personal factors in Connecticut

2021As has often been explained, the founda- tion for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presump- tion in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstandi

2021As has often been explained, the founda- tion for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presump- tion in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstandi

2011Because “[a] trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases ... its orders in such cases will not be reversed unless its findings have no reasonable basis in fact or it has abused its discretion, or unless, in the exercise of such discretion, it applies the wrong standard of law.” Crowley v. Crowley, 46 Conn. App. 87, 90 , 699 A.2d 1029 (1997).

2011Because “[a] trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases ... its orders in such cases will not be reversed unless its findings have no reasonable basis in fact or it has abused its discretion, or unless, in the exercise of such discretion, it applies the wrong standard of law.” Crowley v. Crowley, 46 Conn. App. 87, 90 , 699 A.2d 1029 (1997).

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

1984Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 50 , 440 A.2d 782 (1981).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 13 , 440 A.2d 804 (1981). ‘As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hearing.

1984Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 50 , 440 A.2d 782 (1981).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 13 , 440 A.2d 804 (1981). ‘As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hearing.

1967The registration certificate is for purpose of identification and revenue.” Shea v. Corbett, 97 Conn. 141, 145 ; Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 206 ; Dentamaro v. Motor Vehicles Commissioner, 20 Conn. Sup. 205 , 208 ; 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 60.

1956Shea v. Corbett, 97 Conn. 141,145 .

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

1998As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the patties at the hearing.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982); see also Rostain v. Rostain, 213 Conn. 686, 693 , 569 A.2d 1126 (1990).

1998As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the patties at the hearing.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982); see also Rostain v. Rostain, 213 Conn. 686, 693 , 569 A.2d 1126 (1990).

2024It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28 , 33–34, 263 A.3d 403 (2021). ‘‘As has often been explained, the foundation for [our deferential] standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buxenbaum v. Jones, 189 Conn. App. 790, 794 , 209 A.3d 664 (2019).

2024It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28 , 33–34, 263 A.3d 403 (2021). ‘‘As has often been explained, the foundation for [our deferential] standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buxenbaum v. Jones, 189 Conn. App. 790, 794 , 209 A.3d 664 (2019).

2024As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 87 , 995 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘The question of . . . to what extent . . . the child support guidelines apply . . . is a ques- tion of law over which this court should exercise ple- nary review.’’ Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367 , 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

2024As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 87 , 995 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘The question of . . . to what extent . . . the child support guidelines apply . . . is a ques- tion of law over which this court should exercise ple- nary review.’’ Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367 , 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

2024As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 87 , 995 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘The question of . . . to what extent . . . the child support guidelines apply . . . is a ques- tion of law over which this court should exercise ple- nary review.’’ Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367 , 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

2024As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 87 , 995 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘The question of . . . to what extent . . . the child support guidelines apply . . . is a ques- tion of law over which this court should exercise ple- nary review.’’ Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367 , 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

2021As has often been explained, the founda- tion for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presump- tion in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstandi

2021As has often been explained, the founda- tion for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presump- tion in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstandi

2019In determin- ing whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn.

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn. App. 335, 337 ,

2019In determin- ing whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn.

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn. App. 335, 337 ,

2019In determin- ing whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn.

2019In determin- ing whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn.

2011Thus, unless the trial court applied the wrong standard of law, its decision is accorded great deference because the trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doody v. Doody, 99 Conn. App. 512, 516 , 914 A.2d 1058 (2007). *561 With respect to the factual predicates on which Judge Taylor based his decision on the motion for modification, our standard of review is well settled.

2011Thus, unless the trial court applied the wrong standard of law, its decision is accorded great deference because the trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doody v. Doody, 99 Conn. App. 512, 516 , 914 A.2d 1058 (2007). *561 With respect to the factual predicates on which Judge Taylor based his decision on the motion for modification, our standard of review is well settled.

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

1967The registration certificate is for purpose of identification and revenue.” Shea v. Corbett, 97 Conn. 141, 145 ; Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 206 ; Dentamaro v. Motor Vehicles Commissioner, 20 Conn. Sup. 205 , 208 ; 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 60.

1967Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 207 .

2026Because “the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hear- ing”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hathaway v. Hathaway, 60 Conn. App. 818, 819 , 760 A.2d 1280 (2000); it is not our role to second-guess the court’s exercise of its discretion or to “review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2026Because “the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hear- ing”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hathaway v. Hathaway, 60 Conn. App. 818, 819 , 760 A.2d 1280 (2000); it is not our role to second-guess the court’s exercise of its discretion or to “review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2024It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28 , 33–34, 263 A.3d 403 (2021). ‘‘As has often been explained, the foundation for [our deferential] standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buxenbaum v. Jones, 189 Conn. App. 790, 794 , 209 A.3d 664 (2019).

2024It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28 , 33–34, 263 A.3d 403 (2021). ‘‘As has often been explained, the foundation for [our deferential] standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buxenbaum v. Jones, 189 Conn. App. 790, 794 , 209 A.3d 664 (2019).

2024S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 785 , 310 A.3d 961 (2024).

2024S., 223 Conn. App. 763 , 785, 310 A.3d 961 (2024).

2018Thus, unless the trial court applied the wrong standard of law, its decision is accorded great deference because the trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antonucci v. Antonucci, 164 Conn. App. 95, 106 , 138 A.3d 297 (2016). ‘‘We have often stated that the power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances that arise out of the dissolution of a marriage. . . .

2018Thus, unless the trial court applied the wrong standard of law, its decision is accorded great deference because the trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antonucci v. Antonucci, 164 Conn. App. 95, 106 , 138 A.3d 297 (2016). ‘‘We have often stated that the power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances that arise out of the dissolution of a marriage. . . .

2016It is axiomatic that we defer to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to afford their testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn.App. 414 , 425, 970 A.2d 743 (2009).

2016It is axiomatic that we defer to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to afford their testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn.App. 414 , 425, 970 A.2d 743 (2009).

2008A trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases, and its orders in such cases will not be reversed unless its findings have no reasonable basis in fact or it has abused its discretion, or unless, in the exercise of such discretion, it applies the wrong standard of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Berry, 88 Conn. App. 674, 677 , 870 A.2d 1161 (2005).

2008A trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases, and its orders in such cases will not be reversed unless its findings have no reasonable basis in fact or it has abused its discretion, or unless, in the exercise of such discretion, it applies the wrong standard of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Berry, 88 Conn. App. 674, 677 , 870 A.2d 1161 (2005).