personal privilege in Michigan

1971Under such facts the defendant did not have any standing to raise the legality of the search and seizure." Judge FITZGERALD quoted the general rule from which the holding stems with approval in his authored opinion in People v. Hale (1967), 7 Mich App 127, 132 . "`The immunity to illegal searches and seizures is a personal privilege, and evidence wrongfully obtained * * * is not incompetent against accused where the unlawful search and seizure was of the person or property of a third person.'" By including this excerpt, I do not mean to imply that I hold the search in this case was unlawful, I

1971Under such facts the defendant did not have any standing to raise the legality of the search and seizure.” Judge Fitzgerald quoted the general rule from which the holding stems with approval in his authored opinion in People v. Hale (1967), 7 Mich App 127, 132 . “ ‘The immunity to illegal searches and seizures is a personal privilege, and evidence wrongfully obtained * * * is not incompetent against accused where the unlawful search and seizure was of the person or property of a third person.’ ” By including this excerpt, I do not mean to imply that I hold the search in this case was unlawful,

2018However, Clifford also expressly concedes that these arguments do not entitle him to relief because Butler testified at trial, thereby alleviating any confrontation clause concerns, People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 275 ; 715 NW2d 290 (2006), and because Clifford cannot seek to have Butler’s confession suppressed based on a violation of Butler’s rights, see People v Wood, 447 Mich 80, 89 ; 523 NW2d 477 (1994) (“As a general rule, criminal defendants do not have standing to assert the rights of third parties.”); Paramount Pictures Corp v Miskinis, 418 Mich 708, 715 ; 344 NW2d 788 (1984) (“The Fifth

2018However, Clifford also expressly concedes that these arguments do not entitle him to relief because Butler testified at trial, thereby alleviating any confrontation clause concerns, People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 275 ; 715 NW2d 290 (2006), and because Clifford cannot seek to have Butler’s confession suppressed based on a violation of Butler’s rights, see People v Wood, 447 Mich 80, 89 ; 523 NW2d 477 (1994) (“As a general rule, criminal defendants do not have standing to assert the rights of third parties.”); Paramount Pictures Corp v Miskinis, 418 Mich 708, 715 ; 344 NW2d 788 (1984) (“The Fifth

1985Tuxedo Enterprises, Inc v Detroit Trust Co, 272 Mich 160, 167 ; 261 NW 283 (1935); Dimmitt & Owens Financial, Inc v Realtek Industries, Inc, 90 Mich App 429, 436 ; 280 NW2d 827 (1979).

1985Tuxedo Enterprises, Inc v Detroit Trust Co, 272 Mich 160, 167 ; 261 NW 283 (1935); Dimmitt & Owens Financial, Inc v Realtek Industries, Inc, 90 Mich App 429, 436 ; 280 NW2d 827 (1979).

2018Although the restriction on use of peer-review materials is termed a “privilege,” the language of MCL 333.20175(5) does not create a personal privilege, such as a physician-patient privilege that may be waived by a patient. -2- See Meier v Awaad, 299 Mich App 655, 666 ; 832 NW2d 251 (2013) (discussing the scope of the physician-patient privilege).

2018Although the restriction on use of peer-review materials is termed a “privilege,” the language of MCL 333.20175(5) does not create a personal privilege, such as a physician-patient privilege that may be waived by a patient. -2- See Meier v Awaad, 299 Mich App 655, 666 ; 832 NW2d 251 (2013) (discussing the scope of the physician-patient privilege).

2016However unusual such an agreement might be, if the parties wish to make a “distinct, formal, solemn admission,” Ortega v Lenderink, 382 Mich 218, 222-223 ; 169 NW2d 470 (1969), that plaintiff’s claim against defendants is a personal claim against them for wrongs they committed against him personally and his recovery, if any, is on a theory of imposing a constructive trust due to their alleged undue influence; I find no reason why the courts should not be bound to treat that agreement as a fact.

2016However unusual such an agreement might be, if the parties wish to make a “distinct, formal, solemn admission,” Ortega v Lenderink, 382 Mich 218, 222-223 ; 169 NW2d 470 (1969), that plaintiff’s claim against defendants is a personal claim against them for wrongs they committed against him personally and his recovery, if any, is on a theory of imposing a constructive trust due to their alleged undue influence; I find no reason why the courts should not be bound to treat that agreement as a fact.

2014The provision cites as an example “a situation in which [Social Security benefits] are the only direct deposit payments in the account,” and notes that a “beneficiary or recipient can use [42 USC 407(a)] as a personal defense if ordered to pay his or her payments to someone else, or if his or her payments are ordered to be taken by legal process.” Id.

2012Although Brookhart discussed confrontation, the dispositive issue in that case concerned whether counsel has power to enter a plea which is inconsistent with his client’s expressed desire and thereby waive his client’s constitutional right to plead not guilty and have a trial in which he can confront and cross- examine the witnesses against him. [Brookhart, 384 US at 7 .] Thus, Brookhart merely dealt with waiver of the right to plead not guilty, not waiver of the right of confrontation.

2012Although Brookhart discussed confrontation, the dispositive issue in that case concerned whether counsel has power to enter a plea which is inconsistent with his client’s expressed desire and thereby waive his client’s constitutional right to plead not guilty and have a trial in which he can confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. [Brookhart, 384 US at 7 .] Thus, Brookhart merely dealt with waiver of the right to plead not guilty, not waiver of the right of confrontation.

2012Still, Lawson has been cited in a number of other cases, including Buie I,11 as 11 See, e.g., People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268, 277 ; 731 NW2d 797 (2007).

2012Still, Lawson has been cited in a number of other cases, including Buie I,11 as 11 See, e.g., People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268, 277 ; 731 NW2d 797 (2007).

2012As the Court of Appeals below correctly indicated, “the personal waiver rule articulated by [Lawson] is dictum and is, therefore, not binding.” Buie II, 291 Mich App at 272 .

2012As the Court of Appeals below correctly indicated, “the personal waiver rule articulated by [Lawson] is dictum and is, therefore, not binding.” Buie II, 291 Mich App at 272 .

1997Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act, 6 7 the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l, 361 US 477 ; 80 S Ct 419 ; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 394 ; 102 S Ct 3141 ; 73 L Ed 2d 835 (1982). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 8

1997Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act, 6 7 the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l, 361 US 477 ; 80 S Ct 419 ; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 394 ; 102 S Ct 3141 ; 73 L Ed 2d 835 (1982). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 8

1997Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act, 6 7 the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l, 361 US 477 ; 80 S Ct 419 ; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 394 ; 102 S Ct 3141 ; 73 L Ed 2d 835 (1982). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 8

1997Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act, 6 7 the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l, 361 US 477 ; 80 S Ct 419 ; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 394 ; 102 S Ct 3141 ; 73 L Ed 2d 835 (1982). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 8

1997Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act, 6 7 the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l, 361 US 477 ; 80 S Ct 419 ; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 394 ; 102 S Ct 3141 ; 73 L Ed 2d 835 (1982). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 8

1997Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act, 6 7 the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l, 361 US 477 ; 80 S Ct 419 ; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 394 ; 102 S Ct 3141 ; 73 L Ed 2d 835 (1982). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 8

1997She was exercising a personal privilege for her own personal benefit in attending a meeting of an organization of which she was a member and the purposes of which were clearly for her own interests and not necessarily in any way for the benefit of her employer." [ Id. at 88 , 44 N.W.2d 880 , quoting Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 191 Cal. 557, 562 , 217 P. 744 (1923).] We agree with Associated Oil that an employee is acting in the scope of employment when "the employee is doing the duty he is employed to perform...." Id.

1997She was exercising a personal privilege for her own personal benefit in attending a meeting of an organization of which she was a member and the purposes of which were clearly for her own interests and not necessarily in any way for the benefit of her employer." [ Id. at 88 , 44 N.W.2d 880 , quoting Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 191 Cal. 557, 562 , 217 P. 744 (1923).] We agree with Associated Oil that an employee is acting in the scope of employment when "the employee is doing the duty he is employed to perform...." Id.

1997She was exercising a personal privilege for her own personal benefit in attending a meeting of an organization of which she was a member and the purposes of which were clearly for her own interests and not necessarily in any way for the benefit of her employer." [ Id. at 88 , 44 N.W.2d 880 , quoting Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 191 Cal. 557, 562 , 217 P. 744 (1923).] We agree with Associated Oil that an employee is acting in the scope of employment when "the employee is doing the duty he is employed to perform...." Id.

1997She was exercising a personal privilege for her own personal benefit in attending a meeting of an organization of which she was a member and the purposes of which were clearly for her own interests and not necessarily in any way for the benefit of her employer." [ Id. at 88 , 44 N.W.2d 880 , quoting Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 191 Cal. 557, 562 , 217 P. 744 (1923).] We agree with Associated Oil that an employee is acting in the scope of employment when "the employee is doing the duty he is employed to perform...." Id.

1994Taxes levied after the act went into effect may properly be made a personal claim, but the rejected taxes of 1884, reassessed under the act of 1885, cannot, in our opinion, be made a personal claim against the owner of the land. [ 83 Mich 582 .] See Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 9 ; 345 NW2d 184 (1984).

1994Taxes levied after the act went into effect may properly be made a personal claim, but the rejected taxes of 1884, reassessed under the act of 1885, cannot, in our opinion, be made a personal claim against the owner of the land. [ 83 Mich 582 .] See Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 9 ; 345 NW2d 184 (1984).

1994In Municipal Investors Ass’n v Birmingham, 298 Mich 314, 325 ; 299 NW 90 (1941), this Court had the following to say about the intent behind amendments to the statutes providing for judicial sale of real property for delinquent taxes: The clear import of the language of the foregoing amendatory enactments, and the obvious intent and purpose of the legislature to relieve owners from the weight of accumulated obligation . . . must lead one to the conclusion that when title to [real property] became absolute in the State of Michigan upon expiration of the period of redemption provided by the tax

1994In Municipal Investors Ass'n v Birmingham, 298 Mich 314, 325 ; 299 NW 90 (1941), this Court had the following to say about the intent behind amendments to the statutes providing for judicial sale of real property for delinquent taxes: The clear import of the language of the foregoing amendatory enactments, and the obvious intent and purpose of the legislature to relieve owners from the weight of accumulated obligation ... must lead one to the conclusion that when title to [real property] became absolute in the State of Michigan upon expiration of the period of redemption provided by the tax la

1994In Municipal Investors Ass’n v Birmingham, 298 Mich 314, 325 ; 299 NW 90 (1941), this Court had the following to say about the intent behind amendments to the statutes providing for judicial sale of real property for delinquent taxes: The clear import of the language of the foregoing amendatory enactments, and the obvious intent and purpose of the legislature to relieve owners from the weight of accumulated obligation . . . must lead one to the conclusion that when title to [real property] became absolute in the State of Michigan upon expiration of the period of redemption provided by the tax

1994In Municipal Investors Ass'n v Birmingham, 298 Mich 314, 325 ; 299 NW 90 (1941), this Court had the following to say about the intent behind amendments to the statutes providing for judicial sale of real property for delinquent taxes: The clear import of the language of the foregoing amendatory enactments, and the obvious intent and purpose of the legislature to relieve owners from the weight of accumulated obligation ... must lead one to the conclusion that when title to [real property] became absolute in the State of Michigan upon expiration of the period of redemption provided by the tax la

1994It is not the privilege of the court or of any third party. [Passmore v Passmore Estate, 50 Mich 626, 627 ; 16 NW 170 (1883), quoted in In re Dalton Estate, 346 Mich 613, 621 ; 78 NW2d 266 (1956).] In contrast, § 11(b)(1) is constructed less as a personal privilege than a systemic policy.

1994It is not the privilege of the court or of any third party. [Passmore v Passmore Estate, 50 Mich 626, 627 ; 16 NW 170 (1883), quoted in In re Dalton Estate, 346 Mich 613, 621 ; 78 NW2d 266 (1956).] In contrast, § 11(b)(1) is constructed less as a personal privilege than a systemic policy.

1994This Court held in Hoehner v Western Casualty & Surety Co, 8 Mich App 708, 714-715 ; 155 NW2d 231 (1967), that the statute of frauds is a personal defense available only to parties to a contract.

1994This Court held in Hoehner v Western Casualty & Surety Co, 8 Mich App 708, 714-715 ; 155 NW2d 231 (1967), that the statute of frauds is a personal defense available only to parties to a contract.

1994In the court's words, "[t]he meaning of, and the weight to be given an admission or declaration against interest are generally questions for the jury." [2] Ante, p 229. [3] In Sheffield v Runner, 163 Cal App 2d 48; 328 P2d 828 (1958), a physician's statement that he should have put the patient in a hospital was held to be prima facie evidence of the standard of care and breach.

1994It is not the privilege of the court or of any third party. [Passmore v Passmore Estate, 50 Mich 626, 627 ; 16 NW 170 (1883), quoted in In re Dalton Estate, 346 Mich 613, 621 ; 78 NW2d 266 (1956).] In contrast, § 11(b)(1) is constructed less as a personal privilege than a systemic policy.

1994It is not the privilege of the court or of any third party. [Passmore v Passmore Estate, 50 Mich 626, 627 ; 16 NW 170 (1883), quoted in In re Dalton Estate, 346 Mich 613, 621 ; 78 NW2d 266 (1956).] In contrast, § 11(b)(1) is constructed less as a personal privilege than a systemic policy.