personal waiver in Alaska

2020And you’re not under the influence of any medication or anything that might affect your decision in deciding to waive a jury trial and have the case presented to me as a bench trial. 5 Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Alaska 1978); see Walunga v. State, 630 P.2d 527, 528 (Alaska 1980) (explaining that Criminal Rule 23(a) “require[s] a personal inquiry by the court to determine whether the defendant’s waiver is voluntary and knowing”). –7– 2676 Mr. Hedrick: Yeah, I — The Court: That’s what you want to do?

1993Walunga, 630 P.2d at 628 .

2020And you’re not under the influence of any medication or anything that might affect your decision in deciding to waive a jury trial and have the case presented to me as a bench trial. 5 Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Alaska 1978); see Walunga v. State, 630 P.2d 527, 528 (Alaska 1980) (explaining that Criminal Rule 23(a) “require[s] a personal inquiry by the court to determine whether the defendant’s waiver is voluntary and knowing”). –7– 2676 Mr. Hedrick: Yeah, I — The Court: That’s what you want to do?

1980In Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388 , 1390 & n. 12 (Alaska 1978), however, we stated that the rule does require a personal inquiry by the court to determine whether the defendant’s waiver is voluntary and knowing.

2024As we explained in Marshall, there are jurisdictions that require a personal waiver from the defendant before accepting stipulations that essentially amount to a guilty plea. 61 There are also jurisdictions that 57 Id. at 332 . 58 Id. at 332-33 . 59 Id. at 333 . 60 Id. at 337 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring). 61 Marshall v. State, 436 P.3d 1065 , 1069 n.16 (Alaska App. 2018) (collecting cases). – 14 – 2779 prohibit trial courts from accepting stipulations to which the defendant has expressly objected.62 In his reply brief, Hank cites to various jurisdictions that require the trial court to obtai

2024As we explained in Marshall, there are jurisdictions that require a personal waiver from the defendant before accepting stipulations that essentially amount to a guilty plea. 61 There are also jurisdictions that 57 Id. at 332 . 58 Id. at 332-33 . 59 Id. at 333 . 60 Id. at 337 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring). 61 Marshall v. State, 436 P.3d 1065 , 1069 n.16 (Alaska App. 2018) (collecting cases). – 14 – 2779 prohibit trial courts from accepting stipulations to which the defendant has expressly objected.62 In his reply brief, Hank cites to various jurisdictions that require the trial court to obtai

2024As we explained in Marshall, there are jurisdictions that require a personal waiver from the defendant before accepting stipulations that essentially amount to a guilty plea. 61 There are also jurisdictions that 57 Id. at 332 . 58 Id. at 332-33 . 59 Id. at 333 . 60 Id. at 337 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring). 61 Marshall v. State, 436 P.3d 1065 , 1069 n.16 (Alaska App. 2018) (collecting cases). – 14 – 2779 prohibit trial courts from accepting stipulations to which the defendant has expressly objected.62 In his reply brief, Hank cites to various jurisdictions that require the trial court to obtai

2024As we explained in Marshall, there are jurisdictions that require a personal waiver from the defendant before accepting stipulations that essentially amount to a guilty plea. 61 There are also jurisdictions that 57 Id. at 332 . 58 Id. at 332-33 . 59 Id. at 333 . 60 Id. at 337 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring). 61 Marshall v. State, 436 P.3d 1065 , 1069 n.16 (Alaska App. 2018) (collecting cases). – 14 – 2779 prohibit trial courts from accepting stipulations to which the defendant has expressly objected.62 In his reply brief, Hank cites to various jurisdictions that require the trial court to obtai

2024As we explained in Marshall, there are jurisdictions that require a personal waiver from the defendant before accepting stipulations that essentially amount to a guilty plea. 61 There are also jurisdictions that 57 Id. at 332 . 58 Id. at 332-33 . 59 Id. at 333 . 60 Id. at 337 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring). 61 Marshall v. State, 436 P.3d 1065 , 1069 n.16 (Alaska App. 2018) (collecting cases). – 14 – 2779 prohibit trial courts from accepting stipulations to which the defendant has expressly objected.62 In his reply brief, Hank cites to various jurisdictions that require the trial court to obtai

2024As we explained in Marshall, there are jurisdictions that require a personal waiver from the defendant before accepting stipulations that essentially amount to a guilty plea. 61 There are also jurisdictions that 57 Id. at 332 . 58 Id. at 332-33 . 59 Id. at 333 . 60 Id. at 337 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring). 61 Marshall v. State, 436 P.3d 1065 , 1069 n.16 (Alaska App. 2018) (collecting cases). – 14 – 2779 prohibit trial courts from accepting stipulations to which the defendant has expressly objected.62 In his reply brief, Hank cites to various jurisdictions that require the trial court to obtai

2023A considerably longer period could elapse before trial without resultant unfairness or injustice to the accused.”); Stuard v. Stewart, 401 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a defendant’s statutory right to speedy trial under state law does not implicate the constitutional speedy trial right).

2023VI (same). 52 Jeske, 823 P.2d at 8; Coffman v. State, 2002 WL 341988 , at *14 (Alaska App. Mar. 6, 2002) (unpublished); see also Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1242-43 (Alaska App. 2000); State v. Vaughn, 200 P.3d 446, 451 (Kan. 2009) (holding that “[a]ctions of defense counsel are attributable to the defendant in computing speedy trial violations unless the defendant timely voices his or her disagreement with those actions”). 53 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 685 (Alaska App. 1990). 54 Id.; see also Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 , 1356 n.9 (Alaska 1978) (defendant’s consent to Rule 45 waive

2023Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.” (citation and quotations omitted)); Yoder v. State, 2008 WL 2853443 , at *3 (Alaska App. July 23, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that defendant’s choice between two competing rights — waiving right to counsel or agreeing to a continuance that would have exceeded the 120-day speedy trial limit — was “not sufficient to render the choice constitutionally offensive” (citation and quotation omitted)). 50 State

2023Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.” (citation and quotations omitted)); Yoder v. State, 2008 WL 2853443 , at *3 (Alaska App. July 23, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that defendant’s choice between two competing rights — waiving right to counsel or agreeing to a continuance that would have exceeded the 120-day speedy trial limit — was “not sufficient to render the choice constitutionally offensive” (citation and quotation omitted)). 50 State

2023VI (same). 52 Jeske, 823 P.2d at 8; Coffman v. State, 2002 WL 341988 , at *14 (Alaska App. Mar. 6, 2002) (unpublished); see also Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1242-43 (Alaska App. 2000); State v. Vaughn, 200 P.3d 446, 451 (Kan. 2009) (holding that “[a]ctions of defense counsel are attributable to the defendant in computing speedy trial violations unless the defendant timely voices his or her disagreement with those actions”). 53 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 685 (Alaska App. 1990). 54 Id.; see also Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 , 1356 n.9 (Alaska 1978) (defendant’s consent to Rule 45 waive

2023VI (same). 52 Jeske, 823 P.2d at 8; Coffman v. State, 2002 WL 341988 , at *14 (Alaska App. Mar. 6, 2002) (unpublished); see also Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1242-43 (Alaska App. 2000); State v. Vaughn, 200 P.3d 446, 451 (Kan. 2009) (holding that “[a]ctions of defense counsel are attributable to the defendant in computing speedy trial violations unless the defendant timely voices his or her disagreement with those actions”). 53 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 685 (Alaska App. 1990). 54 Id.; see also Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 , 1356 n.9 (Alaska 1978) (defendant’s consent to Rule 45 waive

2023VI (same). 52 Jeske, 823 P.2d at 8; Coffman v. State, 2002 WL 341988 , at *14 (Alaska App. Mar. 6, 2002) (unpublished); see also Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1242-43 (Alaska App. 2000); State v. Vaughn, 200 P.3d 446, 451 (Kan. 2009) (holding that “[a]ctions of defense counsel are attributable to the defendant in computing speedy trial violations unless the defendant timely voices his or her disagreement with those actions”). 53 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 685 (Alaska App. 1990). 54 Id.; see also Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 , 1356 n.9 (Alaska 1978) (defendant’s consent to Rule 45 waive

2023Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.” (citation and quotations omitted)); Yoder v. State, 2008 WL 2853443 , at *3 (Alaska App. July 23, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that defendant’s choice between two competing rights — waiving right to counsel or agreeing to a continuance that would have exceeded the 120-day speedy trial limit — was “not sufficient to render the choice constitutionally offensive” (citation and quotation omitted)). 50 State

2023VI (same). 52 Jeske, 823 P.2d at 8; Coffman v. State, 2002 WL 341988 , at *14 (Alaska App. Mar. 6, 2002) (unpublished); see also Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1242-43 (Alaska App. 2000); State v. Vaughn, 200 P.3d 446, 451 (Kan. 2009) (holding that “[a]ctions of defense counsel are attributable to the defendant in computing speedy trial violations unless the defendant timely voices his or her disagreement with those actions”). 53 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 685 (Alaska App. 1990). 54 Id.; see also Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 , 1356 n.9 (Alaska 1978) (defendant’s consent to Rule 45 waive

2023VI (same). 52 Jeske, 823 P.2d at 8; Coffman v. State, 2002 WL 341988 , at *14 (Alaska App. Mar. 6, 2002) (unpublished); see also Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1242-43 (Alaska App. 2000); State v. Vaughn, 200 P.3d 446, 451 (Kan. 2009) (holding that “[a]ctions of defense counsel are attributable to the defendant in computing speedy trial violations unless the defendant timely voices his or her disagreement with those actions”). 53 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 685 (Alaska App. 1990). 54 Id.; see also Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 , 1356 n.9 (Alaska 1978) (defendant’s consent to Rule 45 waive

2015Ev, Jr, Trg Law or EasemENts anp Licenses in Lamp § 11:1 (2014) ("Generally a license is not viewed as an interest in the land."); see also, e.g., Rau v. Collins, 167 Md.App. 176 , 891 A.2d 1175, 1184 (2006) (noting that license is a personal privilege rather than an interest in the land); Wilson v. Staats, 232 W.Va. 227 , 751 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2013) (noting that essential characteristic of license is that it does not create an interest in land, only a "personal and revocable privilege").

2015Ev, Jr, Trg Law or EasemENts anp Licenses in Lamp § 11:1 (2014) ("Generally a license is not viewed as an interest in the land."); see also, e.g., Rau v. Collins, 167 Md.App. 176 , 891 A.2d 1175, 1184 (2006) (noting that license is a personal privilege rather than an interest in the land); Wilson v. Staats, 232 W.Va. 227 , 751 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2013) (noting that essential characteristic of license is that it does not create an interest in land, only a "personal and revocable privilege").

2015Ev, Jr, Trg Law or EasemENts anp Licenses in Lamp § 11:1 (2014) ("Generally a license is not viewed as an interest in the land."); see also, e.g., Rau v. Collins, 167 Md.App. 176 , 891 A.2d 1175, 1184 (2006) (noting that license is a personal privilege rather than an interest in the land); Wilson v. Staats, 232 W.Va. 227 , 751 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2013) (noting that essential characteristic of license is that it does not create an interest in land, only a "personal and revocable privilege").

2015Ev, Jr, Trg Law or EasemENts anp Licenses in Lamp § 11:1 (2014) ("Generally a license is not viewed as an interest in the land."); see also, e.g., Rau v. Collins, 167 Md.App. 176 , 891 A.2d 1175, 1184 (2006) (noting that license is a personal privilege rather than an interest in the land); Wilson v. Staats, 232 W.Va. 227 , 751 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2013) (noting that essential characteristic of license is that it does not create an interest in land, only a "personal and revocable privilege").

1987See, e.g., United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.1971) (perpetrator of crime of bribing official acquitted on ground of entrapment; accessory convicted); State v. Harvey, 303 Or. 351 , 736 P.2d 191 (1987) (perpetrator's defense of duress does not insulate instigator from criminal liability).

1987See, e.g., United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.1971) (perpetrator of crime of bribing official acquitted on ground of entrapment; accessory convicted); State v. Harvey, 303 Or. 351 , 736 P.2d 191 (1987) (perpetrator’s defense of duress does not insulate instigator from criminal liability).

1987See, e.g., United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.1971) (perpetrator of crime of bribing official acquitted on ground of entrapment; accessory convicted); State v. Harvey, 303 Or. 351 , 736 P.2d 191 (1987) (perpetrator's defense of duress does not insulate instigator from criminal liability).

1987See, e.g., United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.1971) (perpetrator of crime of bribing official acquitted on ground of entrapment; accessory convicted); State v. Harvey, 303 Or. 351 , 736 P.2d 191 (1987) (perpetrator's defense of duress does not insulate instigator from criminal liability).

1963See also Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Or. 45 , 361 P.2d 64 (1961), in which the appellate court held that the husband’s personal immunity against an action by the wife for injuries resulting from his negligence in the operation of his employer’s automobile in the course of employment did not extend to the employer.

1963See also Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Or. 45 , 361 P.2d 64 (1961), in which the appellate court held that the husband’s personal immunity against an action by the wife for injuries resulting from his negligence in the operation of his employer’s automobile in the course of employment did not extend to the employer.