personal defense in Delaware

2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar.

2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar.

2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i

2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i

2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar.

2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar.

2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232–33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d

2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar.

2025It may be waived only by the person entitled to rely upon it.”); Dolan v. Tate, 137 So. 515, 516 (Miss. 1931) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege that a defendant may waive.”); Gentry v. Field, 45 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo. 1898) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege[.]”); Nugent & Pullen v. Robertson, 88 So. 895, 898 (Miss. 1921) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a personal defense, and cannot be pleaded for one defendant by another.”); Guar.

2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232–33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d

2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321–22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation

2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321–22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation

2025Co., 47 P.2d 273, 275 (Cal. 1935) (“[T]he statute of limitations is a special defense, personal in its nature, which may be waived or asserted.”); PXP Producing Co. LLC v. MitEnergy Upstream LLC, C.A.

2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed.

2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed.

2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i

2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i

2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232–33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d

2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232–33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d

2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed.

2025A. Folger & Co., 270 F.2d 666 , 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959) (“The view that the statute of limitations is a personal defense pervades much of the law[.]”); Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 1971) (“It has long been held that a statute of limitations is a personal defense.” (first citing Allen, 129 U.S. at 470 ; and then citing Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 , 232–33 (1887))); see also Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting “the statute of limitations is a plea personal to the d

2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321–22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation

2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321–22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation

2025No. 2024-0668-MTZ June 26, 2025 Page 6 of 34 Laches addresses the inequity arising from a defendant’s prejudice or injury caused by the plaintiff’s delay.23 Laches is a personal defense, available only to the defendant prejudiced by a plaintiff’s delay.24 “[T]he defense of laches is one personal to defendant, and arises out of the personal relationship between defendant and plaintiff[.]”25 To establish laches, the asserting party must demonstrate three elements: knowledge by the claimant, unreasonable delay in bringing the claim, and 23 Wolfe & Pittenger¸ supra note 20, at § 15.07[c][4] at 15-

2025It may be asserted only by a party against whom the claim is brought, or by persons standing in that party’s shoes or acting on its behalf. (collecting cases and discussing the rationale “was particularly apt when” the plaintiff sought “equitable remedies that were the functional equivalent of legal ones”). 43 Id. at 980 (observing over time, the Court’s “use of limitations periods widened”). 44 Id. at 983 (noting the Court should give strong deference to an analogous limitations period when a statute of limitation applies by analogy because of “its quasi-legal status”).

2025It may be asserted only by a party against whom the claim is brought, or by persons standing in that party’s shoes or acting on its behalf. (collecting cases and discussing the rationale “was particularly apt when” the plaintiff sought “equitable remedies that were the functional equivalent of legal ones”). 43 Id. at 980 (observing over time, the Court’s “use of limitations periods widened”). 44 Id. at 983 (noting the Court should give strong deference to an analogous limitations period when a statute of limitation applies by analogy because of “its quasi-legal status”).

2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i

2025Co. v. Coad, 195 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1921) (holding “the statute of limitations can only be invoked by the debtor himself”); Mountain Waterworks Const. Co. v. Holme, 113 P. 501 , 509 (Colo. 1911) (“The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of a defendant.”); Pendley v. Powers, 58 S.E. 653, 653 (Ga. 1907) (“[T]he right to plead the statute of limitations to a suit is a personal privilege.”); Funk v. Kempton, 77 N.E. 683, 685 (Ill. 1906) (“The defense of the statute of limitations, being a personal defense, can only be made available by the person for whose use the statute i

2025See, e.g., Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, 123 N.E.3d 233 , 239 n.6 (N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims, [and] also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Foster, 893 N.W.2d 319 , 321–22 (Mich. 2017) (“[A] statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.”); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 640 (S.D. 1998) (“[T]he statute of limitation

2019P’ship, 140 A.3d 1125 , 1140 n.76 (Del. 2016) (quoting In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1056 (Del.

2009See Wied v. Valhi, Inc., 466 A.2d 9, 16 (Del.1983) (finding that where a failure to comply with Rule 23.1 was subsequently remedied and that the requirements of justice were satisfied, there was no breach of fiduciary duty). 175 .PWC makes a similar argument, stating that because the some of their allegedly negligent conduct occurred more than three years before the Stockholder Plaintiffs brought a claim, the claims about that conduct are time-barred.