state law claim in Pennsylvania

2014Thus, the published opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Commonwealth Court, respectively, are clearly at odds with one another concerning the preemptive effect of the FRSA as extended by Section 213.33 vis-à-vis Pennsylvania law.4 4 The MD Mall court addressed two separate preemption issues: (1) express preemption -- whether the FRSA’s express preemption provision operated to extinguish MD Mall’s state claims in trespass seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage; and (2) implied conflict preemption -- whether MD Mall’s “lawsuit may be pre- e

2014The MD Mall court addressed two separate preemption issues: (1) express preemption— whether the FRSA’s express preemption provision operated to extinguish MD Mall’s state claims in trespass seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage; and (2) implied conflict preemption — whether MD Mali’s “lawsuit may be preempted by implication because the state-law principle it seeks to vindicate would conflict with federal law.’’ MD Mall, 715 F.3d at 495 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2012Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219-20 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). § 301(a) of the LMRA also preempts all state law claims where resolution of the state law claim is “substantially dependent” on an analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

2012Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219-20 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). § 301(a) of the LMRA also preempts all state law claims where resolution of the state law claim is “substantially dependent” on an analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

2026“It is well established that the [Eminent Domain] Code provides the exclusive method and practice governing eminent domain proceedings, including de facto takings.” Linde Enters., Inc. v. Lackawanna River Basin Sewer Auth., 911 A.2d 658, 661 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Gerg v. Township of Fox, 107 A.3d 849, 852 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“[W]e have held that the Eminent Domain Code provides the exclusive method and practice governing eminent domain proceedings, including de facto takings[] . . . .”) (italics in original).

2026“It is well established that the [Eminent Domain] Code provides the exclusive method and practice governing eminent domain proceedings, including de facto takings.” Linde Enters., Inc. v. Lackawanna River Basin Sewer Auth., 911 A.2d 658, 661 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Gerg v. Township of Fox, 107 A.3d 849, 852 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“[W]e have held that the Eminent Domain Code provides the exclusive method and practice governing eminent domain proceedings, including de facto takings[] . . . .”) (italics in original).

2026Greevy v. Reifsteck, 115 A. 130, 132 (Pa. 1921) (stating that, while the General Assembly may enact legislation affecting the availability of habeas corpus relief, the “right to a habeas corpus is recognized in [A]rticle 1, [Section] 14, of the [Pennsylvania] Constitution … , and hence [a detainee] cannot be wholly deprived thereof, or the right be so hampered as to amount to a practical deprivation”). [J-49-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 11 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a state court’s rejection of Napue claim was not entitled to deference because the court “applied a state law standard f

2025A state law requirement is not fully consistent with FIFRA’s requirements when the state law requirement is: (1) for labeling or packaging; and (2) in addition to or different from what FIFRA requires. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); Carson, 92 F.4th at 989 -91 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 444, 446-47 ).

2025Carson v. Monsanto Company, 92 F.4th 980, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005)).

2025A state law requirement is not fully consistent with FIFRA’s requirements when the state law requirement is: (1) for labeling or packaging; and (2) in addition to or different from what FIFRA requires. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); Carson, 92 F.4th at 989 -91 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 444, 446-47 ).

2025Carson v. Monsanto Company, 92 F.4th 980, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005)).

2017See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Davila, 542 U.S. at 210 (noting that a state law claim is completely preempted “if an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions[.]”) (citation omitted).

2012From these facts and precepts of law, the Bentz court concluded that resolution of the mechanics’ lien claim did not require an “interpretation of a [collective bargaining agreement]” but instead, only required a “mere glance at it.” Id. at 289.

2012In addition, the Bentz court explained that under prior precedent, “[t]he mere need to look to [a] [collective bargaining agreement] for damage computation is no reason to hold a state-law claim defeated by § 301.” 253 F.3d at 286. (discussing Livadas).

2012Sears v. Upton [— U.S.-], 130 S.Ct. 3259 , 3263 & n. 6 [ 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 ] (2010); Green v. Georgia) 442 U.S. 95, 97 [ 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 ] (1979); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 [ 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 ] (1973).” Appellant’s Brief at 60.

2012Sears v. Upton [— U.S.-], 130 S.Ct. 3259 , 3263 & n. 6 [ 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 ] (2010); Green v. Georgia) 442 U.S. 95, 97 [ 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 ] (1979); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 [ 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 ] (1973).” Appellant’s Brief at 60.

2012Sears v. Upton [— U.S.-], 130 S.Ct. 3259 , 3263 & n. 6 [ 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 ] (2010); Green v. Georgia) 442 U.S. 95, 97 [ 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 ] (1979); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 [ 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 ] (1973).” Appellant’s Brief at 60.

2012Sears v. Upton [— U.S.-], 130 S.Ct. 3259 , 3263 & n. 6 [ 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 ] (2010); Green v. Georgia) 442 U.S. 95, 97 [ 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 ] (1979); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 [ 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 ] (1973).” Appellant’s Brief at 60.

2002Lightning Lube v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 , 1196 (3d Cir.1993) (citing Cohen v. Lupo, 927 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 , 112 S.Ct. 180 , 116 L.Ed.2d 142 (1991) for the proposition that a grant of Rule 11 sanctions is not res judicata with respect to a state law claim of malicious prosecution, and Amwest Mortgage Corp. v. Grady, 925 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.1991) as authority that the denial of Rule 11 sanctions will not support a federal court’s enjoining a state malicious prosecution proceeding). ¶ 15 The torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process are sep

2002Lightning Lube v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 , 1196 (3d Cir.1993) (citing Cohen v. Lupo, 927 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 , 112 S.Ct. 180 , 116 L.Ed.2d 142 (1991) for the proposition that a grant of Rule 11 sanctions is not res judicata with respect to a state law claim of malicious prosecution, and Amwest Mortgage Corp. v. Grady, 925 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.1991) as authority that the denial of Rule 11 sanctions will not support a federal court’s enjoining a state malicious prosecution proceeding). ¶ 15 The torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process are sep

2002Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 434 Pa.Super. 491 , 644 A.2d 188, 191 (1994).

2002Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 434 Pa.Super. 491 , 644 A.2d 188, 191 (1994).

2000See also Wertz, supra, 559 Pa. at 643 n. 5, 741 A.2d at 1279 n. 5 (noting that it is possible that a case which joins a PHRA claim with a federal claim would be heard by a jury, but that same case heard in state court would be heard only by a judge; but “such is one of the peculiarities of our system of federalism.”) In addition, we also note that an interpretation of Pennsylvania law by a federal court may be persuasive where our own Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, but the same is not binding precedent.

2000See also Wertz, supra, 559 Pa. at 643 n. 5, 741 A.2d at 1279 n. 5 (noting that it is possible that a case which joins a PHRA claim with a federal claim would be heard by a jury, but that same case heard in state court would be heard only by a judge; but “such is one of the peculiarities of our system of federalism.”) In addition, we also note that an interpretation of Pennsylvania law by a federal court may be persuasive where our own Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, but the same is not binding precedent.