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12 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United Fruit Company v. J. A. Folger & Companygreen1 sentence2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232-33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d | 1 | 1 |
Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc., a Nevada Corporation v. The World Church, a California Corporation, Jackson Appliance, Inc., a California Corporationgreen1 sentence2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232-33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d | 1 | 1 |
James D. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor v. Lodge 851, International Association of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers, Afl-Ciogreen1 sentence2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232-33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d | 1 | 1 |
Akin v. City of Miamigreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321-22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation | 1 | 1 |
Nugent v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar. 2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar. | 1 | 1 |
Gentry v. Fieldgreen2 sentences2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar. 2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar. | 1 | 1 |
Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co.green1 sentence2025Co., 47 P.2d 273, 275 (Cal. 1935) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a special defense, personal in its nature, which may be waived or asserted.”); PXP Producing Co. LLC v. MitEnergy Upstream LLC, C.A. | 1 | 1 |
Harold Kraft v. Wisdomtree Investments, Inc.green2 sentences2025It may be asserted only by a party against whom the claim is brought, or by persons standing in that party’s shoes or acting on its behalf. (collecting cases and discussing the rationale “was particularly apt when” the plaintiff sought “equitable remedies that were the functional equivalent of legal ones”). 43 Id. at 980 (observing over time, the Court’s “use of limitations periods widened”). 44 Id. at 983 (noting the Court should give strong deference to an analogous limitations period when a statute of limitation applies by analogy because of “its quasi-legal status”). 2025It may be asserted only by a party against whom the claim is brought, or by persons standing in that party’s shoes or acting on its behalf. (collecting cases and discussing the rationale “was particularly apt when” the plaintiff sought “equitable remedies that were the functional equivalent of legal ones”). 43 Id. at 980 (observing over time, the Court’s “use of limitations periods widened”). 44 Id. at 983 (noting the Court should give strong deference to an analogous limitations period when a statute of limitation applies by analogy because of “its quasi-legal status”). | 1 | 1 |
Zelson v. Thomfordegreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed. R. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. BARR, STATE TAX COMM.green1 sentence2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321-22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation | 1 | 1 |
Pendley v. Powersgreen2 sentences2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i 2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232-33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d | 1 | 1 |
Shilts v. Younggreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321-22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232-33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d | 1 | 1 |
City Collectors, Ltd. v. Mokugreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321-22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation | 1 | 1 |
Guaranty Security Co. v. Coadgreen2 sentences2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i 2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i | 1 | 1 |
Kobbeman v. Olesongreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321-22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation | 1 | 1 |
Shae Kevin Graham v. Sharea Fostergreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321-22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation | 1 | 1 |
Hudak v. Procekgreen1 sentence2025No. 2024-0668-MTZ June 26, 2025 Laches addresses the inequity arising from a defendant’s prejudice or injury caused by the plaintiff’s delay.23 Laches is a personal defense, available only to the defendant prejudiced by a plaintiff’s delay.24 “[T]he defense of laches is one personal to defendant, and arises out of the personal relationship between defendant and plaintiff[.]”25 To establish laches, the asserting party must demonstrate three elements: knowledge by the claimant, unreasonable delay in bringing the claim, and 23 Wolfe & Pittenger¸ supra note 20, at § 15.07[c][4] at 15-85; see Hudak | 1 | 1 |
Funk v. Kemptongreen2 sentences2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i 2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i | 1 | 1 |
Moshe Marcel Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, a Province of the Republic of Argentinagreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321-22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Pedersengreen1 sentence2025No. 2024-0668-MTZ June 26, 2025 Laches addresses the inequity arising from a defendant’s prejudice or injury caused by the plaintiff’s delay.23 Laches is a personal defense, available only to the defendant prejudiced by a plaintiff’s delay.24 “[T]he defense of laches is one personal to defendant, and arises out of the personal relationship between defendant and plaintiff[.]”25 To establish laches, the asserting party must demonstrate three elements: knowledge by the claimant, unreasonable delay in bringing the claim, and 23 Wolfe & Pittenger¸ supra note 20, at § 15.07[c][4] at 15-85; see Hudak | 1 | 1 |
Gary Gibson v. Timothy Hudockgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed. R. 2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed. R. | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. Tategreen2 sentences2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar. 2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar. | 1 | 1 |
Mountain Water Works Construction Co. v. Holmegreen2 sentences2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i 2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i | 1 | 1 |
In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litigationgreen1 sentence2019P’ship, 140 A.3d 1125 , 1140 n.76 (Del. 2016) (quoting In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1056 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
| Wied v. Valhi, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. Moskin Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Finn v. United States
green
1 sentence2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232-33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Allen v. Smith
green
1 sentence2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232-33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bellis v. United States
green
1 sentence2021“Since no artificial organization may utilize the personal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, . . . it follows that an individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of the organization may likewise not take advantage of his personal privilege.” Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re Williams green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Couch v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Neither of the cases cited by the Plaintiffs address the actual situation currently under review.’ As Jason is a minor child with documented developmental and cognitive disabilities, his parents are the only people that could effectively assert his Fifth Amendment, or any other, privilege.’ Moreover, given traditional living arrangements, parents will, as a matter of necessity and practical ° Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 7 See Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (involving a taxpayer’s business and tax records in possession of her accountant); Fish 2019Neither of the cases cited by the Plaintiffs address the actual situation currently under review.’ As Jason is a minor child with documented developmental and cognitive disabilities, his parents are the only people that could effectively assert his Fifth Amendment, or any other, privilege.’ Moreover, given traditional living arrangements, parents will, as a matter of necessity and practical ° Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 7 See Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (involving a taxpayer’s business and tax records in possession of her accountant); Fish | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Fisher v. United States green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Pollitz v. . Gould green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State Ex Rel. Porterie green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Brandt v. Olson green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Finkel v. Kushner neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Pennoyer v. Neff red | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| State v. Ashley green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.