personal waiver in California

2026(C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 908, 919.) Citing Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1136 , the C.O. court noted our Supreme Court’s holding that “a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver [of a right to jury trial] without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (C.O. at p. 918.) The appellate court found the trial court’s error harmless, noting it saw “nothing in the record suggesting that C.O. would have elected a jury trial over a

2026In People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn), our Supreme Court held that, in proceedings to extend the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender, “the trial court must advise the MDO 17 defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence— that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver

2026In People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn), our Supreme Court held that, in proceedings to extend the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender, “the trial court must advise the MDO 17 defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence— that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver

2026Code § 2972, subd. (a).) As a result, the court held that “the trial court must advise the MDO defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence . . . that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver.” (61 Cal.4th at p. 1116.) In Tran, a companion case filed the same day as Blackburn, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion for NGI commitments based on “nearly identical language in the statutory scheme.” (Tran, su

2026(People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) To do so, the court “must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and 7 the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver” of each right.

2026(People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) To do so, the court “must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and 7 the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver” of each right.

2026(Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 384 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 909; § 5350, subd. (d)(1).) “[T]he trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial.

2026(Compare Conservatorship of Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 [“‘LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.’”] and Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384 [jury trial waiver by counsel is valid only if the proposed conservatee lacked capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver] with Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894 , 911 [jury trial waiver by counsel is valid unless circumstances suggest that counsel lacked actual authority from the proposed conserv

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2025(See Boykin v. Alabama [, supra, ] 395 U.S. 238 , 243–244 . . . .) As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each. (. . . see . . .

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2026Instead, a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1136 ; see People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166 [“‘[w]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case’”].) Under the modified harmless error standard of People v. Blackburn, sup

2025We adopt the standard our Supreme Court employed in the related contexts of mentally disordered offender commitment extensions, People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1116 (Blackburn), and commitment extensions for people who originally pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to a criminal offense, People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 . “[A] trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary

2021(See Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 381 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1244 (Kevin A.).) Notably, in Heather W., the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6, held, “In conservatorship proceedings pursuant to the LPS Act, the trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial.

2021Similarly, a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement of the statutory right to a jury trial may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (Tran, at p. 1170; Blackburn, at p. 1136.) In Kevin A., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at page 1253 , an LPS case in which the trial court accepted counsel’s waiver of the jury trial right over the proposed conservatee’s objection, the Court of Appeal reversed the conservatorship order, but did not remand for

2024APPLICABLE LAW “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) Courts refer to this prophylactic measure as an advisement of “Boykin/Tahl rights . . . .” (See People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295,

2023(People v. Farwell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 299 .) The trial court, however, did not advise the defendant of his “constitutional rights implicated by . . . the stipulation” and did not “solicit a personal waiver of those rights” from the defendant.

2001"It is blackletter law that the defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege which must be affirmatively invoked in the lower court by appropriate pleading (if the defense appears on the face of the complaint, it must be raised by demurrer; otherwise it must be specially pleaded in the answer) or is waived [citations]." ( O'Neil v. Spillane (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 147, 156 . 119 Cal.Rptr. 245 ; Hall v. Chamberlain (1948) 31 Cal.2d 673, 679 , 192 P.2d 759 ; Neptune Society Corp. v. Longanecker (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1233, 1243-1244 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 117 .) [9] Bozanich and County al

2001"It is blackletter law that the defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege which must be affirmatively invoked in the lower court by appropriate pleading (if the defense appears on the face of the complaint, it must be raised by demurrer; otherwise it must be specially pleaded in the answer) or is waived [citations]." ( O'Neil v. Spillane (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 147, 156 . 119 Cal.Rptr. 245 ; Hall v. Chamberlain (1948) 31 Cal.2d 673, 679 , 192 P.2d 759 ; Neptune Society Corp. v. Longanecker (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1233, 1243-1244 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 117 .) [9] Bozanich and County al

2025Governing law and standard of review When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. 5 (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243-244 ; People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) Prior to acceptance of a guilty plea, courts must advise the defendant of “three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (Cross, at p. 170, citing Boykin, at pp. 243-244 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal

2024Analysis “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each. [Citations.]” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) These are commonly referred to as “Boykin-Tahl advisements.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 ; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969)

2020(Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 7 p. 874; Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 95 [citing cases].) By contrast, some of the rights that do not require a personal waiver from the accused include (1) the right to testify (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1052-1053 ); (2) in a capital case based on a prior-murder-conviction special-circumstance allegation, the right to have that allegation determined in a separate proceeding following a finding of first degree murder (Hinton, at p. 873); (3) the right to be present at pretrial conferences (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1196 ); (4) in a

2015In Blackburn, the high court was faced with the question of whether a trial court must personally advise a mentally disordered offender (MDO) of his or her right to a jury trial, and whether the trial court must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the offender before conducting a bench trial to extend the MDO commitment. ( Blackburn, supra, at p. 1116 .) In the companion case, Tran, the question before the court presented a similar rights and waiver issue wherein the extension of an involuntary commitment was preceded by the original commitment after the individual pleaded NGI to a cri

1992(In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-925 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].) In those circumstances, no submission will be effective absent a personal waiver of constitutional rights to plead not guilty, to jury trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present evidence on a defendant’s own behalf.

1992(In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-925 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].) In those circumstances, no submission will be effective absent a personal waiver of constitutional rights to plead not guilty, to jury trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present evidence on a defendant’s own behalf.

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2024Analysis “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each. [Citations.]” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) These are commonly referred to as “Boykin-Tahl advisements.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 ; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969)

2024The shareholders may, however, bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation’s rights and redress its injuries when the board of directors fails or refuses to do so.” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a derivative suit is one in which the shareholder seeks ‘redress of the wrong to the corporation.’ ” (Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775, 793 .) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity: ‘If the injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of acti

2022F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 106 .) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity.” (Denevi v. LGCC, LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1222 .) The fraud / fiduciary duty cause of action includes allegations describing two categories of conduct by the individual respondents: (1) breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and other misconduct and mismanagement that reduced the value of the corporation and shares therein, and (2) fraudulent nondisclosures and misrepresentat

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2024Analysis “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each. [Citations.]” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) These are commonly referred to as “Boykin-Tahl advisements.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 ; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969)

2024The shareholders may, however, bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation’s rights and redress its injuries when the board of directors fails or refuses to do so.” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a derivative suit is one in which the shareholder seeks ‘redress of the wrong to the corporation.’ ” (Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775, 793 .) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity: ‘If the injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of acti

2019Omitted].) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity: ‘If the injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action exists.’ [Citation.]” (Denevi v. LGCC, LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1222 (Denevi).) “[T]he principles of derivative lawsuits applicable to corporations likewise apply to a limited liability compan[ies].” (PacLink Communications Intern., Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 958, 963 (PacLink).) Sprengel’s appellate briefing do

2000Redwood Empire points to language in Gion cautioning that in implied dedication cases, “analogies from the law of adverse possession and easement by prescriptive rights can be misleading.” (Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 39.) The Gion court, however, was only discussing the element of adverse use, which differs in dedication cases because use under “a personal claim of right need not be shown.” (Ibid.) When it comes to the issue of whether an impliedly dedicated public easement should be limited to the use that gave rise to it, prescriptive easements appear fully analogous.

1997Co. v. Sacramento County (1954) 42 Cal.2d 235 , which drew upon all of these as well as other cases, identified this form of dedication as one implied in law, as opposed to those forms resting upon the acts or acquiescence of the owner, which it characterized as implied in fact. [Citation.] "Our Gion-Dietz [Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 29 ] case, adverting to this venerable line of authority, went on to distinguish the character of `adversity' necessary to implied in law dedication to the public from that obtaining in the law of private prescriptive rights, pointing out that what

2019If the employee chooses the first or third option, the employee may obtain and keep for herself all of the underpaid wages she may recover in pursuing her private right of action; but in choosing either of these options, the employee's personal claim for Labor Code violations is subject to arbitration if the employee has agreed to arbitrate her personal claims. (§§ 1194, 218; *78 Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 391 , 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 .) If, on the other hand, the employee chooses the second option and files a lawsuit asserting only a PAGA claim, the employee may recover t

2019If the employee chooses the first or third option, the employee may obtain and keep for herself all of the underpaid wages she may recover in pursuing her private right of action; but in choosing either of these options, the employee's personal claim for Labor Code violations is subject to arbitration if the employee has agreed to arbitrate her personal claims. (§§ 1194, 218; *78 Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 391 , 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 .) If, on the other hand, the employee chooses the second option and files a lawsuit asserting only a PAGA claim, the employee may recover t

2020(O’Neil v. Spillane (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 147, 156 [“It is blackletter law that the defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege which must be affirmatively invoked in the lower court by appropriate pleading . . . or [it] is waived”].) As one court explained, “A trial judge presiding over a case initiated by an incarcerated and self-represented plaintiff, particularly when there has been no appearance by any defendant, faces a significant challenge in balancing his or her obligations to facilitate the ability of the self-represented litigant to be fairly heard, on the one hand,

2016Generally, “[l]imitations periods represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate; they relate to matters of procedure, not to substantial rights.” (Talei v. Pan American World Airways (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 904, 909 .) The defense of the statute of limitations is “a personal privilege which must be affirmatively invoked in the lower court by appropriate pleading (if the defense appears on the face of the complaint, it must be raised by demurrer; otherwise it must be specially pleaded in the answer) . . . .” (O’Neil v. Spillane (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 147, 156 .) Failure to assert the de

2020(Id. at pp. 451-452; accord, Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal.4th 644, 656, fn. 7 [constitutional right to jury trial does not apply to actions in equity or to special proceedings, though the Legislature may provide for a jury trial in these types of actions]; People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, 829 , disapproved on another ground in Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1113 .) Thus, because an SVP defendant’s right to a jury trial is based only on statute (§ 6603, subd. (a)), the defendant is not constitutionally entitled to the safeguards of a judicial advisement and a personal waiver.

2014It too noted that the statutory language did not expressly require a personal waiver or clearly preclude a waiver by counsel and agreed that the Legislature could not have intended to require a personal waiver and thereby deny counsel the authority to act on behalf of an incompetent MDO such as the MDO in Otis. ( Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 830-831.) The court acknowledged that "a patient might be mentally disordered for some purposes and not for others." (Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 831 .) However, it noted that the defendant's mind was not functioning normally (he was diag

2025It has long been settled that “the plain language of section 859b’s 60-day rule establishes the right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment [or plea] is absolute absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 729 , italics added; see People v. Superior Court (Arnold) (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 923 , 940; Lacayo v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 396 , 400 (Lacayo); Del Castillo v. Superior Court (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1120 (Del Castillo); Garcia, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 645; People v. Mackey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 177 , 183–184 (Mackey), su

2024We address that argument in part D, infra. 5 arraignment is absolute absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 729 .) Thus, “excepting only his own waiver, a defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 consecutive calendar days from entry of plea or arraignment, whichever is later.” (People v. Mackey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 177, 183 .) B.

2021However, our Supreme Court has held that persons with mental illness and persons with developmental disabilities are not similarly situated when it comes to whether they are entitled to a personal advisement of the right to a jury trial and whether a personal waiver of that right is necessary. ( Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1108-1109.) That is because persons with developmental disabilities—unlike persons with mental illness— 13 lack “cognitive and intellectual functioning,” and because their more “reduced ability to understand, and make decisions about, the conduct of the proceedings” ma

2021However, our Supreme Court has held that persons with mental illness and persons with developmental disabilities are not similarly situated when it comes to whether they are entitled to a personal advisement of the right to a jury trial and whether a personal waiver of that right is necessary. ( Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1108-1109.) That is because persons with developmental disabilities—unlike persons with mental illness— 13 lack “cognitive and intellectual functioning,” and because their more “reduced ability to understand, and make decisions about, the conduct of the proceedings” ma

2025In People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447 , the defendant argued that the interests implicated by SVP civil commitment proceedings “are no less fundamental than those in criminal proceedings, and that the defendant in [such] a commitment proceeding ‘ “is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 453.) Because of this, the defendant claimed, “a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial was required.” (Ibid.) Another panel of this court disagreed, explaining that “the fact that the interests involv

2021As the Third District explained in People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 454 (Rowell), in concluding the SVPA does not require a trial court to take a personal waiver from a defendant of his or her right to a jury trial, “[T]he fact that the interests involved in involuntary commitment proceedings are fundamental enough to require a jury trial does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the waiver of a jury trial in such proceedings must be personal as in criminal prosecutions.

2013To be effective, a court must take a personal waiver from the defendant and there must be “‘an “affirmative 7 showing,” on the record, of waiver which was “intelligent and voluntary” on the part of the affected defendant.’” (Aguilar, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 794 .) Here, the court and defendant engaged in the following colloquy regarding waiving the right to an interpreter: “[The Court:] The use of interpreters.

1987This argument was rejected in Aguilar , the court holding that the defendant must personally and knowingly waive his right to an exclusive interpreter. ( 35 Cal.3d at p. 794 .) The record here is devoid of any indication that Baez understood *1436 his right to have an independent interpreter throughout the proceedings or any statement by Baez that would suggest a personal waiver.