state law claim in Louisiana

2008Reeder v. Succession of Palmer, 623 So.2d 1268 (La.1993).

1995Reeder, 623 So.2d at 1272-1273 .

2005As we recognized in Hargrove, 888 So.2d at 1114 (quoting Anderson v. Wisconsin Central Transportation Co., 327 F.Supp.2d 969, 975 (E.D.Wis.2004)), "a state law claim based on excessive train speed is preempted `if a train is involved in an accident while traveling under the maximum speed by [49 C.F.R.] § 213.9(a).'" To establish that the train was traveling within federal guidelines, Defendants offered several documents, including the federal timetable setting forth speed limits, the memorandum summary of the event recorder data, and the event recorder printout, that were not attached to any a

2005As we recognized in Hargrove, 888 So.2d at 1114 (quoting Anderson v. Wisconsin Central Transportation Co., 327 F.Supp.2d 969, 975 (E.D.Wis.2004)), “a state law claim based on excessive train speed is preempted ‘if a train is involved in an accident while traveling under the maximum speed by [49 C.F.R.] § 213.9(a).’ ” To establish that the train was traveling within federal guidelines, Defendants offered several documents, including the federal timetable setting forth speed limits, the memorandum summary of the event recorder data, and the event recorder printout, that were not attached to any

2005"A document which is not an affidavit or sworn to in any way, or which is not certified or attached to an affidavit, is not of sufficient evidentiary quality to be given weight in determining whether or not there remain genuine issues of material fact." Premier Rests., Inc. v. Kenner Plaza Shopping Ctr., *322 L.L.C., 99-1310, 99-1311, p. 10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/29/00), 767 So.2d 927, 932-33 .

2005“A document which is not an affidavit or sworn to in any way, or which |9is not certified or attached to an affidavit, is not of sufficient evidentiary quality to be given weight in determining whether or not there remain genuine issues of material fact.” Premier Rests., Inc. v. Kenner Plaza Shopping Ctr., L.L.C., 99-1310, 99-1311, p. 10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/29/00), 767 So.2d 927, 932-33 .

2025See New Orleans Towing Ass’n v. Foster, 248 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 2001); Laxey v. Louisiana Board of Trustees, 22 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 1994); Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1990).

2025See New Orleans Towing Ass’n v. Foster, 248 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 2001); Laxey v. Louisiana Board of Trustees, 22 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 1994); Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1990).

2023When filing suit in federal court, the Neighbors “invoked federal question jurisdiction, relying on their Fifth Amendment claim.” Ariyan, 29 F.4th at 232 .

2004Similarly, as this court recognized in Western Co. of North America v. Dynasty Transportation, Inc., 96-877, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 696 So.2d 1, 2 , "there is a large body of appellate and trial court decisions finding that state law excessive train speed claims are preempted when there is no evidence providing that the train's speed was in excess of federal regulations." Since the Easterwood decision, however, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has clarified, through publication in the Federal Register, that it only has an indirect role in determining railroad speed limits.

2004Transitional Hospitals Corporation v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc., 164 F.3d 952 (5th Cir.1999).

2002Milstead v. Diamond M Offshore, Inc., 95-2446 (La.7/2/96); 676 So.2d 89 .

1997Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 95-0654, 95-0671 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624 .

1996PREEMPTION The United States Supreme Court clearly set forth the standard for federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992): Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Thus, since our decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law

1996PREEMPTION The United States Supreme Court clearly set forth the standard for federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992): Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Thus, since our decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law

1996PREEMPTION The United States Supreme Court clearly set forth the standard for federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992): Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Thus, since our decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law

1996PREEMPTION The United States Supreme Court clearly set forth the standard for federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992): Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Thus, since our decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law

1996Thus, to the extent that the Papases' *622 claims require a showing that Zoecon's labelling or packaging "should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims are pre-empted." Id. (emphasis added).

1990But when the resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependant upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract, that claim must be treated as a § 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aerolodge NO. 735, 390 U.S. 557 , 88 S.Ct. 1235 , 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), or dismissed as preempted by federal labor—contract law.

1990But when the resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependant upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract, that claim must be treated as a § 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aerolodge NO. 735, 390 U.S. 557 , 88 S.Ct. 1235 , 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), or dismissed as preempted by federal labor—contract law.

1990Allis-Chalmers, supra at 105 S.Ct. 1916 .

1974Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra. In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the state-law principle, stating: "We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State." ( 414 U.S. at 319 , 94 S.Ct. at 523 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 535 ) Finally, we recognize that our present holding is contrary to the decision of the intermediate Court of Appeal in State v. Cockrell, 162

1974Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra. In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the state-law principle, stating: "We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State." ( 414 U.S. at 319 , 94 S.Ct. at 523 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 535 ) Finally, we recognize that our present holding is contrary to the decision of the intermediate Court of Appeal in State v. Cockrell, 162

1974Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra. In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the state-law principle, stating: "We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State." ( 414 U.S. at 319 , 94 S.Ct. at 523 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 535 ) Finally, we recognize that our present holding is contrary to the decision of the intermediate Court of Appeal in State v. Cockrell, 162

1974Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra. In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the state-law principle, stating: "We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State." ( 414 U.S. at 319 , 94 S.Ct. at 523 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 535 ) Finally, we recognize that our present holding is contrary to the decision of the intermediate Court of Appeal in State v. Cockrell, 162

1974Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra. In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the state-law principle, stating: "We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State." ( 414 U.S. at 319 , 94 S.Ct. at 523 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 535 ) Finally, we recognize that our present holding is contrary to the decision of the intermediate Court of Appeal in State v. Cockrell, 162