 S.Ct. at 2695-96 (1979) (false imprisonment does not become fourteenth amendment violation simply because defendant is a state official); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 , 97 S.Ct. at 292 (medical malpractice not a constitutional violation merely because the patient is a prisoner).

1999Baker, 443 U.S. at 146-47 , 99 S.Ct. at 2695-96 (1979) (false imprisonment does not become fourteenth amendment violation simply because defendant is a state official); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 , 97 S.Ct. at 292 (medical malpractice not a constitutional violation merely because the patient is a prisoner).

1999Baker, 443 U.S. at 146-47 , 99 S.Ct. at 2695-96 (1979) (false imprisonment does not become fourteenth amendment violation simply because defendant is a state official); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 , 97 S.Ct. at 292 (medical malpractice not a constitutional violation merely because the patient is a prisoner).

2025But such “purely factual questions” do not “requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 . “[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for . . . pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 409–10.

2025But such “purely factual questions” do not “requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 . “[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for . . . pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 409–10.

1993In Allis-Chalmers, the Court also delineated the standard by which a cause of action is determined to be preempted, holding, “when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim, [citations omitted] or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract.” Id., 471 U.S. at 220 , 105 S.Ct. at 1915 ; 369 U.S. 95 , 82 S.Ct. 571 ; see also Int’l Brotherhood of Elec.

1993In Allis-Chalmers, the Court also delineated the standard by which a cause of action is determined to be preempted, holding, “when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim, [citations omitted] or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract.” Id., 471 U.S. at 220 , 105 S.Ct. at 1915 ; 369 U.S. 95 , 82 S.Ct. 571 ; see also Int’l Brotherhood of Elec.

2015Thus, courts “may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.” Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“A state- law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [section 2].”). [11] [12] However, the purpose and language of the FAA require only that agreements to arbitrate be placed “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S.

2015Thus, courts “may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.” Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“A state- law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [section 2].”). [11] [12] However, the purpose and language of the FAA require only that agreements to arbitrate be placed “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S.

2015Thus, courts “may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.” Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“A state- law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [section 2].”). [11] [12] However, the purpose and language of the FAA require only that agreements to arbitrate be placed “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S.

2015Thus, courts “may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.” Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“A state- law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [section 2].”). [11] [12] However, the purpose and language of the FAA require only that agreements to arbitrate be placed “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S.

2011The Supreme Court noted “the limiting effect of the requirement that the federal issue in a state-law claim must actually be in dispute to justify federal-question jurisdiction,” and cited Shulthis as an example where “this Court found that there was no federal-question jurisdiction to hear a plaintiffs [state law] claim in part because the federal statutes on which [the claim] depended were not subject to ‘any controversy respecting their validity, construction, or effect.’ ” Id. (quoting Shulthis, 225 U.S. at 570 , 32 S.Ct. 704 ) (emphasis added).

2011The Supreme Court noted “the limiting effect of the requirement that the federal issue in a state-law claim must actually be in dispute to justify federal-question jurisdiction,” and cited Shulthis as an example where “this Court found that there was no federal-question jurisdiction to hear a plaintiffs [state law] claim in part because the federal statutes on which [the claim] depended were not subject to ‘any controversy respecting their validity, construction, or effect.’ ” Id. (quoting Shulthis, 225 U.S. at 570 , 32 S.Ct. 704 ) (emphasis added).

2025To determine whether a federal statute preempts a state-law claim, we must “focus first on the statutory language, ‘which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’” Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).

2014We think the reason why is because, under the reasoning in those cases, a FELA claim is precluded by the FRSA if the same claim would be preempted if brought by a non-employee under state law, and a state-law claim is preempted by the FRSA when a regulation “covers,” or “substantially subsume[s],” the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim. 49 U.S.C.A. § 20106 (a)(2); Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664 , 113 S.Ct. at 1738 .

2025Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); see also Horton v. Kan.

2025Complete preemption exists when “the pre-emptive force of a [federal] statute is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metro.