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33 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1825–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berube v. City of Northamptongreen2 sentences2024See LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 326 (2012), quoting Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635, 638-639 (1992) (“Without liability in tort there is no right of contribution. … If one has a personal defense or special status that would bar liability, contribution is not allowed because it is only permitted from those liable, and not from those who are shown merely to be at fault.”). 2024See LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 326 (2012), quoting Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635, 638-639 (1992) (“Without liability in tort there is no right of contribution. … If one has a personal defense or special status that would bar liability, contribution is not allowed because it is only permitted from those liable, and not from those who are shown merely to be at fault.”). | 3 | 5 |
LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venturegreen2 sentences2024See LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 326 (2012), quoting Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635, 638-639 (1992) (“Without liability in tort there is no right of contribution. … If one has a personal defense or special status that would bar liability, contribution is not allowed because it is only permitted from those liable, and not from those who are shown merely to be at fault.”). 2024See LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 326 (2012), quoting Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635, 638-639 (1992) (“Without liability in tort there is no right of contribution. … If one has a personal defense or special status that would bar liability, contribution is not allowed because it is only permitted from those liable, and not from those who are shown merely to be at fault.”). | 2 | 2 |
Bellis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1994Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974) ("privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be `limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records'"), quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 . 701 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) ("right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege" and was not intended to extend to corporations). 1994Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974) (“privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be ‘limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records’ ”), quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 . 701 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) (“right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege” and was not intended to extend to corporations). | 2 | 2 |
Phillips v. Chasegreen2 sentences2002See Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 305-306 (1969); Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 450 (1909) (“ [I]f evidence is material and competent except for a personal privilege of one of the parties to have it excluded under the law, his claim of the privilege may be referred to in argument and considered by the jury, as indicating his opinion that the evidence, if received, would be prejudicial to him”). 1938But in Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 450 , it was said, “If evidence is material and competent except for a personal privilege of one of the parties to have it excluded under the law, his claim of the privilege may be referred to in argument and considered by the jury, as indicating his opinion that the evidence, if received, would be prejudicial to him. | 1 | 2 |
Gillis v. Bonelli-Adams Co.green1 sentence2012Gillis v. Bonelli-Adams Co., 284 Mass. 176, 181 (1933) (“There is no impropriety in joining the cause of action held by the plaintiff in his own right with the one acquired by him by assignment. | 1 | 1 |
Gonzales v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz , remarked one year before that decision, “I doubt many think that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses cannot be waived by counsel.” Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 256 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guineegreen1 sentence2011See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived”). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. New Yorkgreen1 sentence2010In short, “[a] defendant’s opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness.” Rock v. Arkansas, supra. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (“Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kordelgreen1 sentence2008See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 8 (1970) (corporation may not avoid obligation in civil suit to answer interrogatories by selecting individual to verify the answers who asserts his own fifth amendment privilege; “(s]uch a result would effectively permit the corporation to assert on its own behalf the personal privilege of its individual agents”). | 1 | 1 |
Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.green1 sentence2008See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 406 Mass. at 670 ; Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 15 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying Mass. law to minority shareholders’ freeze-out claim). | 1 | 1 |
Jon Sugarman v. Leonard Sugarman and Statler Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2008See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 406 Mass. at 670 ; Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 15 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying Mass. law to minority shareholders’ freeze-out claim). | 1 | 1 |
Kaye v. Newhallgreen1 sentence2002See Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 305-306 (1969); Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 450 (1909) (“ [I]f evidence is material and competent except for a personal privilege of one of the parties to have it excluded under the law, his claim of the privilege may be referred to in argument and considered by the jury, as indicating his opinion that the evidence, if received, would be prejudicial to him”). | 1 | 1 |
Baxter v. Palmigianogreen1 sentence2002See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Tindol v. Boston Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences1998Id; See also Tindol v. Boston Housing Authority, 396 Mass. 515 , 487 N.E. 2d 488 (1986); and Klein, supra. A claim to enforce a mechanics lien under G.L.c. 254 is an in rem claim against property and not a personal claim against any person or entity. 1998Id; See also Tindol v. Boston Housing Authority, 396 Mass. 515 , 487 N.E. 2d 488 (1986); and Klein, supra. A claim to enforce a mechanics lien under G.L.c. 254 is an in rem claim against property and not a personal claim against any person or entity. | 1 | 1 |
Hale v. Henkelred2 sentences1994Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974) ("privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be `limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records'"), quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 . 701 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) ("right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege" and was not intended to extend to corporations). 1994Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974) (“privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be ‘limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records’ ”), quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 . 701 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) (“right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege” and was not intended to extend to corporations). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Woodgreen2 sentences1994Commonwealth v. Wood, 302 Mass. 265, 269 (1939). 1994Commonwealth v. Wood, 302 Mass. 265, 269 (1939). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Simpsongreen1 sentence1991The privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege of a witness “not assertable by the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 121 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.green1 sentence1980Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothgreen1 sentence1980There is no longer room for doubt that a license granted under a statutory provision such as § 13 is a property right which can be revoked only upon compliance with the requirements of procedural due process (Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-577 [1972]), including the requirement of timely notice sufficient reasonably to apprise the licensee of information needed for the preparation and presentation of his case. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. . Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Packardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oliver v. Houdlet
green
2 sentences1867The case of Oliver v. Houdlet, 13 Mass. 237 -240, is cited as authority to the point that the guardian of a minor cannot avoid his deed on the ground of minority. 1839Oliver v. Howd let, 13 Mass. R. 237 ; Worcester v. Eaton, 13 Mass. R. 374 ; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. R. 460 ; Boston Bank v. Chamberlin, 15 Mass. R. 220 ; Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. R. 271 . | 2 | 1839–1867 |
Commonwealth v. Amirault
green
2 sentences2012Additionally, we conclude that a prophylactic rule requiring a defendant’s personal waiver confirmed by colloquy would lead a judge to “intrude on the defense presentation in a manner that would jeopardize the primary responsibility [which] our system places on counsel.” Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. at 651 n.23. 2012Recognizing that “there is no precise way to compare the value of one right with another,” ibid., Massachusetts law currently requires a defendant’s personal waiver for only a “very short list of rights.” Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618 , 651 n.23 (1997). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Conley
green
2 sentences2012In Commonwealth v. Conley, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 391 (1997), this court recognized that only a limited number of rights “are [waivable by] the defendant alone,” including “whether to plead guilty, to waive the right to trial by jury, to testify in one’s behalf, to take an appeal, or to waive the right to counsel.” 12 We distinguished other rights as relating to “strategic or tactical matters, resting] ultimately in counsel, with the degree of required client consultation and participation dependent on the circumstances.” Ibid. 2012In Commonwealth v. Conley, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 391 (1997), this court recognized that only a limited number of rights “are [waivable by] the defendant alone,” including “whether to plead guilty, to waive the right to trial by jury, to testify in one’s behalf, to take an appeal, or to waive the right to counsel.” 12 We distinguished other rights as relating to “strategic or tactical matters, resting] ultimately in counsel, with the degree of required client consultation and participation dependent on the circumstances.” Ibid. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2012Although the United States Supreme Court has not considered the specific question whether defense counsel may waive a defendant’s right to confront an analyst before introduction in evidence of a drug analysis certificate, the majority in Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332 , found that “[d]efense attorneys and their clients will often stipulate to the nature of the substance [identified in a drug analysis certificate] . . . [without] insisting] on live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analysis.” The Court’s failure to mention the need for | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Rock v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2010In short, “[a] defendant’s opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness.” Rock v. Arkansas, supra. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (“Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense . . .”). 2010Even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation, which was found to be ‘necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment,’ ... is an accused’s right to present his own version of events in his own words.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. at 52 , quoting from Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 819 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2010Even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation, which was found to be ‘necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment,’ ... is an accused’s right to present his own version of events in his own words.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. at 52 , quoting from Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 819 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. White
green
2 sentences1994Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974) ("privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be `limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records'"), quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 . 701 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) ("right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege" and was not intended to extend to corporations). 1994Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974) (“privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be ‘limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records’ ”), quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 . 701 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) (“right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege” and was not intended to extend to corporations). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Shaw
green
1 sentence1976Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Cush. 594 , 595 (1849). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Hawkins v. Graham
green
1 sentence1975Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284 (1889). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Clifton v. Granger
neutral
1 sentence1951See People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 574 ; Page v. Payne, 293 Mo. 600, 621 ; Clifton v. Granger, 86 Iowa, 573 ; State v. Shockley, 29 Utah, 25, 44-46 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Page v. Payne
green
1 sentence1951See People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 574 ; Page v. Payne, 293 Mo. 600, 621 ; Clifton v. Granger, 86 Iowa, 573 ; State v. Shockley, 29 Utah, 25, 44-46 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| State v. Shockley green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Quinn v. Middlesex Electric Light Co. green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Forbes v. Snow green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Commonwealth v. Lavery green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Tracy v. Ginzberg green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Montgomery v. Pickering green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Dewing v. Dewing green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| O'Connor v. Boston & Lowell Railroad green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Marks v. . Townsend green | 1 | 1885–1885 |
| President, Directors, & Co. v. Chamberlin green | 1 | 1839–1839 |
| Nightingale v. Withington neutral | 1 | 1839–1839 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.