state law claim in Illinois

1993Ed. 2d at 331 , 107 S. Ct. at 2433 (when a defense to a State-law claim is based on the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the State court will have to interpret the agreement to determine if the State-law claim survives); but see Berda v. CBS Inc. (3d Cir. 1989), 881 F.2d 20, 25 ; McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. (4th Cir. 1991), 934 F.2d 531, 545 (en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).

1993Ed. 2d at 331 , 107 S. Ct. at 2433 (when a defense to a State-law claim is based on the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the State court will have to interpret the agreement to determine if the State-law claim survives); but see Berda v. CBS Inc. (3d Cir. 1989), 881 F.2d 20, 25 ; McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. (4th Cir. 1991), 934 F.2d 531, 545 (en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).

2022In any case where “ ‘the resolution of a state law claim depends on the meaning of, or requires the interpretation of, a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law is preempted and federal labor law principles must be employed to resolve the dispute.’ ” Id. at *4 (quoting Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, 101 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1996), citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , 405- 06 (1988)). “ ‘To determine whether a state-law claim is pre-empted, we must look at the legal character of the claim: a question of state law, entirely in

2022In any case where “ ‘the resolution of a state law claim depends on the meaning of, or requires the interpretation of, a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law is preempted and federal labor law principles must be employed to resolve the dispute.’ ” Id. at *4 (quoting Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, 101 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1996), citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , 405- 06 (1988)). “ ‘To determine whether a state-law claim is pre-empted, we must look at the legal character of the claim: a question of state law, entirely in

2026Id. ¶ 119 Whether section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state law claim entails a “ ‘case-by-case factual analysis.’ ” Byrne v. Hayes Beer Distributing Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 172612 , ¶ 21 (quoting In re Bentz Metal Products Co., 253 F.3d 283 , 285 (7th Cir. 2001)).

2024App. 3d 686, 692-93 , 826 N.E.2d 391, 398-99 (2005), which states the following: “In order to determine whether a claim filed pursuant to a state statute or common law tort is preempted, we examine the character of the claim. [Citation.] Where a matter is purely a question of state law and is entirely independent of any understanding of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, it may proceed as a state-law claim. [Citation.] By contrast, where the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim will be preempted. [Citation.]

2022In any case where “ ‘the resolution of a state law claim depends on the meaning of, or requires the interpretation of, a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law is preempted and federal labor law principles must be employed to resolve the dispute.’ ” Id. at *4 (quoting Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, 101 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1996), citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , 405- 06 (1988)). “ ‘To determine whether a state-law claim is pre-empted, we must look at the legal character of the claim: a question of state law, entirely in

2019See Atchley, 101 F.3d at 499 (“if it is necessary to interpret express or implied terms of a CBA, a state law claim is completely preempted by [section] 301, the claim is deemed federal in nature”).

2021See Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (N.D.

2021See Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (N.D.

2025The Borrowers rely on two particular cases applying this principle, but both are distinguishable from the present case, and we see no fundamental unfairness in the application of res judicata to bar the claims raised in the Borrowers’ complaint. ¶ 24 In Nowak, our supreme court held that it would be fundamentally unfair to bar a plaintiff’s state law claim that had been dismissed from an earlier federal court case on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. 197 Ill. 2d at 392 .

2024Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 392 (2001), in which our supreme court held that it would be fundamentally unfair to bar a plaintiff’s state law claim that had been dismissed from an earlier federal court case on grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

2011Specifically, the Court has "sh[ied] away from the expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the `arising under' door." Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 .

2011Specifically, the Court has "sh[ied] away from the expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the `arising under' door." Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 .

2012As the National Basketball Ass’n court noted, there is no preemption if a cause of action complains of something other than “acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display.” (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) National Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 850 .

2000“Copyrightable material often contains uncopyrightable elements within it, but Section 301 preemption bars state law misappropriation claims with respect to uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements.” National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997).

2002Speciale v. Seybold , 147 F.3d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1998).

2002Speciale, 147 F.3d at 615 .

2021Both claims and defenses “must be considered in determining whether resolution of a state law claim requires construing the relevant collective bargaining agreement.” Id. (citing Jones v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 241 Ill.

2005Jones v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 241 Ill.

2016Board of Education, Joliet Township High School District No. 204 v. Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210, 231 Ill. 2d 184, 194 (2008). ¶ 17 CHA argues that its breach of contract claim based upon defendant’s failure to meet its obligations to follow the federal accessibility standards, as stated in the parties’ restated design contract, does not conflict with federal law, but instead supports it.

2015Board of Education, Joliet Township High School District No. 204 v. Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210, 231 Ill. 2d 184, 194 (2008). & 17 CHA argues that its breach of contract claim based upon defendant's failure to meet its obligations to follow the federal accessibility standards, as stated in the parties' restated design 8 1-14-2870 & 1-15-3040 (consolidated) contract, does not conflict with federal law, but instead supports it.

2011See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 , 126 S.Ct. 2121 , 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006) (describing those state-law claims warranting federal jurisdiction as a "special and small category" of cases). ¶ 30 In fact, the Court recently stated that a federal interest will be substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction where the question "present[s] a nearly `pure issue of law,' one `that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern'" similar cases in the future.

2011See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 , 126 S.Ct. 2121 , 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006) (describing those state-law claims warranting federal jurisdiction as a "special and small category" of cases). ¶ 30 In fact, the Court recently stated that a federal interest will be substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction where the question "present[s] a nearly `pure issue of law,' one `that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern'" similar cases in the future.

2011See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 . ¶ 37 Consistent with the concept of substantiality in a section 1331 jurisdiction analysis, the Court has specifically stated that to invoke section 1338 jurisdiction, "`the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 , 18 S.Ct. 62 , 42 L.Ed. 458 (1897));

2011See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 . ¶ 37 Consistent with the concept of substantiality in a section 1331 jurisdiction analysis, the Court has specifically stated that to invoke section 1338 jurisdiction, "`the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 , 18 S.Ct. 62 , 42 L.Ed. 458 (1897));

2011See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 . ¶ 37 Consistent with the concept of substantiality in a section 1331 jurisdiction analysis, the Court has specifically stated that to invoke section 1338 jurisdiction, "`the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 , 18 S.Ct. 62 , 42 L.Ed. 458 (1897));

2011See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 . ¶ 37 Consistent with the concept of substantiality in a section 1331 jurisdiction analysis, the Court has specifically stated that to invoke section 1338 jurisdiction, "`the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 , 18 S.Ct. 62 , 42 L.Ed. 458 (1897));

2011See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 . ¶ 37 Consistent with the concept of substantiality in a section 1331 jurisdiction analysis, the Court has specifically stated that to invoke section 1338 jurisdiction, "`the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 , 18 S.Ct. 62 , 42 L.Ed. 458 (1897));

2011See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 . ¶ 37 Consistent with the concept of substantiality in a section 1331 jurisdiction analysis, the Court has specifically stated that to invoke section 1338 jurisdiction, "`the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 , 18 S.Ct. 62 , 42 L.Ed. 458 (1897));

2022The Lueck Court further held that two options exist when a state-law claim is preempted: “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim [citation] or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” (Emphases added.) Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 .

2022We disagree. ¶ 77 As we noted, Lueck teaches that, “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim [citation], or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 .

2026Id. ¶ 119 Whether section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state law claim entails a “ ‘case-by-case factual analysis.’ ” Byrne v. Hayes Beer Distributing Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 172612 , ¶ 21 (quoting In re Bentz Metal Products Co., 253 F.3d 283 , 285 (7th Cir. 2001)).

2019Whether section 301 preempts a state law claim entails a “case-by-case factual analysis.” In re Bentz Metal Products Co., 253 F.3d 283 , 285 (7th Cir. 2001). “[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a [section] 301 claim [citation], or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 .

2022However, “preemption will not occur if a dispute merely references or requires consultation of a collective bargaining agreement.” Id. (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994)). - 12 - No. 1-21-0890 ¶ 26 In two other cases cited by the plaintiffs, Byrne v. Hayes Beer Distributing Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 172612 , and Daniels v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 277 Ill.

2005Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124-25 , 129 L.

2026It is true that federal labor policy provides that “when resolution of a state law claim depends on an analysis of the terms of the agreement, the claim must either be arbitrated as required by the collective bargaining agreement or dismissed as preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (2000)).” Kostecki v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., of Illinois, 361 Ill.

2026Kostecki, 361 Ill.

2011Early on, the Supreme Court held that a state-law claim could give rise to federal-question jurisdiction as long as it "appears from the [complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal law]." Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 , 41 S.Ct. 243 , 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921). ¶ 27 However, the Court has since retreated from the "somewhat generous statement of the scope of the doctrine" set forth in Smith.

2011Early on, the Supreme Court held that a state-law claim could give rise to federal-question jurisdiction as long as it "appears from the [complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal law]." Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 , 41 S.Ct. 243 , 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921). ¶ 27 However, the Court has since retreated from the "somewhat generous statement of the scope of the doctrine" set forth in Smith.