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27 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Braswellgreen2 sentences2025“The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which he may waive expressly or by a failure to assert it in apt time even in a capital case.” Braswell, 312 N.C. at 558 (cleaned up). 2019It is true that “[t]he constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which he may waive expressly or by a failure to assert it in apt time even in a capital case.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 558 , 324 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1985) (citation and emphasis removed). | 5 | 5 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences2005Our Supreme Court has held that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witness against him is a personal privilege, which [the accused] may waive even in a capital case." State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 210 , 166 S.E.2d 652, 660 (1969); see also State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 558 , 324 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1985) ("The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which he may waive expressly or by a failure to assert it in apt time even in a capital case."); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 341-42 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 2005Our Supreme Court has held that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witness against him is a personal privilege, which [the accused] may waive even in a capital case." State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 210 , 166 S.E.2d 652, 660 (1969); see also State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 558 , 324 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1985) ("The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which he may waive expressly or by a failure to assert it in apt time even in a capital case."); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 341-42 , 279 S.E.2d 788, | 2 | 3 |
In re: J.B.green1 sentence2019However, Section 7B-2405 of our General Statutes provides that our courts are to protect the rights of a juvenile defendant during a delinquency hearing, and has been considered a “statutory mandate.” Matter of J.B., __ N.C. App. __, __, 820 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2018) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hutchinsgreen2 sentences2005Our Supreme Court has held that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witness against him is a personal privilege, which [the accused] may waive even in a capital case." State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 210 , 166 S.E.2d 652, 660 (1969); see also State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 558 , 324 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1985) ("The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which he may waive expressly or by a failure to assert it in apt time even in a capital case."); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 341-42 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 2005Our Supreme Court has held that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witness against him is a personal privilege, which [the accused] may waive even in a capital case." State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 210 , 166 S.E.2d 652, 660 (1969); see also State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 558 , 324 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1985) ("The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which he may waive expressly or by a failure to assert it in apt time even in a capital case."); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 341-42 , 279 S.E.2d 788, | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Brinsongreen2 sentences1993Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 509 , 78 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1953). 1993Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 509 , 78 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1953). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Whitegreen2 sentences1982The requested discovery to which the court ordered response sought information which the corporate records should have contained and which plaintiffs thus would have received had defendants complied with the statutory requirements for maintenance of corporate records and observed plaintiffs’ right to inspect. “[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one,” and “the official records and documents of [a corporation] that are held by [an individual] in a representative rather than in a personal capacity cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against self-incriminat 1982The requested discovery to which the court ordered response sought information which the corporate records should have contained and which plaintiffs thus would have received had defendants complied with the statutory requirements for maintenance of corporate records and observed plaintiffs’ right to inspect. “[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one,” and “the official records and documents of [a corporation] that are held by [an individual] in a representative rather than in a personal capacity cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against self-incriminat | 1 | 1 |
Waters v. McBeegreen2 sentences1961See Waters v. McBee, 244 N.C. 540 , 94 S.E. 2d 640 . 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 108, says: “Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred upon a court by, or be based on, the estoppel of a party to deny that it exists. 1961See Waters v. McBee, 244 N.C. 540 , 94 S.E. 2d 640 . 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 108, says: “Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred upon a court by, or be based on, the estoppel of a party to deny that it exists. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2001As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: “A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 , 57 L. 2001As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: “A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 , 57 L. | 2 | 1981–2001 |
Springer v. . Shavender
green
2 sentences1953Springer v. Shavender, 118 N.C. 33 , 23 S.E. 976 ; 14 Am. 1953Springer v. Shavender, 118 N.C. 33 , 23 S.E. 976 ; 14 Am. | 2 | 1953–1953 |
Elmore v. Fields
green
2 sentences1922He stands, then, stripped of his official character, and confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's rights, for which he must personally answer, he is without defense." This principle is sustained in Scott v. Donald , 165 U.S. 58 ; Elmore v. Fields , 153 Ala. 345 ; Burroughs v. Commonwealth , 224 Mass. 28 . 1922He stands, then, stripped of bis official character, and confessing a personal violation of tbe plaintiff’s rights, for which be must personally answer, be is without defense.” This principle is sustained in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S., 58 ; Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala., 345 ; Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 224 Mass., 28 . | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Scott v. Donald
green
2 sentences1922He stands, then, stripped of his official character, and confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's rights, for which he must personally answer, he is without defense." This principle is sustained in Scott v. Donald , 165 U.S. 58 ; Elmore v. Fields , 153 Ala. 345 ; Burroughs v. Commonwealth , 224 Mass. 28 . 1922He stands, then, stripped of bis official character, and confessing a personal violation of tbe plaintiff’s rights, for which be must personally answer, be is without defense.” This principle is sustained in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S., 58 ; Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala., 345 ; Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 224 Mass., 28 . | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina
green
2 sentences1922In Hopkin v. Clemson College , 221 U.S. 636 , on which the plaintiff chiefly relies, the facts were that the defendant maintained an embankment on the eastern side of the Seneca River to protect its lands from overflow, but its construction narrowed the channel of the river and caused the current of the stream to flow across the banks of the plaintiff's lands, causing injury. 1922In Hophin v. Clemson College, 221 U. S., 636 , on which tbe plaintiff chiefly relies, tbe facts were that tbe defendant maintained an embankment on tbe eastern side of tbe Seneca Eiver to protect its lands from overflow, but its construction narrowed tbe channel of tbe river and caused tbe current of tbe stream to flow across tbe banks of tbe plaintiff’s lands, causing injury. | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Burroughs v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1922He stands, then, stripped of his official character, and confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's rights, for which he must personally answer, he is without defense." This principle is sustained in Scott v. Donald , 165 U.S. 58 ; Elmore v. Fields , 153 Ala. 345 ; Burroughs v. Commonwealth , 224 Mass. 28 . 1922He stands, then, stripped of bis official character, and confessing a personal violation of tbe plaintiff’s rights, for which be must personally answer, be is without defense.” This principle is sustained in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S., 58 ; Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala., 345 ; Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 224 Mass., 28 . | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Emerald Partners v. Berlin
green
2 sentences2019Emerald Partners , 787 A.2d at 91 ; accord Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. 2019Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 91 ; accord Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Rock v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2008A defendant’s opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness.” 483 U.S. at 52 , 45 L. 2008A defendant's opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness." 483 U.S. at 52 , 107 S.Ct. at 2709 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 47 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2008A defendant’s opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness.” 483 U.S. at 52 , 45 L. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Carpenter v. . R. R.
green
2 sentences1996The public official “stands, then, stripped of his official *206 character, and confessing a personal violation of the plaintiffs rights, for which he must personally answer, he is without defense.” Carpenter, 184 N.C. at 405 , 114 S.E. at 695 . 1996The public official “stands, then, stripped of his official *206 character, and confessing a personal violation of the plaintiffs rights, for which he must personally answer, he is without defense.” Carpenter, 184 N.C. at 405 , 114 S.E. at 695 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Payne
green
2 sentences1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con 1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Pope
green
2 sentences1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con 1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. . Dry
green
2 sentences1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con 1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. . Cherry
green
2 sentences1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con 1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. . O'Neal
green
2 sentences1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con 1989Our Court has repeatedly stated that the accused cannot waive the right to be present at a capital trial, State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 , 357 S.E. 2d 612 (1987); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198 , 166 S.E. 2d 652 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326 , 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962); State v. O’Neal, 197 N.C. 548 , 149 S.E. 860 (1929); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 , 70 S.E. 294 (1911); State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 , 67 S.E. 1000 (1910), which the law permits him to do with other, personal trial rights, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 208-09 , 166 S.E. 2d 652, 659 (defendant’s federal constitutional right to con | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Commission
green
2 sentences1978As was said in Midgett v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 241, 249 , 132 S.E. 2d 599 (1963), “[o]nce the cause of action has occurred by the infliction of damage to the property, the taking is a fait-accompli." In 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (Rev. 3 ed.), § 521, we find: “If a parcel of land is sold after a portion of it has been taken (or after it has been injuriously affected by the construction of some authorized public work), the right to compensation, constitutional or statutory, does not run with the land but remains a personal claim in the hands of the vendor, unless it has been assigned by 1978As was said in Midgett v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 241, 249 , 132 S.E. 2d 599 (1963), “[o]nce the cause of action has occurred by the infliction of damage to the property, the taking is a fait-accompli." In 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (Rev. 3 ed.), § 521, we find: “If a parcel of land is sold after a portion of it has been taken (or after it has been injuriously affected by the construction of some authorized public work), the right to compensation, constitutional or statutory, does not run with the land but remains a personal claim in the hands of the vendor, unless it has been assigned by | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. . Mitchell
green
2 sentences1969State v. Hartsfield, supra; State v. Mitchell, 119 N.C. 784, 25 S.E. 783 . 1969State v. Hartsfield, supra; State v. Mitchell, 119 N.C. 784, 25 S.E. 783 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
In Re Donnelly
green
2 sentences1967In Re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E. 2d 904 ; Beaver v. Scheldt, 251 N.C. 671 , 111 S.E. 2d 881 . 1967In Re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E. 2d 904 ; Beaver v. Scheldt, 251 N.C. 671 , 111 S.E. 2d 881 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Beaver v. Scheidt
green
2 sentences1967In Re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E. 2d 904 ; Beaver v. Scheldt, 251 N.C. 671 , 111 S.E. 2d 881 . 1967In Re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375 , 132 S.E. 2d 904 ; Beaver v. Scheldt, 251 N.C. 671 , 111 S.E. 2d 881 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Foy v. Electric Co.
neutral
1 sentence1965In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, this Court, speaking through Seawell, J., said: “The personal immunity from suit because of the domestic relation does not extend to the employer so as to cancel his liability or defeat recovery on the principle of respondeat superior when the injury was inflicted by the servant acting as such.” Id. at 507 , 50 S.E. 2d at 544 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Wright Ex Rel. Wright v. Wright
green
1 sentence1965In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, this Court, speaking through Seawell, J., said: “The personal immunity from suit because of the domestic relation does not extend to the employer so as to cancel his liability or defeat recovery on the principle of respondeat superior when the injury was inflicted by the servant acting as such.” Id. at 507 , 50 S.E. 2d at 544 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Byers v. McAuley
green
1 sentence1963Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608 , 37 L. ed. 867. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Harry's Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn
neutral
2 sentences1955It was held in Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N.C. 23 , 51 S.E. 2d 916 , that an assignment by parol by the purchaser of a contract to convey real estate is no defense to an action on tbe contract by tbe assignee against the vendor, since tbe Statute of Frauds is a personal defense which may be set up only inter partes. 1955It was held in Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N.C. 23 , 51 S.E. 2d 916 , that an assignment by parol by the purchaser of a contract to convey real estate is no defense to an action on tbe contract by tbe assignee against the vendor, since tbe Statute of Frauds is a personal defense which may be set up only inter partes. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| People Ex Rel. Attorney General Ex Rel. Boyer v. Teague green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| State v. . Fleming green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Campbell v. . White neutral | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Markham v. W. H. Hicks & Co. neutral | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.