personal waiver in California

2026Instead, a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1136 ; see People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166 [“‘[w]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case’”].) Under the modified harmless error standard of People v. Blackburn, sup

2026Instead, a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1136 ; see People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166 [“‘[w]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case’”].) Under the modified harmless error standard of People v. Blackburn, sup

2026In People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn), our Supreme Court held that, in proceedings to extend the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender, “the trial court must advise the MDO 17 defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence— that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver

2026Code § 2972, subd. (a).) As a result, the court held that “the trial court must advise the MDO defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence . . . that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver.” (61 Cal.4th at p. 1116.) In Tran, a companion case filed the same day as Blackburn, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion for NGI commitments based on “nearly identical language in the statutory scheme.” (Tran, su

2026(People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) To do so, the court “must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and 7 the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver” of each right.

2026(People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) To do so, the court “must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and 7 the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver” of each right.

2026We respectfully disagree with Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383 (Heather W.), which held that “LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.” Heather W. analogized LPS proceedings to proceedings for offenders with mental health disorders (OHMD)6 and hospital commitments for defendants who plead not guilty by 6 Before January 1, 2020, offenders with mental health disorders were referred to as mentally disordered offenders or MDOs.

2026(Compare Conservatorship of Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 [“‘LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.’”] and Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384 [jury trial waiver by counsel is valid only if the proposed conservatee lacked capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver] with Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894 , 911 [jury trial waiver by counsel is valid unless circumstances suggest that counsel lacked actual authority from the proposed conserv

2021(See Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 381 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1244 (Kevin A.).) Notably, in Heather W., the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6, held, “In conservatorship proceedings pursuant to the LPS Act, the trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial.

2021Similarly, a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement of the statutory right to a jury trial may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (Tran, at p. 1170; Blackburn, at p. 1136.) In Kevin A., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at page 1253 , an LPS case in which the trial court accepted counsel’s waiver of the jury trial right over the proposed conservatee’s objection, the Court of Appeal reversed the conservatorship order, but did not remand for

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2026Instead, a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1136 ; see People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166 [“‘[w]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case’”].) Under the modified harmless error standard of People v. Blackburn, sup

2025We adopt the standard our Supreme Court employed in the related contexts of mentally disordered offender commitment extensions, People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1116 (Blackburn), and commitment extensions for people who originally pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to a criminal offense, People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 . “[A] trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary

2024APPLICABLE LAW “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) Courts refer to this prophylactic measure as an advisement of “Boykin/Tahl rights . . . .” (See People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295,

2023(People v. Farwell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 299 .) The trial court, however, did not advise the defendant of his “constitutional rights implicated by . . . the stipulation” and did not “solicit a personal waiver of those rights” from the defendant.

2001"It is blackletter law that the defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege which must be affirmatively invoked in the lower court by appropriate pleading (if the defense appears on the face of the complaint, it must be raised by demurrer; otherwise it must be specially pleaded in the answer) or is waived [citations]." ( O'Neil v. Spillane (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 147, 156 . 119 Cal.Rptr. 245 ; Hall v. Chamberlain (1948) 31 Cal.2d 673, 679 , 192 P.2d 759 ; Neptune Society Corp. v. Longanecker (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1233, 1243-1244 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 117 .) [9] Bozanich and County al

2001"It is blackletter law that the defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege which must be affirmatively invoked in the lower court by appropriate pleading (if the defense appears on the face of the complaint, it must be raised by demurrer; otherwise it must be specially pleaded in the answer) or is waived [citations]." ( O'Neil v. Spillane (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 147, 156 . 119 Cal.Rptr. 245 ; Hall v. Chamberlain (1948) 31 Cal.2d 673, 679 , 192 P.2d 759 ; Neptune Society Corp. v. Longanecker (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1233, 1243-1244 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 117 .) [9] Bozanich and County al

2025Governing law and standard of review When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. 5 (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243-244 ; People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) Prior to acceptance of a guilty plea, courts must advise the defendant of “three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (Cross, at p. 170, citing Boykin, at pp. 243-244 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.

2024APPLICABLE LAW “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) Courts refer to this prophylactic measure as an advisement of “Boykin/Tahl rights . . . .” (See People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295,

2026(See Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967, 972-973 [in competency proceeding, counsel may waive jury trial and 12 make other decisions regarding jury trial, even over defendant’s objection]; cf. People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1116 [“the trial court must advise the [mentally disordered offender] defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence— that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the defendant lacks the

2020(Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 7 p. 874; Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 95 [citing cases].) By contrast, some of the rights that do not require a personal waiver from the accused include (1) the right to testify (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1052-1053 ); (2) in a capital case based on a prior-murder-conviction special-circumstance allegation, the right to have that allegation determined in a separate proceeding following a finding of first degree murder (Hinton, at p. 873); (3) the right to be present at pretrial conferences (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1196 ); (4) in a

1992(In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-925 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].) In those circumstances, no submission will be effective absent a personal waiver of constitutional rights to plead not guilty, to jury trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present evidence on a defendant’s own behalf.

1992(In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-925 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].) In those circumstances, no submission will be effective absent a personal waiver of constitutional rights to plead not guilty, to jury trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present evidence on a defendant’s own behalf.

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2024Analysis “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each. [Citations.]” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) These are commonly referred to as “Boykin-Tahl advisements.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 ; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969)

2024The shareholders may, however, bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation’s rights and redress its injuries when the board of directors fails or refuses to do so.” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a derivative suit is one in which the shareholder seeks ‘redress of the wrong to the corporation.’ ” (Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775, 793 .) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity: ‘If the injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of acti

2022F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 106 .) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity.” (Denevi v. LGCC, LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1222 .) The fraud / fiduciary duty cause of action includes allegations describing two categories of conduct by the individual respondents: (1) breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and other misconduct and mismanagement that reduced the value of the corporation and shares therein, and (2) fraudulent nondisclosures and misrepresentat

2025Applicable legal principles “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) These required advisements are known as “Boykin/Tahl admonitions.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174 (Howard),

2024Analysis “When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers—and solicit a personal waiver of each. [Citations.]” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 .) These are commonly referred to as “Boykin-Tahl advisements.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 ; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969)

2026(Compare Conservatorship of Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 [“‘LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.’”] and Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384 [jury trial waiver by counsel is valid only if the proposed conservatee lacked capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver] with Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894 , 911 [jury trial waiver by counsel is valid unless circumstances suggest that counsel lacked actual authority from the proposed conserv

2024Jury Trial Waivers Under the LPS Act “‘LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.’” (Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016; see Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383 ; Prob.

2024The shareholders may, however, bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation’s rights and redress its injuries when the board of directors fails or refuses to do so.” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a derivative suit is one in which the shareholder seeks ‘redress of the wrong to the corporation.’ ” (Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775, 793 .) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity: ‘If the injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of acti

2019Omitted].) “A personal claim, in contrast, asserts a right against the corporation which the shareholder possesses as an individual apart from the corporate entity: ‘If the injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action exists.’ [Citation.]” (Denevi v. LGCC, LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1222 (Denevi).) “[T]he principles of derivative lawsuits applicable to corporations likewise apply to a limited liability compan[ies].” (PacLink Communications Intern., Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 958, 963 (PacLink).) Sprengel’s appellate briefing do

2025(See People v. Washington (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 453 , 471 (Washington) [applying four-factor test to conclude that in SVP commitment proceeding “the lack of an advisement of Washington’s right to a jury trial and an express personal waiver of that 3 right did not violate Washington’s due process rights”]; People v. Magana (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 310 , 319 (Magana).) Defendant acknowledges these precedents but argues their “reasoning was flawed.” We disagree and adhere to the decisions holding that due process does not require a jury trial advisement or the personal waiver of a jury trial in SVP

2025In People v. Cannon (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 786 , 798–799, our colleagues in Division Five followed Nolasco and People v. Magana (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 310 , 324, in concluding rational basis review applied in determining whether the Sexually Violent Predators Act (§§ 6600 et seq.) violates equal protection by not requiring a personal waiver of a jury trial right, as other civil commitment statutes require.

2000Redwood Empire points to language in Gion cautioning that in implied dedication cases, “analogies from the law of adverse possession and easement by prescriptive rights can be misleading.” (Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 39.) The Gion court, however, was only discussing the element of adverse use, which differs in dedication cases because use under “a personal claim of right need not be shown.” (Ibid.) When it comes to the issue of whether an impliedly dedicated public easement should be limited to the use that gave rise to it, prescriptive easements appear fully analogous.

1997Co . v. Sacramento County (1954) 42 Cal.2d 235 , which drew upon all of these as well as other cases, identified this form of dedication as one implied in law, as opposed to those forms resting upon the acts or acquiescence of the owner, which it characterized as implied in fact. [Citation.] "Our Gion-Dietz [ Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 29 ] case, adverting to this venerable line of authority, went on to distinguish the character of `adversity' necessary to implied in law dedication to the public from that obtaining in the law of private prescriptive rights, pointing out that wh

2019If the employee chooses the first or third option, the employee may obtain and keep for herself all of the underpaid wages she may recover in pursuing her private right of action; but in choosing either of these options, the employee's personal claim for Labor Code violations is subject to arbitration if the employee has agreed to arbitrate her personal claims. (§§ 1194, 218; *78 Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 391 , 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 .) If, on the other hand, the employee chooses the second option and files a lawsuit asserting only a PAGA claim, the employee may recover t

2019If the employee chooses the first or third option, the employee may obtain and keep for herself all of the underpaid wages she may recover in pursuing her private right of action; but in choosing either of these options, the employee's personal claim for Labor Code violations is subject to arbitration if the employee has agreed to arbitrate her personal claims. (§§ 1194, 218; *78 Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 391 , 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 .) If, on the other hand, the employee chooses the second option and files a lawsuit asserting only a PAGA claim, the employee may recover t

2020(Id. at pp. 451-452; accord, Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal.4th 644, 656, fn. 7 [constitutional right to jury trial does not apply to actions in equity or to special proceedings, though the Legislature may provide for a jury trial in these types of actions]; People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, 829 , disapproved on another ground in Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1113 .) Thus, because an SVP defendant’s right to a jury trial is based only on statute (§ 6603, subd. (a)), the defendant is not constitutionally entitled to the safeguards of a judicial advisement and a personal waiver.

2014It too noted that the statutory language did not expressly require a personal waiver or clearly preclude a waiver by counsel and agreed that the Legislature could not have intended to require a personal waiver and thereby deny counsel the authority to act on behalf of an incompetent MDO such as the MDO in Otis. ( Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 830-831.) The court acknowledged that "a patient might be mentally disordered for some purposes and not for others." (Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 831 .) However, it noted that the defendant's mind was not functioning normally (he was diag

2025It has long been settled that “the plain language of section 859b’s 60-day rule establishes the right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment [or plea] is absolute absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 729 , italics added; see People v. Superior Court (Arnold) (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 923 , 940; Lacayo v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 396 , 400 (Lacayo); Del Castillo v. Superior Court (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1120 (Del Castillo); Garcia, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 645; People v. Mackey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 177 , 183-184 (Mackey), su

2024We address that argument in part D, infra. 5 arraignment is absolute absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 729 .) Thus, “excepting only his own waiver, a defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 consecutive calendar days from entry of plea or arraignment, whichever is later.” (People v. Mackey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 177, 183 .) B.