personal privilege in Iowa

1989It is a personal privilege incident to ownership of land, and, as said in Sayre v. Vander-Voort, 200 Iowa 990 , 205 N.W. 760 , 42 A.L.R. 880 , is not “an estate which can be carved out of the larger estate at the will of a creditor.” Starits, 204 Iowa at 404-405 , 213 N.W. at 771 .

1989It is a personal privilege incident to ownership of land, and, as said in Sayre v. Vander-Voort, 200 Iowa 990 , 205 N.W. 760 , 42 A.L.R. 880 , is not “an estate which can be carved out of the larger estate at the will of a creditor.” Starits, 204 Iowa at 404-405 , 213 N.W. at 771 .

2020Ninety years later, we relied on Dodd in Francksen, 297 N.W.2d at 377 .

2013Looking at existing precedent, the court stated: “Unquestionably, protection against double jeopardy is a personal privilege which may be waived.” Id. at 363 .

1989It is a personal privilege incident to ownership of land, and, as said in Sayre v. Vander-Voort, 200 Iowa 990 , 205 N.W. 760 , 42 A.L.R. 880 , is not “an estate which can be carved out of the larger estate at the will of a creditor.” Starits, 204 Iowa at 404-405 , 213 N.W. at 771 .

1989It is a personal privilege incident to ownership of land, and, as said in Sayre v. Vander-Voort, 200 Iowa 990 , 205 N.W. 760 , 42 A.L.R. 880 , is not “an estate which can be carved out of the larger estate at the will of a creditor.” Starits, 204 Iowa at 404-405 , 213 N.W. at 771 .

1978However, the proposition seems to be undisputed that, where the bar of the statute is complete against the person from whom right or title was derived, it is operative and binding against the successor”); Muse v. Hathaway, 193 N.C. 227 , 136 S.E. 633 ; Hartford Accident & Indem.

1978However, the proposition seems to be undisputed that, where the bar of the statute is complete against the person from whom right or title was derived, it is operative and binding against the successor”); Muse v. Hathaway, 193 N.C. 227 , 136 S.E. 633 ; Hartford Accident & Indem.

1976See Kistner v. United States, 332 F.2d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1964); Ballensky v. People, 116 Colo. 34 , 178 P.2d 433 , 434-A35 (1947); State v. Davis, 72 Idaho 115 , 238 P.2d 450, 454-455 (1951); State v. Tahash, 154 N.W.2d at 817-818 ; 22 C.J.S.

1976See Kistner v. United States, 332 F.2d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1964); Ballensky v. People, 116 Colo. 34 , 178 P.2d 433 , 434-A35 (1947); State v. Davis, 72 Idaho 115 , 238 P.2d 450, 454-455 (1951); State v. Tahash, 154 N.W.2d at 817-818 ; 22 C.J.S.

1976See Kistner v. United States, 332 F.2d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1964); Ballensky v. People, 116 Colo. 34 , 178 P.2d 433 , 434-A35 (1947); State v. Davis, 72 Idaho 115 , 238 P.2d 450, 454-455 (1951); State v. Tahash, 154 N.W.2d at 817-818 ; 22 C.J.S.

1973As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: 'A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its production.’ Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 , 33 S.Ct. 572 , 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913).

1973As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: 'A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its production.’ Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 , 33 S.Ct. 572 , 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913).

1973The appellee cites the following, found in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 , 93 S.Ct. 611, 616 , 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (decided January 9, 1973): “It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information which may incriminate him.

1973The appellee cites the following, found in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 , 93 S.Ct. 611, 616 , 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (decided January 9, 1973): “It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information which may incriminate him.

1968The court was correct in excluding the testimony of the secretary, and there being no reversible error the case is affirmed.” And in Pinckney v. Watkinson, 254 Iowa 144, 154 , 116 N.W.2d 258 , 264 is found this relevant statement: “It is true we have held this section does more than create a personal privilege, for it prohibits the use in evidence of information required of one for the purpose of a report to the State, and that the information given an officer as therein required for the purpose of making his written report cannot he used to the prejudice of the informant through the testimony

1968The court was correct in excluding the testimony of the secretary, and there being no reversible error the case is affirmed.” And in Pinckney v. Watkinson, 254 Iowa 144, 154 , 116 N.W.2d 258 , 264 is found this relevant statement: “It is true we have held this section does more than create a personal privilege, for it prohibits the use in evidence of information required of one for the purpose of a report to the State, and that the information given an officer as therein required for the purpose of making his written report cannot he used to the prejudice of the informant through the testimony

1968The court was correct in excluding the testimony of the secretary, and there being no reversible error the case is affirmed.” And in Pinckney v. Watkinson, 254 Iowa 144, 154 , 116 N.W.2d 258 , 264 is found this relevant statement: “It is true we have held this section does more than create a personal privilege, for it prohibits the use in evidence of information required of one for the purpose of a report to the State, and that the information given an officer as therein required for the purpose of making his written report cannot he used to the prejudice of the informant through the testimony

1968The court was correct in excluding the testimony of the secretary, and there being no reversible error the case is affirmed.” And in Pinckney v. Watkinson, 254 Iowa 144, 154 , 116 N.W.2d 258 , 264 is found this relevant statement: “It is true we have held this section does more than create a personal privilege, for it prohibits the use in evidence of information required of one for the purpose of a report to the State, and that the information given an officer as therein required for the purpose of making his written report cannot he used to the prejudice of the informant through the testimony

1967Directing attention particularly to the guest statute, it has been said: “Such statutes were enacted for two major purposes: (1) to alleviate the claimed injustice resulting from holding an automobile owner or operator liable for injuries to one riding simply as a guest, where the injury resulted from mere failure to exercise ordinary care; and (2) to avoid collusive suits between friends or relatives, where the driver admits fault in order to force his insurer to bear the loss resulting from the accident.” 45 Iowa Law Review 171, a case comment on Ritter v. Dexter, 250 Iowa 830 , 95 N.W.2d 28

1967Directing attention particularly to the guest statute, it has been said: “Such statutes were enacted for two major purposes: (1) to alleviate the claimed injustice resulting from holding an automobile owner or operator liable for injuries to one riding simply as a guest, where the injury resulted from mere failure to exercise ordinary care; and (2) to avoid collusive suits between friends or relatives, where the driver admits fault in order to force his insurer to bear the loss resulting from the accident.” 45 Iowa Law Review 171, a case comment on Ritter v. Dexter, 250 Iowa 830 , 95 N.W.2d 28

1962Section 321.271, Code 1958, I.C.A.; Sprague v. Brodus, 245 Iowa 90 , 60 N.W.2d 850 ; Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transport Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 202 , 61 N.W.2d 696 .

1962Section 321.271, Code 1958, I.C.A.; Sprague v. Brodus, 245 Iowa 90 , 60 N.W.2d 850 ; Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transport Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 202 , 61 N.W.2d 696 .

1962Section 321.271, Code 1958, I.C.A.; Sprague v. Brodus, 245 Iowa 90 , 60 N.W.2d 850 ; Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transport Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 202 , 61 N.W.2d 696 .

1962Section 321.271, Code 1958, I.C.A.; Sprague v. Brodus, 245 Iowa 90 , 60 N.W.2d 850 ; Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transport Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 202 , 61 N.W.2d 696 .

1958It is so stated by-Justice Brandéis in the case of Long v. Ansell, 293 U. S. 76, 83 , 55 S. Ct. 21, 22 , 79 L.

1958It is so stated by-Justice Brandéis in the case of Long v. Ansell, 293 U. S. 76, 83 , 55 S. Ct. 21, 22 , 79 L.

1952I must also express disagreement with the majority's statement by way of dictum, unsupported by authority, "that the duty placed upon the court by section 690.4, supra, is mandatory, and it cannot be avoided by any waiver, even by the defendant himself." (Italics added.) 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, section 119, states, "In fact, the trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." Id., sec. 188, says, "The right to be confronted by witnesses again

1952I must also express disagreement with the majority's statement by way of dictum, unsupported by authority, "that the duty placed upon the court by section 690.4, supra, is mandatory, and it cannot be avoided by any waiver, even by the defendant himself." (Italics added.) 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, section 119, states, "In fact, the trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." Id., sec. 188, says, "The right to be confronted by witnesses again

1952The Moore case holds the right to a separate trial may be waived and cites with approval State v. Olds, 106 Iowa 110, 114 , 76 N.W. 644 , where it is held the right to be confronted by witnesses may be waived and their written testimony received.

1952The Moore case holds the right to a separate trial may be waived and cites with approval State v. Olds, 106 Iowa 110, 114 , 76 N.W. 644 , where it is held the right to be confronted by witnesses may be waived and their written testimony received.

1949When the debtor dies the power and authority to waive the bar of the statute of limitations dies with him, and the conscience and sense of fair dealing to which this statute appeals thereupon loses the medium of expression and action to take the obligation out of the operation of the statute of limitations.” In Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 335, 338 , 60 P. 977, 978 , the court said: “As between parties acting in their own right, the plea of the statute of limitations is unquestionably a personal privilege which may be waived.

1949When the debtor dies the power and authority to waive the bar of the statute of limitations dies with him, and the conscience and sense of fair dealing to which this statute appeals thereupon loses the medium of expression and action to take the obligation out of the operation of the statute of limitations.” In Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 335, 338 , 60 P. 977, 978 , the court said: “As between parties acting in their own right, the plea of the statute of limitations is unquestionably a personal privilege which may be waived.

1944In the case of Bahr v. Zahm, 1941, 219 Ind. 297, 302 , 37 N. E. 2d 942, 944 , in commenting upon the claim of the state for care of a prior ward of a state hospital, wherein the question as to the delayed filing of a claim was before the court, it is stated: “It seems to us that the difference between the statutes here involved is basic.

1944In the case of Bahr v. Zahm, 1941, 219 Ind. 297, 302 , 37 N. E. 2d 942, 944 , in commenting upon the claim of the state for care of a prior ward of a state hospital, wherein the question as to the delayed filing of a claim was before the court, it is stated: “It seems to us that the difference between the statutes here involved is basic.

1944It is not a personal claim against anyone, under our system of administering the estates of decedents * ® “The decisions of the Courts of the Union touching the statutory limitations against, the right of a state to sue upon or otherwise establish its claim .against an estate of a decedent, read superficially, may not seem wholly harmonious; but we *409 think, as applied to systems of probate jurisdiction and administration of estates of decedents such as exist in our state, the weight and reason of the authorities are decidedly to the effect that a state as a claimant is subject to exactly th

1944It is not a personal claim against anyone, under our system of administering the estates of decedents * ® “The decisions of the Courts of the Union touching the statutory limitations against, the right of a state to sue upon or otherwise establish its claim .against an estate of a decedent, read superficially, may not seem wholly harmonious; but we *409 think, as applied to systems of probate jurisdiction and administration of estates of decedents such as exist in our state, the weight and reason of the authorities are decidedly to the effect that a state as a claimant is subject to exactly th

1943After a review of the cases, the court, in Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29, 32 , 73 P. 744, 745 , said: “The theory of all the cases above cited is, that while the general rule is, that the plea of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege, that rule does not extend to subsequent property rights over which he has no control. ’ ’ Other decisions, and authorities from many more, which could be cited, are Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203 , 87 P. 674 ; Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34 , 112 P. 2d 570, 576 , 113 P. 2d 963 , 136 A. L.

1943After a review of the cases, the court, in Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29, 32 , 73 P. 744, 745 , said: “The theory of all the cases above cited is, that while the general rule is, that the plea of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege, that rule does not extend to subsequent property rights over which he has no control. ’ ’ Other decisions, and authorities from many more, which could be cited, are Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203 , 87 P. 674 ; Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34 , 112 P. 2d 570, 576 , 113 P. 2d 963 , 136 A. L.

1943After a review of the cases, the court, in Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29, 32 , 73 P. 744, 745 , said: “The theory of all the cases above cited is, that while the general rule is, that the plea of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege, that rule does not extend to subsequent property rights over which he has no control. ’ ’ Other decisions, and authorities from many more, which could be cited, are Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203 , 87 P. 674 ; Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34 , 112 P. 2d 570, 576 , 113 P. 2d 963 , 136 A. L.

1943After a review of the cases, the court, in Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29, 32 , 73 P. 744, 745 , said: “The theory of all the cases above cited is, that while the general rule is, that the plea of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege, that rule does not extend to subsequent property rights over which he has no control. ’ ’ Other decisions, and authorities from many more, which could be cited, are Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203 , 87 P. 674 ; Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34 , 112 P. 2d 570, 576 , 113 P. 2d 963 , 136 A. L.

1943In such cases it would seem on principle that no distinction can be made between the right of a judgment creditor to plead the statute and the right of a junior mortgagee. ’ ’ *1122 In Lord v. Morris, 18 Cal. 482, 491 , speaking on the matter of the personal privilege, the court said: “But with respect to property placed by him [the debtor] beyond his control, or subjected by him to liens, he has no such personal privilege.

1943After a review of the cases, the court, in Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29, 32 , 73 P. 744, 745 , said: “The theory of all the cases above cited is, that while the general rule is, that the plea of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege, that rule does not extend to subsequent property rights over which he has no control. ’ ’ Other decisions, and authorities from many more, which could be cited, are Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203 , 87 P. 674 ; Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34 , 112 P. 2d 570, 576 , 113 P. 2d 963 , 136 A. L.

1943After a review of the cases, the court, in Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29, 32 , 73 P. 744, 745 , said: “The theory of all the cases above cited is, that while the general rule is, that the plea of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege, that rule does not extend to subsequent property rights over which he has no control. ’ ’ Other decisions, and authorities from many more, which could be cited, are Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203 , 87 P. 674 ; Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34 , 112 P. 2d 570, 576 , 113 P. 2d 963 , 136 A. L.