61 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1849–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Key v. Stategreen2 sentences1973Moreover, "The plea of former jeopardy is a personal privilege and may be waived [Citations], and going to trial without filing any plea of former jeopardy or invoking any action on such a plea amounts to a waiver of such privilege. [Citations].” Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) ( 66 SE2d 773 ). 1973Moreover, "The plea of former jeopardy is a personal privilege and may be waived [Citations], and going to trial without filing any plea of former jeopardy or invoking any action on such a plea amounts to a waiver of such privilege. [Citations].” Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) ( 66 SE2d 773 ). | 4 | 4 |
Fortner v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co.green2 sentences2018Co. , 286 Ga. 189 , 190, 686 S.E.2d 93 (2009) ("If an insurer acts in bad faith in refusing to settle a personal claim against its insured within the policy limits, it may be liable for an excess judgment entered against its insured."). 2018Co. , 286 Ga. 189 , 190, 686 S.E.2d 93 (2009) ("If an insurer acts in bad faith in refusing to settle a personal claim against its insured within the policy limits, it may be liable for an excess judgment entered against its insured."). | 2 | 2 |
Hooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See also Hooks v. State, 138 Ga. App. 539, 540 (3) ( 226 SE2d 765 ) (1976) (“A plea of former jeopardy is a personal privilege and may be waived.”). 2016See also Hooks v. State, 138 Ga. App. 539, 540 (3) ( 226 SE2d 765 ) (1976) (“A plea of former jeopardy is a personal privilege and may be waived.”). | 2 | 2 |
Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Brightmangreen2 sentences2018See Brightman , 276 Ga. at 684 , 580 S.E.2d 519 (noting that insured assigned her claim against her insurer for its bad faith refusal to settle the personal injury action to plaintiff); S. Gen. 2018See Brightman , 276 Ga. at 684 , 580 S.E.2d 519 (noting that insured assigned her claim against her insurer for its bad faith refusal to settle the personal injury action to plaintiff); S. Gen. | 1 | 2 |
McCray v. Stategreen2 sentences1985“The personal privilege of a witness can not be set up by a party to the cause on trial, as a ground for excluding testimony which the witness gives without claiming the protection of his privilege.” McCray v. State, 134 Ga. 416 (8) ( 68 SE 62 ) (1910). 1985“The personal privilege of a witness can not be set up by a party to the cause on trial, as a ground for excluding testimony which the witness gives without claiming the protection of his privilege.” McCray v. State, 134 Ga. 416 (8) ( 68 SE 62 ) (1910). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Int'l Indem. Co.green2 sentences2024This is because “[s]overeign immunity and official immunity are distinct doctrines.” 28 State of Ga. v. International Indemnity Co., 305 Ga. 126, 131 (2) (a) (823 SE2d 806) (2019). “[I]t is well settled that sovereign immunity shields from suit the State and its departments and agencies, including claims against the State’s officers or employees in their official capacity, while official immunity “offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). 2024This is because “[s]overeign immunity and official immunity are distinct doctrines.” 28 State of Ga. v. International Indemnity Co., 305 Ga. 126, 131 (2) (a) (823 SE2d 806) (2019). “[I]t is well settled that sovereign immunity shields from suit the State and its departments and agencies, including claims against the State’s officers or employees in their official capacity, while official immunity “offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 194-195 (3) ( 744 SE2d 413 ) (2013); Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 204-205 (3) ( 739 SE2d 682 ) (2013); Martin v. State, 251 Ga. App. 149, 149-150 (1) ( 553 SE2d 827 ) (2001). 2024See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 194-195 (3) ( 744 SE2d 413 ) (2013); Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 204-205 (3) ( 739 SE2d 682 ) (2013); Martin v. State, 251 Ga. App. 149, 149-150 (1) ( 553 SE2d 827 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Littlejohn v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 194-195 (3) ( 744 SE2d 413 ) (2013); Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 204-205 (3) ( 739 SE2d 682 ) (2013); Martin v. State, 251 Ga. App. 149, 149-150 (1) ( 553 SE2d 827 ) (2001). 2024See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 194-195 (3) ( 744 SE2d 413 ) (2013); Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 204-205 (3) ( 739 SE2d 682 ) (2013); Martin v. State, 251 Ga. App. 149, 149-150 (1) ( 553 SE2d 827 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Muldrow v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 194-195 (3) ( 744 SE2d 413 ) (2013); Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 204-205 (3) ( 739 SE2d 682 ) (2013); Martin v. State, 251 Ga. App. 149, 149-150 (1) ( 553 SE2d 827 ) (2001). 2024See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 194-195 (3) ( 744 SE2d 413 ) (2013); Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 204-205 (3) ( 739 SE2d 682 ) (2013); Martin v. State, 251 Ga. App. 149, 149-150 (1) ( 553 SE2d 827 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Roach v. Stouffergreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (105 SCt. 3099, 87 LE2d 114) (1985) (“The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess[.]”); Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 870 (8th Cir. 2009) (“immunity, either absolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are sued in their individual capacities”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2024See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 167 (II) (A) ( 105 SCt 3099 , 87 LE2d 114) (1985) (“The only immunities that can be claimed in an official- capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess[.]” (emphasis in original)); Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F3d 860, 870 (II) (8th Cir. 2009) (“immunity, either absolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are sued in their individual capacities” (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Kentucky v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (105 SCt. 3099, 87 LE2d 114) (1985) (“The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess[.]”); Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 870 (8th Cir. 2009) (“immunity, either absolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are sued in their individual capacities”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2024See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 167 (II) (A) ( 105 SCt 3099 , 87 LE2d 114) (1985) (“The only immunities that can be claimed in an official- capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess[.]” (emphasis in original)); Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F3d 860, 870 (II) (8th Cir. 2009) (“immunity, either absolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are sued in their individual capacities” (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Couch v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007See Nobles, supra, 422 U. S. at 233 (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination “ ‘is a personal privilege; it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him’ ”) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 327 (93 SC 611, 34 LE2d 548) (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Noblesgreen2 sentences2007See Nobles, supra, 422 U. S. at 233 (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination “ ‘is a personal privilege; it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him’ ”) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 327 (93 SC 611, 34 LE2d 548) (1973)). 2007See Nobles, supra, 422 U. S. at 233 (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination “ ‘is a personal privilege; it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him’ ”) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 327 (93 SC 611, 34 LE2d 548) (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Nishida v. Du Pont De Nemours & Companygreen1 sentence2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
Grigsby v. Whitegreen2 sentences2000See Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997); Reid v. U. S. Fidelity &c. 2000See Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997); Reid v. U. S. Fidelity &c. | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Countygreen2 sentences2000Such agreement, if upheld, would prevent GIIP, which is not a party to the action and has not agreed to be bound by the stipulation and agreement, from asserting the defense set forth in OCGA § 33-36-3 (2) (F); would allow DeKalb County to recover directly from GIIP, even *543 though DeKalb County’s assets at the time of the insured event were in excess of $3 million; and would frustrate the intent of the legislature in enacting the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool Act, which was “to provide this remedy to certain groups or ‘persons’ and exclude others with very large financial resources.” Ga. 2000Such agreement, if upheld, would prevent GIIP, which is not a party to the action and has not agreed to be bound by the stipulation and agreement, from asserting the defense set forth in OCGA § 33-36-3 (2) (F); would allow DeKalb County to recover directly from GIIP, even *543 though DeKalb County’s assets at the time of the insured event were in excess of $3 million; and would frustrate the intent of the legislature in enacting the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool Act, which was “to provide this remedy to certain groups or ‘persons’ and exclude others with very large financial resources.” Ga. | 1 | 1 |
King v. Stategreen2 sentences1999(Emphasis omitted.) King v. State, 226 Ga. App. 576, 584 (4) ( 486 SE2d 904 ) (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 270 Ga. 367 ( 509 SE2d 32 ) (1998). 1999(Emphasis omitted.) King v. State, 226 Ga. App. 576, 584 (4) ( 486 SE2d 904 ) (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 270 Ga. 367 ( 509 SE2d 32 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Fictum v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murphy v. Huntgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Fulton Concrete Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirkland v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Butler v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bethea v. Forbesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jacobs v. Hoppergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dye v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Patton v. United Statesred | 1 | 1 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dickens v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stone v. Marshall & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vanderbilt v. Vanderbiltgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Palmer, Stuart & Co. v. Smith
green
2 sentences1935A different ruling would run counter to the line of decisions holding that coverture is privilege personal to the wife; as in Palmer v. Smith, 88 Ga. 84 ( 13 S. E. 956 ), where it was held: “A conveyance of land executed by a married woman in payment of her husband’s debt, though declared by the statute absolutely void, is only so as against her and upon her election to treat it as void, coverture being a personal privilege which is not available in behalf of a stranger to her title.” See also Hawes v. Glover, 126 Ga. 305 (5) ( 55 S. E. 62 ); Scaife v. Scaife, 134 Ga. 1 ( 67 S. E. 408 ); Royst 1935A different ruling would run counter to the line of decisions holding that coverture is privilege personal to the wife; as in Palmer v. Smith, 88 Ga. 84 ( 13 S. E. 956 ), where it was held: “A conveyance of land executed by a married woman in payment of her husband’s debt, though declared by the statute absolutely void, is only so as against her and upon her election to treat it as void, coverture being a personal privilege which is not available in behalf of a stranger to her title.” See also Hawes v. Glover, 126 Ga. 305 (5) ( 55 S. E. 62 ); Scaife v. Scaife, 134 Ga. 1 ( 67 S. E. 408 ); Royst | 4 | 1906–1935 |
Denson v. State
green
2 sentences1995See Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 ( 66 SE2d 773 ); Denson v. State, 209 Ga. 355 ( 72 SE2d 725 ); Phelps v. State, 130 Ga. App. 344 ( 203 SE2d 320 ).” Hooks v. State, 138 Ga. App. 539, 540 (3), supra. In the case sub judice, defendant failed to assert a plea of former jeopardy before retrial in January 1991. 1995See Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 ( 66 SE2d 773 ); Denson v. State, 209 Ga. 355 ( 72 SE2d 725 ); Phelps v. State, 130 Ga. App. 344 ( 203 SE2d 320 ).” Hooks v. State, 138 Ga. App. 539, 540 (3), supra. In the case sub judice, defendant failed to assert a plea of former jeopardy before retrial in January 1991. | 2 | 1976–1995 |
Phelps v. State
green
2 sentences1995See Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 ( 66 SE2d 773 ); Denson v. State, 209 Ga. 355 ( 72 SE2d 725 ); Phelps v. State, 130 Ga. App. 344 ( 203 SE2d 320 ).” Hooks v. State, 138 Ga. App. 539, 540 (3), supra. In the case sub judice, defendant failed to assert a plea of former jeopardy before retrial in January 1991. 1976See Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 ( 66 SE2d 773 ); Denson v. State, 209 Ga. 355 ( 72 SE2d 725 ); Phelps v. State, 130 Ga. App. 344 ( 203 SE2d 320 ). 4. | 2 | 1976–1995 |
Helms v. Young
green
2 sentences1995See Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 ( 66 SE2d 773 ); Denson v. State, 209 Ga. 355 ( 72 SE2d 725 ); Phelps v. State, 130 Ga. App. 344 ( 203 SE2d 320 ).” Hooks v. State, 138 Ga. App. 539, 540 (3), supra. In the case sub judice, defendant failed to assert a plea of former jeopardy before retrial in January 1991. 1976See Key v. State, 84 Ga. App. 599, 600 ( 66 SE2d 773 ); Denson v. State, 209 Ga. 355 ( 72 SE2d 725 ); Phelps v. State, 130 Ga. App. 344 ( 203 SE2d 320 ). 4. | 2 | 1976–1995 |
Raney v. McRae
green
2 sentences1972And I speak what I know, when I say that the opinion of this court, in The Central Bank of Georgia v. Gibson ( 11 Ga. Rep. 453 ) was not intended, nor so understood at the time, to be in conflict with this principle.” Raney v. McRae, 14 Ga. 589, 593 . 1880The amount sued on was for$24.25, so that justice Cleghorn had jurisdiction •-of the subject-matter of the suit under the law, and although he did not have jurisdiction of the defendant’s person in his district, yet that was a personal privilege which the defendant had the right to waive so far as he -was individually concerned, but not as to the rights of other persons. 14 Ga., 589 . | 2 | 1880–1972 |
Small v. Cohen
green
2 sentences1964Burch v. Wofford-Terrell Co., 52 Ga. App. 685 ( 184 SE 419 ); Small v. Cohen, 102 Ga. 248 (3) ( 29 SE 430 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. R. 1964Burch v. Wofford-Terrell Co., 52 Ga. App. 685 ( 184 SE 419 ); Small v. Cohen, 102 Ga. 248 (3) ( 29 SE 430 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. R. | 2 | 1936–1964 |
Hawes v. Gloves
green
2 sentences1935A different ruling would run counter to the line of decisions holding that coverture is privilege personal to the wife; as in Palmer v. Smith, 88 Ga. 84 ( 13 S. E. 956 ), where it was held: “A conveyance of land executed by a married woman in payment of her husband’s debt, though declared by the statute absolutely void, is only so as against her and upon her election to treat it as void, coverture being a personal privilege which is not available in behalf of a stranger to her title.” See also Hawes v. Glover, 126 Ga. 305 (5) ( 55 S. E. 62 ); Scaife v. Scaife, 134 Ga. 1 ( 67 S. E. 408 ); Royst 1935A different ruling would run counter to the line of decisions holding that coverture is privilege personal to the wife; as in Palmer v. Smith, 88 Ga. 84 ( 13 S. E. 956 ), where it was held: “A conveyance of land executed by a married woman in payment of her husband’s debt, though declared by the statute absolutely void, is only so as against her and upon her election to treat it as void, coverture being a personal privilege which is not available in behalf of a stranger to her title.” See also Hawes v. Glover, 126 Ga. 305 (5) ( 55 S. E. 62 ); Scaife v. Scaife, 134 Ga. 1 ( 67 S. E. 408 ); Royst | 2 | 1910–1935 |
Temple v. Velcro USA, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). 2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
EI DuPONT DE NEM. & CO. v. Ladner
green
2 sentences2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). 2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co.
green
2 sentences2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). 2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ford Motor v. Wagoner
green
2 sentences2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). 2001See Restatement of Torts, 3rd, Product Liability, § 13(b)(2). [2] Nishida v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.Miss.1957); Rekab, Inc. v. Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141 , 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Temple v. Velcro USA, 148 Cal.App.3d 1090 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378 , 73 So.2d 249 (1954). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
King v. State
green
2 sentences1999(Emphasis omitted.) King v. State, 226 Ga. App. 576, 584 (4) ( 486 SE2d 904 ) (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 270 Ga. 367 ( 509 SE2d 32 ) (1998). 1999(Emphasis omitted.) King v. State, 226 Ga. App. 576, 584 (4) ( 486 SE2d 904 ) (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 270 Ga. 367 ( 509 SE2d 32 ) (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Terry v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In re Estate of Adamson
green
2 sentences1998Furthermore, “it is well-settled that probate courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate conflicting claims of title to real or personal property.” In re Estate of Adamson, 215 Ga. App. 613 (1) ( 451 SE2d 501 ) (1994). 1998Furthermore, “it is well-settled that probate courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate conflicting claims of title to real or personal property.” In re Estate of Adamson, 215 Ga. App. 613 (1) ( 451 SE2d 501 ) (1994). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Goodroe v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Bradley v. Tenneco Oil Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Fountain v. Cabe green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Patterson v. Patterson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Williamson & Co. v. Morgan green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Curcio v. United States green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Webb v. Southern Cotton Oil Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Fay v. Noia red | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Brookhart v. Janis green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Barber v. Page green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Boykin v. Alabama green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Estelle v. Williams green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Francis v. Henderson green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Davis v. United States green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Johnson v. Aetna Insurance Company green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Nevels v. Detroiter Mobile Homes green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Underwood v. American Book Company green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Central Bank v. Gibson green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Carter v. State green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Rawlins v. Georgia green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Moses v. Chapman neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Daneker v. Megrue neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Burch v. Wofford-Terrell Co. neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Aiken v. Bank of Georgia green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Personal Finance Co. v. Silver neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.