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14 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1919–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Madera Production Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green1 sentence2006Ct. App. 2003), 107 S.W.3d 652, 662 (“a stranger to the [agreement] ... would not have standing to challenge the agreement on the statute of frauds ground”); Lamereaux v. Pague (Wash. Ct. App. 1973), 513 P.2d 1053, 1055 (holding that the statute of frauds is a personal defense that cannot be availed of by a third person); Restatement (Second) Contracts § 144 (1981) (“[o]nly a party to a contract or a transferee or successor of a party to the contract can assert that the contract is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds”); but cf. Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass’n v. Anderson (Iowa 1996), 551 N.W. | 1 | 1 |
Lamereaux v. Paguegreen1 sentence2006Ct. App. 2003), 107 S.W.3d 652, 662 (“a stranger to the [agreement] ... would not have standing to challenge the agreement on the statute of frauds ground”); Lamereaux v. Pague (Wash. Ct. App. 1973), 513 P.2d 1053, 1055 (holding that the statute of frauds is a personal defense that cannot be availed of by a third person); Restatement (Second) Contracts § 144 (1981) (“[o]nly a party to a contract or a transferee or successor of a party to the contract can assert that the contract is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds”); but cf. Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass’n v. Anderson (Iowa 1996), 551 N.W. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass'n v. Andersongreen1 sentence2006Ct. App. 2003), 107 S.W.3d 652, 662 (“a stranger to the [agreement] ... would not have standing to challenge the agreement on the statute of frauds ground”); Lamereaux v. Pague (Wash. Ct. App. 1973), 513 P.2d 1053, 1055 (holding that the statute of frauds is a personal defense that cannot be availed of by a third person); Restatement (Second) Contracts § 144 (1981) (“[o]nly a party to a contract or a transferee or successor of a party to the contract can assert that the contract is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds”); but cf. Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass’n v. Anderson (Iowa 1996), 551 N.W. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tetrault v. Ingraham
neutral
2 sentences1991Tetrault v. Ingram (1918), 54 Mont. 524, 525 , 171 P. 1148, 1149 . 1991Tetrault v. Ingram (1918), 54 Mont. 524, 525 , 171 P. 1148, 1149 . | 2 | 1923–1991 |
Snider v. Yarbrough
green
2 sentences1922(Snider v. Yarbrough, 43 Mont. 203 , 115 Pac. 411 ; Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71 , 125 Pac. 136 ; Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65 , 144 Pac. 1090 .) The holder [2] of the option, then, acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase, which does not ripen into an interest in the land until he chooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the option and complies with the terms upon which he obtained it. 1922(Snider v. Yarbrough, 43 Mont. 203 , 115 Pac. 411 ; Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71 , 125 Pac. 136 ; Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65 , 144 Pac. 1090 .) The holder [2] of the option, then, acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase, which does not ripen into an interest in the land until he chooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the option and complies with the terms upon which he obtained it. | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Winslow v. Dundom
green
2 sentences1922(Snider v. Yarbrough, 43 Mont. 203 , 115 Pac. 411 ; Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71 , 125 Pac. 136 ; Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65 , 144 Pac. 1090 .) The holder [2] of the option, then, acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase, which does not ripen into an interest in the land until he chooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the option and complies with the terms upon which he obtained it. 1922(Snider v. Yarbrough, 43 Mont. 203 , 115 Pac. 411 ; Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71 , 125 Pac. 136 ; Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65 , 144 Pac. 1090 .) The holder [2] of the option, then, acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase, which does not ripen into an interest in the land until he chooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the option and complies with the terms upon which he obtained it. | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Tyler v. Tyler
neutral
2 sentences1922(Snider v. Yarbrough, 43 Mont. 203 , 115 Pac. 411 ; Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71 , 125 Pac. 136 ; Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65 , 144 Pac. 1090 .) The holder [2] of the option, then, acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase, which does not ripen into an interest in the land until he chooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the option and complies with the terms upon which he obtained it. 1922(Snider v. Yarbrough, 43 Mont. 203 , 115 Pac. 411 ; Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71 , 125 Pac. 136 ; Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65 , 144 Pac. 1090 .) The holder [2] of the option, then, acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase, which does not ripen into an interest in the land until he chooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the option and complies with the terms upon which he obtained it. | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Richardson v. Hardwick
green
2 sentences1922So it is held by the authorities generally, from a number of which found in the brief of counsel for plaintiff we cite the following: James on Option Contract, sec. 502; Richardson v. Hardwich, 106 U. S. 252 , 27 L. 1922So it is held by the authorities generally, from a number of which found in the brief of counsel for plaintiff we cite the following: James on Option Contract, sec. 502; Richardson v. Hardwich, 106 U. S. 252 , 27 L. | 2 | 1922–1922 |
Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan
green
1 sentence2019The plaintiff then may have a personal claim against the defendant's general assets-but recovering out of those assets is a legal remedy, not an equitable one. ***93 Montanile , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 658 . ¶58 Applying these principles to the case at hand, I would hold the dividends that § 30-8-414(2), MCA, required Farmers to pay John Jr. were not compensatory damages. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re the Support Obligation of McGurran
neutral
2 sentences2017In re Support Obligation of McGurran, 2002 MT 144, ¶¶ 12-13 , 310 Mont. 268 , 49 P.3d 626 (citations omitted). ¶12 In McGurran, we interpreted § 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA, of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, which states that a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision “must be filed in the district court for the county where the petitioner resides or has the petitioner’s principal place of business or where the agency maintains its principal office.” Section 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA (emphasis added). 2017In re Support Obligation of McGurran, 2002 MT 144, ¶¶ 12-13 , 310 Mont. 268 , 49 P.3d 626 (citations omitted). ¶12 In McGurran, we interpreted § 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA, of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, which states that a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision “must be filed in the district court for the county where the petitioner resides or has the petitioner’s principal place of business or where the agency maintains its principal office.” Section 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA (emphasis added). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Parchen v. Chessman
green
2 sentences1999And, in Parchen v. Chessman (1914), 49 Mont. 326 , 142 P. 631 , this Court determined that statutes of limitations may be waived because they are a personal privilege for the benefit of individuals and not to secure general objects of policy. ¶ 12 We conclude that the case sub judice is dissimilar to the five cases cited above wherein we determined that the statutory provision at issue in each case was enacted for a private benefit and could, thus, be waived. 1999And, in Parchen v. Chessman (1914), 49 Mont. 326 , 142 P. 631 , this Court determined that statutes of limitations may be waived because they are a personal privilege for the benefit of individuals and not to secure general objects of policy. ¶12 We conclude that the case sub judice is dissimilar to the five cases cited above wherein we determined that the statutory provision at issue in each case was enacted for a private benefit and could, thus, be waived. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Brandt v. Olson
green
1 sentence1982Brandt v. Olson (N.D.Iowa, E.D.1959), 179 F.Supp. 363 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
H. Earl Clack Co. v. Staunton
neutral
2 sentences1938Earl Clack Co. v. Staunton, 105 Mont. 375 , 72 Pac. (2d) 1022 ), and this is true of the statute of limitations which is universally regarded as a personal privilege which may be waived (24 C. 1938Earl Clack Co. v. Staunton, 105 Mont. 375 , 72 Pac. (2d) 1022 ), and this is true of the statute of limitations which is universally regarded as a personal privilege which may be waived (24 C. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Reay v. Heazelton
green
2 sentences1938J. 299, notes 42 and 43; Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 335 , 60 Pac. 977 ), and a person may be estopped from pleading it. (24 C. 1938J. 299, notes 42 and 43; Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 335 , 60 Pac. 977 ), and a person may be estopped from pleading it. (24 C. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Libby Lumber Co. v. Pacific States Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences1928Co., 79 Mont. 166 , 255 Pac. 340 , and Brown v. Timmons, 79 Mont. 246 , 256 Pac. 176 , which hold that after a sale of real property under execution or order of sale and before redemption, the judgment debtor has no title to the property sold, and that the right to redeem is only a personal privilege. 1928Co., 79 Mont. 166 , 255 Pac. 340 , and Brown v. Timmons, 79 Mont. 246 , 256 Pac. 176 , which hold that after a sale of real property under execution or order of sale and before redemption, the judgment debtor has no title to the property sold, and that the right to redeem is only a personal privilege. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Brown v. Timmons
green
2 sentences1928Co., 79 Mont. 166 , 255 Pac. 340 , and Brown v. Timmons, 79 Mont. 246 , 256 Pac. 176 , which hold that after a sale of real property under execution or order of sale and before redemption, the judgment debtor has no title to the property sold, and that the right to redeem is only a personal privilege. 1928Co., 79 Mont. 166 , 255 Pac. 340 , and Brown v. Timmons, 79 Mont. 246 , 256 Pac. 176 , which hold that after a sale of real property under execution or order of sale and before redemption, the judgment debtor has no title to the property sold, and that the right to redeem is only a personal privilege. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Mennell v. Wells
neutral
2 sentences1923In Mennell v. Wells, 51 Mont. 141 , 149 Pac. 954 , this court held that our exemption statutes confer a right, as distinguished from a personal privilege. 1923In Mennell v. Wells, 51 Mont. 141 , 149 Pac. 954 , this court held that our exemption statutes confer a right, as distinguished from a personal privilege. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
State v. Yoes
green
1 sentence1921Rep. 978 , 68 S. E. 181 ; Thompson on Trials, sec. 2149.) The right to appear by counsel is a personal privilege to be availed of by the accused at his pleasure, and, if he is sui juris and not laboring under any disability, he may act as his own counsel. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Washoe Copper Co. v. Hickey
neutral
2 sentences1919“Anyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit.” (Sec. 6181.) The statement of Mr. Lunke found in his motion before Judge Utter, in the light of the reasoning in the opinion of this court in Washoe Copper Co. v. Hickey, 46 Mont. 363 , 128 Pac. 584 , is proof against his contention that a waiver is not made out against him. 1919“Anyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit.” (Sec. 6181.) The statement of Mr. Lunke found in his motion before Judge Utter, in the light of the reasoning in the opinion of this court in Washoe Copper Co. v. Hickey, 46 Mont. 363 , 128 Pac. 584 , is proof against his contention that a waiver is not made out against him. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.