personal defense in District of Columbia

2008An amendment to section 16-910 changed the terms "award and apportion” to “distribute.” Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Council intended this to be a substantive change. 8 . "[A] court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” In re T.K., 708 A.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C.1998) (quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 , 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957)); see also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 576 , 76 S.Ct. 629 , 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956) (holding that Ohio need not give full faith and credit t

2008An amendment to section 16-910 changed the terms "award and apportion” to “distribute.” Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Council intended this to be a substantive change. 8 . "[A] court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” In re T.K., 708 A.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C.1998) (quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 , 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957)); see also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 576 , 76 S.Ct. 629 , 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956) (holding that Ohio need not give full faith and credit t

2008An amendment to section 16-910 changed the terms "award and apportion” to “distribute.” Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Council intended this to be a substantive change. 8 . "[A] court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” In re T.K., 708 A.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C.1998) (quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 , 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957)); see also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 576 , 76 S.Ct. 629 , 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956) (holding that Ohio need not give full faith and credit t

2008An amendment to section 16-910 changed the terms "award and apportion” to “distribute.” Nothing in the legisla tive history suggests that the Council intended this to be a substantive change. . "[A] court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” In re T.K., 708 A.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C.1998) (quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 , 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957)); see also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 576 , 76 S.Ct. 629 , 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956) (holding that Ohio need not give full faith and credit to

2008An amendment to section 16-910 changed the terms "award and apportion” to “distribute.” Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Council intended this to be a substantive change. 8 . "[A] court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” In re T.K., 708 A.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C.1998) (quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 , 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957)); see also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 576 , 76 S.Ct. 629 , 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956) (holding that Ohio need not give full faith and credit t

2008An amendment to section 16-910 changed the terms "award and apportion” to “distribute.” Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the Council intended this to be a substantive change. 8 . "[A] court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” In re T.K., 708 A.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C.1998) (quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 , 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957)); see also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 576 , 76 S.Ct. 629 , 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956) (holding that Ohio need not give full faith and credit t

2009Quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , which concerned the right to self-representation, the Court has said that “an accused’s right to present his own version of events in his own words” is “[e]ven more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation.” Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 , 107 S.Ct. 2704 .

2009Quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , which concerned the right to self-representation, the Court has said that “an accused’s right to present his own version of events in his own words” is “[e]ven more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation.” Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 , 107 S.Ct. 2704 .

1979We have required that the defendant be personally interrogated so that the record shows the defendant’s own affirmative waiver of his right to assistance of counsel, Gibson v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 221 A.2d 715 (1966), his waiver of his right to a jury trial, Hawkins v. United States, D.C.App., 385 A.2d 744, 746 (1978); Banks v. United States, D.C.App., 262 A.2d 110, 111 (1970); Jackson v. United States, D.C.App., 262 A.2d 106, 108-09 (1970), his entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, Bettis v. United States, D.C.App., 325 A.2d 190, 193 (1974); Durantes v. United States, D.C.A

1970App., 221 A.2d 715 (1966); or his desire to be represented by counsel also representing a codefendant, Lord v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 235 A.2d 322 (1967).

2022Id. (quoting United States v. Reeves, 293 F.Supp. 213, 214 (D.D.C. 1968)).

2020Yarmolinksy, 451 A.2d at 95. 28 And, given the absence of commonality 28 FDS notes that “the bulk of trial was devoted to whether the faxes at issue were in fact successfully transmitted to FDS and the class members.” It may be true that significant time was spent on this issue (largely because FDS itself had no record of the fax ad and had to rely on electronic evidence – introduced and explained via lay and expert witness testimony – to prove that FDS had actually received a fax ad in 2006).

2013McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91 (rejecting appellant's argument that he could not be convicted of unlawful entry because he "was not warned verbally or by sign to refrain from entering the premises” and holding instead that "it is more than plain that wandering through [a four-unit apartment] building, climbing on the roof or perching on the fire escape would be against the will of the owner”); Bowman, 212 A.2d at 611 (rejecting appellant’s contention "that there can be no unlawful entry under the statute unless such entry is contrary to a personal warning or instruction not to enter.”). 9 .

2013Mr. Fortune does not attempt to distinguish Welch , and instead argues that under United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 125 (D.C.Cir.1987), the trial court should have held an on-the-record hearing to advise Mr. Fortune of his right to be present at voir dire and obtained a personal waiver in open court.

2013See also McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91 ("[O]ne who enters for a good purpose and with a bona fide belief of his right to enter is not guilty of unlawful entry.”). 10 .

2013McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91 (rejecting appellant's argument that he could not be convicted of unlawful entry because he "was not warned verbally or by sign to refrain from entering the premises” and holding instead that "it is more than plain that wandering through [a four-unit apartment] building, climbing on the roof or perching on the fire escape would be against the will of the owner”); Bowman, 212 A.2d at 611 (rejecting appellant’s contention "that there can be no unlawful entry under the statute unless such entry is contrary to a personal warning or instruction not to enter.”). 9 .

2012In particular, appellants point out that the parking spaces (1) are assignable and transferable, cf. Union Travel Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Assocs., Inc., 401 A.2d 105, 107 (D.C.1979) (noting that a license does not run with the land and is “generally not assignable,” whereas a lease “confers upon a tenant exclusive possession of the subject premises as against all the world, including the owner”); (2) are not revocable by the Owners’ Association, cf. Jackson v. Emmons, 19 App.D.C. 250 , 1902 WL 19620 , at *4 (1902) ("[A] license is a personal privilege ... conveys no estate or interest, and is r

2002Likewise, in Bovs the Court reiterated that “the exemption of the consul of a foreign government from suit in particular courts, is the privilege, not of the person who happens to fill that office, but of the state or government he represents.” Ill U. S. at 256, 4 S.Ct. 407 ; see also Miller v. Van Loben Sells, 66 Cal. 341 , 5 P. 512, 512 (Cal.1885) (“[A] personal privilege may be waived, but exemption or immunity by virtue of official character from liability to be sued in certain courts is not a personal privilege; it is a question of jurisdiction.”); 6 McKay v. Garcia, 16 F. Cas. 175, 175 (

2002Likewise, in Bovs the Court reiterated that “the exemption of the consul of a foreign government from suit in particular courts, is the privilege, not of the person who happens to fill that office, but of the state or government he represents.” Ill U. S. at 256, 4 S.Ct. 407 ; see also Miller v. Van Loben Sells, 66 Cal. 341 , 5 P. 512, 512 (Cal.1885) (“[A] personal privilege may be waived, but exemption or immunity by virtue of official character from liability to be sued in certain courts is not a personal privilege; it is a question of jurisdiction.”); 6 McKay v. Garcia, 16 F. Cas. 175, 175 (

2002Likewise, in Bovs the Court reiterated that “the exemption of the consul of a foreign government from suit in particular courts, is the privilege, not of the person who happens to fill that office, but of the state or government he represents.” Ill U. S. at 256, 4 S.Ct. 407 ; see also Miller v. Van Loben Sells, 66 Cal. 341 , 5 P. 512, 512 (Cal.1885) (“[A] personal privilege may be waived, but exemption or immunity by virtue of official character from liability to be sued in certain courts is not a personal privilege; it is a question of jurisdiction.”); 6 McKay v. Garcia, 16 F. Cas. 175, 175 (

2002See Jackson v. United States, 498 A.2d 185, 189 (D.C.1985) (holding that the right to a jury trial may only be waived by the defendant herself, and, to be effective, must be done both orally and in writing).

2002Likewise, in Bovs the Court reiterated that “the exemption of the consul of a foreign government from suit in particular courts, is the privilege, not of the person who happens to fill that office, but of the state or government he represents.” Ill U. S. at 256, 4 S.Ct. 407 ; see also Miller v. Van Loben Sells, 66 Cal. 341 , 5 P. 512, 512 (Cal.1885) (“[A] personal privilege may be waived, but exemption or immunity by virtue of official character from liability to be sued in certain courts is not a personal privilege; it is a question of jurisdiction.”); 6 McKay v. Garcia, 16 F. Cas. 175, 175 (

2002Likewise, in Bovs the Court reiterated that “the exemption of the consul of a foreign government from suit in particular courts, is the privilege, not of the person who happens to fill that office, but of the state or government he represents.” Ill U. S. at 256, 4 S.Ct. 407 ; see also Miller v. Van Loben Sells, 66 Cal. 341 , 5 P. 512, 512 (Cal.1885) (“[A] personal privilege may be waived, but exemption or immunity by virtue of official character from liability to be sued in certain courts is not a personal privilege; it is a question of jurisdiction.”); 6 McKay v. Garcia, 16 F. Cas. 175, 175 (

2002Likewise, in Bovs the Court reiterated that “the exemption of the consul of a foreign government from suit in particular courts, is the privilege, not of the person who happens to fill that office, but of the state or government he represents.” Ill U. S. at 256, 4 S.Ct. 407 ; see also Miller v. Van Loben Sells, 66 Cal. 341 , 5 P. 512, 512 (Cal.1885) (“[A] personal privilege may be waived, but exemption or immunity by virtue of official character from liability to be sued in certain courts is not a personal privilege; it is a question of jurisdiction.”); 6 McKay v. Garcia, 16 F. Cas. 175, 175 (