personal privilege in Texas

2006See Mooney Aircraft, Inc., v. Adams, 377 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1964, no writ); see also Grozier v. L-B Sprinkler & Plumbing Repair, 744 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied); In this case, the divorce decree unambiguously restricts the geographical area of the children’s primary residence to Collin County and any contiguous county.

2001S.D., 980 S.W.2d at 759 ; Grozier, 744 S.W.2d at 309 ; Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Adams, 377 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ).

2008See Gonzales v. State , 994 S.W.2d 170 , 171 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (distinguishing deprivation of right to counsel from deprivation of component right to conduct voir dire). 5.

2007See Gonzales v. State , 994 S.W.2d 170 , 171 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (distinguishing deprivation of right to counsel from deprivation of component right to conduct voir dire). 5.

2007Appellate courts have "long recognized . . . that the matter of venue is a personal privilege that a party may expressly or impliedly waive." Huey v. Huey , 200 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); see Grozier v. L-B Sprinkler & Plumbing Repair , 744 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).

2006See Mooney Aircraft, Inc., v. Adams, 377 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1964, no writ); see also Grozier v. L-B Sprinkler & Plumbing Repair, 744 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied); In this case, the divorce decree unambiguously restricts the geographical area of the children’s primary residence to Collin County and any contiguous county.

2003Id. at 667 (“The intervenor has no basis for a personal claim against the garnishor in a separate suit and has no assurance that the fund would be kept intact after its payment to the garnishor. . . .”).

2003Id. at 667 ("The intervenor has no basis for a personal claim against the garnishor in a separate suit and has no assurance that the fund would be kept intact after its payment to the garnishor. . . .").

2020Baptist Church v. Jefferson, 317 S.W.3d 540 , 546–47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“The statute of limitations provides a personal defense that protects the debtor from an action to collect on the debt after the designated passage of time, but it does not defeat the right of the lender to utilize the collateral already held.”) (citing Goldfrank, Frank & Co. v. Young, 64 Tex. 432 , 436–39 (1885)).

2010Id.; see also Goldfrank, Frank & Co. v. Young, 64 Tex. 432, 436-39 (1885) (explaining that while the running of the statute of limitations defeats a lender’s judicial remedy, it does not defeat the lender’s right to use the security to collect the debt).

2020However, he abandoned that argument in his amended response, and we note that the court does not appear to have stated that it was postponing a ruling for a “stated period.” Further, the court has held two hearings and issued temporary orders while the emergency orders were in effect, thus neutralizing any persuasive effect of that argument. 2 Donald cites to Huey v. Huey for the proposition that Texas courts “have long recognized . . . that the matter of venue is a personal privilege that a party may expressly or impliedly waive.” 200 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).

2007Appellate courts have "long recognized . . . that the matter of venue is a personal privilege that a party may expressly or impliedly waive." Huey v. Huey , 200 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); see Grozier v. L-B Sprinkler & Plumbing Repair , 744 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).

2015Petrus v. Cage Brothers, 128 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1939, writ ref'd).

1985Petrus v. Cage Brothers, 128 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1939, writ ref'd).

2010As explained in Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C. v. Bent Tree National Bank, when a lender holds personal property as collateral to guarantee a debt, the running of the statute of limitations on an action to collect personally from the debtor does not bar the right of the lender to use the collateral to repay the debt. 894 S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no writ). 4 The stat *547 ute of limitations provides a personal defense that protects the debtor from an action to collect on the debt after the designated passage of time, but it does not defeat the right of the lender to

2010As explained in Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C. v. Bent Tree National Bank , when a lender holds personal property as collateral to guarantee a debt, the running of the statute of limitations on an action to collect personally from the debtor does not bar the right of the lender to use the collateral to repay the debt. 894 S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). [4] The statute of limitations provides a personal defense that protects the debtor from an action to collect on the debt after the designated passage of time, but it does not defeat the right of the lender to ut

2008The U.S. Supreme Court has described the right to testify as "even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation," Rock , 483 U.S. at 52 , however, it has not held the deprivation of the right to testify to be structural error.

2003The U.S. Supreme Court has described the right to testify as “even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation,” Rock , 483 U.S. at 52 , however, it has not held the deprivation of the right to testify to be structural error.

2022State v. Bush, 253 S.W.2d 269 , 272–73 (Tex. 1952).

1989The private interest involved here is a personal privilege, State v. Bush, 253 S.W.2d at 273, to do that which otherwise would be unlawful.

2003See Gonzales v. State , 994 S.W.2d 170 , 171 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (distinguishing deprivation of right to counsel from deprivation of component right to conduct voir dire). 5: Momon v. State , 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (rehearing granted in part, 18 S.W.3d 174 , Tenn. 2000). 6: LaVigne v. State , 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991). 7: We note, though, that after extensive discussion the court in Artuz adopted the Teague court’s approach and found that the primary responsibility for protection of the defendant’s right to testify lies with defense counsel.

2003See Gonzales v. State, 994 S.W.2d 170 , 171 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (distinguishing deprivation of right to counsel from deprivation of component right to conduct voir dire). 5 Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (rehearing granted in part, 18 S.W.3d 174 , Tenn. 2000). 6 LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991). 7 We note, though, that after extensive discussion the court in Artuz adopted the Teague court’s approach and found that the primary responsibility for protection of the defendant’s right to testify lies with defense counsel.

2003See Gonzales v. State , 994 S.W.2d 170 , 171 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (distinguishing deprivation of right to counsel from deprivation of component right to conduct voir dire). 5: Momon v. State , 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (rehearing granted in part, 18 S.W.3d 174 , Tenn. 2000). 6: LaVigne v. State , 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991). 7: We note, though, that after extensive discussion the court in Artuz adopted the Teague court’s approach and found that the primary responsibility for protection of the defendant’s right to testify lies with defense counsel.

2003See Gonzales v. State, 994 S.W.2d 170 , 171 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (distinguishing deprivation of right to counsel from deprivation of component right to conduct voir dire). 5 Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (rehearing granted in part, 18 S.W.3d 174 , Tenn. 2000). 6 LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991). 7 We note, though, that after extensive discussion the court in Artuz adopted the Teague court’s approach and found that the primary responsibility for protection of the defendant’s right to testify lies with defense counsel.

1987Maloney v. Eaheart, 81 Tex. 281, 284 , 16 S.W. 1030, 1031 (1891). ( Maloney reached this holding in the face of a contention that the plea of usury is the personal privilege of the debtor and was not available to the purchaser under the junior mortgage.

1987Maloney v. Eaheart, 81 Tex. 281, 284 , 16 S.W. 1030, 1031 (1891). ( Maloney reached this holding in the face of a contention that the plea of usury is the personal privilege of the debtor and was not available to the purchaser under the junior mortgage.

2021See Sanders–Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that qualified immunity is “a defense that is only relevant to individual capacity claims”).

2014Where “each shareholder suffers relatively in proportion to the number of shares he owns,” however, “each will be made whole if the corporation obtains restitution or compensation from the wrongdoer.” Massachusetts v. Davis, 168 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. 1942); see also Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 739 S.W.2d 914, 918-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988) (noting stockholder had a personal defense for being fraudulently induced into signing guaranty but he could not sue to recover the value of his stock 12 from the co-guarantor because the tortious interference

2014Where “each shareholder suffers relatively in proportion to the number of shares he owns,” however, “each will be made whole if the corporation obtains restitution or compensation from the wrongdoer.” Massachusetts v. Davis, 168 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. 1942); see also Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 739 S.W.2d 914, 918-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988) (noting stockholder had a personal defense for being fraudulently induced into signing guaranty but he could not sue to recover the value of his stock 12 from the co-guarantor because the tortious interference

2014Where “each shareholder suffers relatively in proportion to the number of shares he owns,” however, “each will be made whole if the corporation obtains restitution or compensation from the wrongdoer.” Massachusetts v. Davis, 168 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. 1942); see also Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 739 S.W.2d 914, 918-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988) (noting stockholder had a personal defense for being fraudulently induced into signing guaranty but he could not sue to recover the value of his stock 12 from the co-guarantor because the tortious interference

2013See Duncan v. Lisenby, 912 S.W.2d 857 , 858–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ); see also Gardner, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7383 , at *9.

2002This conclusion comports with Texas law which holds that “[u]sury is a personal defense and may not be asserted by a guarantor unless the contract with the guarantor also contains the usurious provision.” Ginsberg 1985, 39 F.3d at 534 (quoting FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 700 (5th Cir.1991) (construing Texas law)).

1994See also FDIC v. Adam, 803 F.Supp. 1225, 1228-29 (S.D.Tex.1992) (defense of improper notice of default barred by federal holder in due course doctrine); Smith v. FDIC, 800 S.W.2d 648, 650-52 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism’d) (FDIC as receiver is holder in due course under federal common law, barring borrower’s defenses based on commercial reasonableness of sale of collateral).

1994See also FDIC v. Adam, 803 F.Supp. 1225, 1228-29 (S.D.Tex.1992) (defense of improper notice of default barred by federal holder in due course doctrine); Smith v. FDIC, 800 S.W.2d 648, 650-52 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism’d) (FDIC as receiver is holder in due course under federal common law, barring borrower’s defenses based on commercial reasonableness of sale of collateral).