personal waiver in Florida

2025See, e.g., Briley v. Winter, 149 So. 602, 602 (Fla. 1933) (“The agreement . . . constituted a mere license . . . and, as that license was oral and without consideration, it had no legal binding effect, and could be revoked at will.”); Devlin v. The Phoenix, Inc., 471 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“A license, whether express or implied, is not a right but is a personal privilege . . . necessarily revocable at will.”). 13 “A license allows occupation of a property only so far as it is necessary to do the licensed act and no further.

2025See, e.g., Briley v. Winter, 149 So. 602, 602 (Fla. 1933) (“The agreement . . . constituted a mere license . . . and, as that license was oral and without consideration, it had no legal binding effect, and could be revoked at will.”); Devlin v. The Phoenix, Inc., 471 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“A license, whether express or implied, is not a right but is a personal privilege . . . necessarily revocable at will.”). 4 “A license allows occupation of a property only so far as it is necessary to do the licensed act and no further.

2025See, e.g., Briley v. Winter, 149 So. 602, 602 (Fla. 1933) (“The agreement . . . constituted a mere license . . . and, as that license was oral and without consideration, it had no legal binding effect, and could be revoked at will.”); Devlin v. The Phoenix, Inc., 471 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“A license, whether express or implied, is not a right but is a personal privilege . . . necessarily revocable at will.”). 13 “A license allows occupation of a property only so far as it is necessary to do the licensed act and no further.

2025See, e.g., Briley v. Winter, 149 So. 602, 602 (Fla. 1933) (“The agreement . . . constituted a mere license . . . and, as that license was oral and without consideration, it had no legal binding effect, and could be revoked at will.”); Devlin v. The Phoenix, Inc., 471 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“A license, whether express or implied, is not a right but is a personal privilege . . . necessarily revocable at will.”). 4 “A license allows occupation of a property only so far as it is necessary to do the licensed act and no further.

2025Where a conditional or restricted consent to enter land is given, there is a privilege to enter only insofar as the condition or restriction is complied with.” 20 Fla. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses in Real Property § 82 (2025) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.” (emphasis added)). 14 “A person . . . does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person . . . is in a place where he or she ha

2025Where a conditional or restricted consent to enter land is given, there is a privilege to enter only insofar as the condition or restriction is complied with.” 20 Fla. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses in Real Property § 82 (2025) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.” (emphasis added)). 30 statute5 and centuries-old property rights law. 6 The notes to Instruction 3.6(f) specify that “[i]f the evidence is in dispute about . . . wheth

1997See Mejia v. State, 675 So.2d 996, 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

1996See also Mejia v. State, 675 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

2025“A defendant’s ‘on-the-record personal waiver of the right to a PSI is not required under current supreme court precedent,’ and a trial court’s failure to obtain a personal waiver ‘does not constitute fundamental error.’” Id. at 74 (quoting Ortiz, 9 So. 3d at 775 ).

2025“A defendant’s ‘on-the-record personal waiver of the right to a PSI is not required under current supreme court precedent,’ and a trial court’s failure to obtain a personal waiver ‘does not constitute fundamental error.’” Id. at 74 (quoting Ortiz, 9 So. 3d at 775 ).

2015However, it seems appellant overlooks the Jones court’s acknowledgement of the “long and unbroken lines of precedent conditioning a right to jury instructions on lesser included offenses upon a request for such instruction ... and requiring a contemporaneous objection as a predicate to proper appellate review.” Jones, 484 So.2d at 579 .

1997In Jones v. State, 484 So.2d 577 (Fla.1986), the supreme court distinguished its decision in Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 , 104 S.Ct. 2181 , 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984), a capital case, which held that the defendant had to make a personal "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" joinder in counsel's decision as to which lesser included charges to request.

2016See, é.g., Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1997) (holding that a defendant may, upon a personal waiver and proper colloquy, *155 waive his constitutional right to a six-person jury and agree to be tried by a five-person jury); Evans v. State, 939 So.2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (conviction affirmed where, after jury deliberations began, one of the jurors indicated she knew witness who testified during trial; court gave defendant option of continuing the trial with five jurors or granting a mistrial, and following a court colloquy defendant made knowing and voluntary waiver of right to six-pe

1998While the supreme court declined to mandate a formal protocol beyond what it had found sufficient in Blair’s case, it reminded trial courts “of the importance of securing a personal waiver and of conducting an ‘appropriate oral colloquy’ to be certain that any waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary.” Id. (citations omitted).

2022Ass’n v. McFadyen, 194 So. 3d 418, 419-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (citing section 673.3011 of the Florida Statutes, observing that “[p]romissory notes are, by definition, negotiable instruments which, by law, may be enforced by a holder, a nonholder in possession who has the rights of the holder, or a person not in possession who nevertheless is entitled to enforce the note”); § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“‘Holder’ means . . . [t]he person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession[.]”); see also Firs

2022Ass’n v. McFadyen, 194 So. 3d 418, 419-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (citing section 673.3011 of the Florida Statutes, observing that “[p]romissory notes are, by definition, negotiable instruments which, by law, may be enforced by a holder, a nonholder in possession who has the rights of the holder, or a person not in possession who nevertheless is entitled to enforce the note”); § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“‘Holder’ means . . . [t]he person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession[.]”); see also Firs

2015Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Iowa 2013).

2013See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 26 So.3d 570, 576 (Fla.2010) (noting that “[a]s with other rights that constitute a personal privilege, a defendant may waive his or her right to a speedy trial” and finding waiver where defendant failed to file a notice of expiration of speedy trial after earlier moving for a continuance); also cf. Oxendine v. State, 852 So.2d 286, 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (finding that issue sought to raised by criminal defendant “was waived” by entering a plea and then failing to file a “timely 3.850 motion alleging involuntary plea or based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.

2013See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 26 So.3d 570, 576 (Fla.2010) (noting that “[a]s with other rights that constitute a personal privilege, a defendant may waive his or her right to a speedy trial” and finding waiver where defendant failed to file a notice of expiration of speedy trial after earlier moving for a continuance); also cf. Oxendine v. State, 852 So.2d 286, 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (finding that issue sought to raised by criminal defendant “was waived” by entering a plea and then failing to file a “timely 3.850 motion alleging involuntary plea or based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.

2011See Brevard County v. Blasky, 875 So.2d 6, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (a license “is a personal privilege, and generally may be revoked at the pleasure of the grant- or”); Devlin v. The Phoenix, Inc., 471 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“[a] license, whether express or implied, is not a right but is a personal privilege, not assignable without express permission”).

2010There, the stipulation involved the usury statute, and the supreme court stated that usury was “purely a personal defense created by statute for the protection of borrowers and, therefore, any borrower may waive his right to claim the benefit of such statute.” 252 So.2d at 4 .

2010There, the stipulation involved the usury statute, and the supreme court stated that usury was "purely a personal defense created by statute for the protection of borrowers and, therefore, any borrower may waive his right to claim the benefit of such statute." 252 So.2d at 4 .

2009It referred to its prior holding in State v. Singletary, 549 So.2d 996, 997 (Fla.1989): It is impractical and unnecessary to require an on-the-record waiver by the defendant to anything but those rights which go to the very heart of the adjudicatory process, such as the right to a lawyer or the right to a jury trial.

2009See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 , 106 S.Ct. 988 , 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (where Court wrote that the due process right of a criminal defendant to testify in his own behalf “has long been assumed”).

2009See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 , 106 S.Ct. 988 , 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (where Court wrote that the due process right of a criminal defendant to testify in his own behalf “has long been assumed”).

2008But see, e.g., State v. Hinton, 702 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn.Ct.App.2005) (applying a harmless-error analysis to the admission of the defendant's prior convictions without the defendant's personal waiver of his right to a jury determination of the prior *972 convictions); State v. Kranz, 353 N.W.2d 748, 753 (N.D.1984) (conducting a harmless-error analysis of the trial court's failure to obtain an express jury-trial waiver from the defendant).

2006Kent Co. v. Miller, 77 Nev. 471 , 366 P.2d 520, 522 (1962) ("The exercise and preservation of the homestead exemption is held to be a purely personal right which can be exercised or waived by the debtor."); In re Moore's Estate, 210 Or. 23 , 307 P.2d 483, 492 (1957) ("[T]he homestead exemption, during the lifetime of the owner, is not an estate but is a personal privilege which must be claimed to be effective, and hence it is subject to waiver."); In re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503 , 167 P.2d 690 (Utah 1946); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712 , 6 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1940); Home Owners Loan Corp.

2006Kent Co. v. Miller, 77 Nev. 471 , 366 P.2d 520, 522 (1962) ("The exercise and preservation of the homestead exemption is held to be a purely personal right which can be exercised or waived by the debtor."); In re Moore's Estate, 210 Or. 23 , 307 P.2d 483, 492 (1957) ("[T]he homestead exemption, during the lifetime of the owner, is not an estate but is a personal privilege which must be claimed to be effective, and hence it is subject to waiver."); In re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503 , 167 P.2d 690 (Utah 1946); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712 , 6 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1940); Home Owners Loan Corp.

2006Kent Co. v. Miller, 77 Nev. 471 , 366 P.2d 520, 522 (1962) ("The exercise and preservation of the homestead exemption is held to be a purely personal right which can be exercised or waived by the debtor."); In re Moore's Estate, 210 Or. 23 , 307 P.2d 483, 492 (1957) ("[T]he homestead exemption, during the lifetime of the owner, is not an estate but is a personal privilege which must be claimed to be effective, and hence it is subject to waiver."); In re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503 , 167 P.2d 690 (Utah 1946); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712 , 6 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1940); Home Owners Loan Corp.

2006Kent Co. v. Miller, 77 Nev. 471 , 366 P.2d 520, 522 (1962) ("The exercise and preservation of the homestead exemption is held to be a purely personal right which can be exercised or waived by the debtor."); In re Moore's Estate, 210 Or. 23 , 307 P.2d 483, 492 (1957) ("[T]he homestead exemption, during the lifetime of the owner, is not an estate but is a personal privilege which must be claimed to be effective, and hence it is subject to waiver."); In re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503 , 167 P.2d 690 (Utah 1946); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712 , 6 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1940); Home Owners Loan Corp.