personal claim in Illinois

2004Rather, the party seeking relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected."'" Flynn, 199 Ill.2d at 437 , 264 Ill.Dec. 710 , 771 N.E.2d at 418 , quoting Gamefowl Breeders, 75 Ill.2d at 450-51 , 27 Ill.Dec. 465 , 389 N.E.2d 529 .

2004Rather, the party seeking relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected."'" Flynn, 199 Ill.2d at 437 , 264 Ill.Dec. 710 , 771 N.E.2d at 418 , quoting Gamefowl Breeders, 75 Ill.2d at 450-51 , 27 Ill.Dec. 465 , 389 N.E.2d 529 .

2014But the locality of a lawsuit–the place where judicial authority may be exercised–though defined by legislation relates to the convenience of the litigants and as such is subject to their disposition.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The Court further stated that venue is a personal privilege conferred by statute and may be asserted or waived at the litigant’s election, citing Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co. (1929), 278 U.S. 177, 179 .

2014But the locality of a lawsuit–the place where judicial authority may be exercised–though defined by legislation relates to the convenience of the litigants and as such is subject to their disposition.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The Court further stated that venue is a personal privilege conferred by statute and may be asserted or waived at the litigant’s election, citing Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co. (1929), 278 U.S. 177, 179 .

2003Second, the party seeking the declaration must be interested in the controversy and must possess a personal claim, status or right which is capable of being affected. [Citations.] To have standing, one must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury. [Citation.] The actual controversy requirement of standing cannot be satisfied where the underlying issues of the case are moot or premature. [Citation.] An issue is considered moot where events occur which make it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. [Citations.] When it becomes apparent that an opinio

2003Second, the party seeking the declaration must be interested in the controversy and must possess a personal claim, status or right which is capable of being affected. [Citations.] To have standing, one must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury. [Citation.] The actual controversy requirement of standing cannot be satisfied where the underlying issues of the case are moot or premature. [Citation.] An issue is considered moot where events occur which make it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. [Citations.] When it becomes apparent that an opinion

2007The supreme court held that the order was merely voidable because double jeopardy is “a personal privilege which may be waived.” Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 157 .

2007The supreme court held that the order was merely voidable because double jeopardy is "a personal privilege which may be waived." Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 157 , 189 Ill.Dec. 49 , 619 N.E.2d 750 .

2004Rather, the party seeking relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected."'" Flynn, 199 Ill.2d at 437 , 264 Ill.Dec. 710 , 771 N.E.2d at 418 , quoting Gamefowl Breeders, 75 Ill.2d at 450-51 , 27 Ill.Dec. 465 , 389 N.E.2d 529 .

2004Rather, the party seeking relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected."'" Flynn, 199 Ill.2d at 437 , 264 Ill.Dec. 710 , 771 N.E.2d at 418 , quoting Gamefowl Breeders, 75 Ill.2d at 450-51 , 27 Ill.Dec. 465 , 389 N.E.2d 529 .

2002Adams, 283 Ill.App.3d at 524 , 218 Ill.Dec. 805 , 669 N.E.2d 1331 ." People v. DeSantis, 319 Ill.App.3d 795, 801-02 , 253 Ill.Dec. 227 , 745 N.E.2d 1 (2001).

2002Adams, 283 Ill.

2001An association does not have standing to sue on behalf of its members, even those members allegedly affected by the challenged action, “unless it has been or will be directly injured and therefore has a personal claim related to its own property, or that it has suffered or will suffer injury to a substantive legally protected interest in its individual capacity.” Cable Television & Communications Ass’n of Illinois v. Ameritech Corp., 288 Ill.

2001An association does not have standing to sue on behalf of its members, even those members allegedly affected by the challenged action, "unless it has been or will be directly injured and therefore has a personal claim related to its own property, or that it has suffered or will suffer injury to a substantive legally protected interest in its individual capacity." Cable Television & Communications Ass'n of Illinois v. Ameritech Corp. , 288 Ill.

1984However, the court in French did not discuss our supreme court’s decision in People v. Murrell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 287 , which held that defense counsel’s statement waiving the defendant’s right to a jury trial in defendant’s presence constitutes a valid jury waiver. ( 60 Ill. 2d 287, 290-92 .) Although a personal waiver by the defendant is preferred, it is not constitutionally required, nor do the rules or statutes mandate it. ( 60 Ill. 2d 287, 291 .) As in Murrell, defendant has not argued that he wanted or that he was deprived of a jury trial.

1984However, the court in French did not discuss our supreme court’s decision in People v. Murrell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 287 , which held that defense counsel’s statement waiving the defendant’s right to a jury trial in defendant’s presence constitutes a valid jury waiver. ( 60 Ill. 2d 287, 290-92 .) Although a personal waiver by the defendant is preferred, it is not constitutionally required, nor do the rules or statutes mandate it. ( 60 Ill. 2d 287, 291 .) As in Murrell, defendant has not argued that he wanted or that he was deprived of a jury trial.

2021Id. at 786 . ¶ 32 On appeal, the Chapman court acknowledged that “many courts, [the Seventh Circuit] included, have applied the label ‘moot’ when a plaintiff declines an offer that would satisfy his entire demand.” Id.

2021Id. at 786 . ¶ 32 On appeal, the Chapman court acknowledged that “many courts, [the Seventh Circuit] included, have applied the label ‘moot’ when a plaintiff declines an offer that would satisfy his entire demand.” Id.

2013Rather, the party seeking relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected. [Citations.] The dispute must, therefore, touch the legal relations of parties who stand in a position adverse to one another.’ ” Village of Chatham, 216 Ill. 2d at 420 (quoting Underground Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375-76 (1977)). ¶ 11 All parties acknowledge that the assistant Public Access Counselor’s letter is a nonbinding opinion.

2009Rather, the party seeking relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected. [Citations.] The dispute must, therefore, touch the legal relations of parties who stand in a position adverse to one another.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Village of Chatham, 216 Ill. 2d at 420 , quoting Underground Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375-376 (1977).

2007Such jurisdiction is not defined by the propriety of the court's judgments. `There are many rights belonging to litigants-rights which a court may not properly deny, and yet which if denied do not oust the jurisdiction or render *685 the proceedings absolutely null and void.' ( Humphries v. District of Columbia (1899), 174 U.S. 190, 194 , 19 S.Ct. 637, 639 , 43 L.Ed. 944, 945 .) Significantly, this court has held that the constitutional right to not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is a personal privilege which may be waived.

2007Such jurisdiction is not defined by the propriety of the court's judgments. `There are many rights belonging to litigants-rights which a court may not properly deny, and yet which if denied do not oust the jurisdiction or render *685 the proceedings absolutely null and void.' ( Humphries v. District of Columbia (1899), 174 U.S. 190, 194 , 19 S.Ct. 637, 639 , 43 L.Ed. 944, 945 .) Significantly, this court has held that the constitutional right to not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is a personal privilege which may be waived.

1950(Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 ; People v. Wilson, 399 Ill. 437 .) In short, where the record in a non-capital case, as here, is silent and does not show that the accused.states, upon oath, that he was indigent and asked that counsel be appointed, he is deemed to have waived a personal privilege and has not been denied a constitutional right, and, in particular, he has not been denied due process of law.

1949Stat. 1943, chap. 38, par. 730,) the court is required to provide counsel for defendant only when he shall state on oath that he is unable to procure counsel, and in People v. Ross, 400 Ill. 237 , referring to the case of People v. Wilson, 399 Ill. 437 , we pointed out that, in noncapital cases where the record is silent and the accused did not on oath state that he was indigent and ask that counsel be appointed, he may be considered "to have waived a personal privilege and he has not been denied a constitutional right, nor has he been denied due process of law.

1943In Seymour v. Richardson Fueling Co., 205 Ill. 77, 83, 84 , it is said: ‘The rule that, where a money judgment is a unit as to all the defendants, the judgment must be against all or none, does not apply where a personal defense (such as a discharge in bankruptcy) is established as to one or more of the defendants.’ And in Hem v. Allen, 179 Ill.

1934In Seymour v. Richardson Fueling Co., 205 Ill. 77, 83, 84 , it is said: “The rule that, where a money judgment is a unit as to all the defendants, the judgment must be against all or none, does not apply where a personal defense (such as a discharge in bankruptcy) is established as to one or more of the defendants.” And in Hem v. Allen, 179 Ill.

2021Id. ¶ 44 In Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975), the sole employee and stockholder of a professional corporation was found in contempt for failing to obey a jury subpoena for the production of certain corporate records.

2021Id. - 16 - No. 1-20-0584 ¶ 44 In Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975), the sole employee and stockholder of a professional corporation was found in contempt for failing to obey a jury subpoena for the production of certain corporate records.

2021Id. ¶ 44 In Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975), the sole employee and stockholder of a professional corporation was found in contempt for failing to obey a jury subpoena for the production of certain corporate records.

2021Id. - 16 - No. 1-20-0584 ¶ 44 In Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975), the sole employee and stockholder of a professional corporation was found in contempt for failing to obey a jury subpoena for the production of certain corporate records.

2020The court held (1) a former employee- whistleblower with personal, nonpublic information of possible wrongdoing qualifies as an “interested person” under the Act and need not allege a personal claim, status, or right related to the proceedings and (2) the State need not suffer -2- money damages to partially assign its claim to a relator under the Act. 2019 IL App (1st) 180697 , ¶¶ 30, 37.

2020The court held (1) a former employee- whistleblower with personal, nonpublic information of possible wrongdoing qualifies as an “interested person” under the Act and need not allege a personal claim, status, or right related to the proceedings and (2) the State need not suffer -2- money damages to partially assign its claim to a relator under the Act. 2019 IL App (1st) 180697 , ¶¶ 30, 37.

2017Sinoying, 619 F.3d 207, 213-14 . ¶ 40 We believe Illinois courts have a similar responsibility and conclude that the trial court acted appropriately when it sua sponte raised the issue of personal jurisdiction over Quezada.

2017Sinoying, 619 F.3d at 213-14 . ¶ 40 We believe Illinois courts have a similar responsibility and conclude that the trial court acted appropriately when it sua sponte raised the issue of personal jurisdiction over Quezada.