61 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1912–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Mitchell v. State , 2006 OK CR 20, ¶ 86 , 136 P.3d 671, 706 (holding defendant waived right to preclude disqualified judge from hearing case by failing to properly pursue claim in trial court); Welch v. State , 2000 OK CR 8, ¶ 37 , 2 P.3d 356, 372 ("[T]he right to preclude a disqualified judge from trial is a personal privilege which can be waived by the failure to strictly comply with the proper procedure for See king the disqualification of the trial judge."). 2017Mitchell v. State , 2006 OK CR 20, ¶ 86 , 136 P.3d 671, 706 (holding defendant waived right to preclude disqualified judge from hearing case by failing to properly pursue claim in trial court); Welch v. State , 2000 OK CR 8, ¶ 37 , 2 P.3d 356, 372 ("[T]he right to preclude a disqualified judge from trial is a personal privilege which can be waived by the failure to strictly comply with the proper procedure for See king the disqualification of the trial judge."). | 2 | 2 |
Welch v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Mitchell v. State , 2006 OK CR 20, ¶ 86 , 136 P.3d 671, 706 (holding defendant waived right to preclude disqualified judge from hearing case by failing to properly pursue claim in trial court); Welch v. State , 2000 OK CR 8, ¶ 37 , 2 P.3d 356, 372 ("[T]he right to preclude a disqualified judge from trial is a personal privilege which can be waived by the failure to strictly comply with the proper procedure for See king the disqualification of the trial judge."). 2017Mitchell v. State , 2006 OK CR 20, ¶ 86 , 136 P.3d 671, 706 (holding defendant waived right to preclude disqualified judge from hearing case by failing to properly pursue claim in trial court); Welch v. State , 2000 OK CR 8, ¶ 37 , 2 P.3d 356, 372 ("[T]he right to preclude a disqualified judge from trial is a personal privilege which can be waived by the failure to strictly comply with the proper procedure for See king the disqualification of the trial judge."). | 2 | 2 |
Starr v. Stategreen2 sentences1937Cr. 440 , 115 Pac. 356, 368 , the court says: “Where a constitutional right in a criminal cause is largely for the benefit of the accused or in the nature of a personal privilege, the law is Avell settled that an accused may waive such right.” And in the case of Ex parte Hollingsworth, 46 Okla. 1913Cr. 440 , 115 Pac. 356 , Judge Doyle, speaking for the court, said: “Where a constitutional right in a criminal cause is largely for the benefit of the accused or in the nature of a personal privilege, the law is well settled that an accused may waive such right.” In the ease of State v. Frisbee, 8 Okla. | 1 | 7 |
Willis v. Stategreen2 sentences1988In Willis v. State, 650 P.2d 873, 874 (Okl.Cr.1982), this Court held that the right to preclude a disqualified judge from trial is a personal privilege which can be waived. 1988In Willis v. State, 650 P.2d 873, 874 (Okl.Cr. 1982), this Court held that the right to preclude a disqualified judge from trial is a personal privilege which can be waived. | 1 | 2 |
Glover v. Stategreen2 sentences1975See our recent decision in Glover v. State, Okl.Cr., 531 P.2d 689 (1974). 1975Glover v. State, Okl.Cr., 531 P.2d 689 (1975) and Wright v. State, Okl.Cr., 531 P.2d 696 (1975). | 1 | 2 |
Rock v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2020He argues this unconstitutionally excluded important testimony about the motive of the third party he identified as the real killer, as well as the facts of a drug deal that happened on a different day. ¶73 The state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, including the right to "present his own version of events in his own words." Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1987) (finding this right "[e]ven more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation"). 2020He argues this unconstitutionally excluded important testimony about the motive of the third party he identified as the real killer, as well as the facts of a drug deal that happened on a different day. ¶73 The state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, including the right to "present his own version of events in his own words." Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1987) (finding this right "[e]ven more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation"). | 1 | 1 |
Harrell v. Samson Resources Co.green2 sentences2010Harrell v. Samson Resources, Inc. [ Co ., ] 1998 OK 69 , 980 P.2d 99, 105, 107 . 2010Harrell v. Samson Resources, Inc. [ Co ., ] 1998 OK 69 , 980 P.2d 99, 105, 107 . | 1 | 1 |
Hatch v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Hatch v. State, 1983 OK CR 47, ¶ 5 , 662 P.2d 1377, 1380 , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 , 106 S.Ct. 834 , 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986); Willis v. State, 1982 OK CR 134, ¶ 4 , 650 P.2d 873, 874 . 2000See Hatch v. State, 1983 OK CR 47, ¶ 5 , 662 P.2d 1377, 1380 , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 , 106 S.Ct. 834 , 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986); Willis v. State, 1982 OK CR 134, ¶ 4 , 650 P.2d 873, 874 . | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Et Al.green2 sentences2000See Hatch v. State, 1983 OK CR 47, ¶ 5 , 662 P.2d 1377, 1380 , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 , 106 S.Ct. 834 , 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986); Willis v. State, 1982 OK CR 134, ¶ 4 , 650 P.2d 873, 874 . 2000See Hatch v. State, 1983 OK CR 47, ¶ 5 , 662 P.2d 1377, 1380 , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 , 106 S.Ct. 834 , 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986); Willis v. State, 1982 OK CR 134, ¶ 4 , 650 P.2d 873, 874 . | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Hindley v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1996State, ex rel., Hindley v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 352 , 126 P. 920, 923 (1912). 1996State, ex rel., Hindley v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 352 , 126 P. 920, 923 (1912). | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Stategreen2 sentences1988In Hayes v. State, 541 P.2d 210, 212 (Okl.Cr.1975), this Court reversed in a similar situation where the trial court failed to conduct an appropriate inquiry of the defendant to establish a personal waiver, and there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant authorized, consented to, or ratified the waiver. 1988In Hayes v. State, 541 P.2d 210, 212 (Okl.Cr. 1975), this Court reversed in a similar situation where the trial court failed to conduct an appropriate inquiry of the defendant to establish a personal waiver, and there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant authorized, consented to, or ratified the waiver. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morris v. State
green
2 sentences1972In Morris v. State, Okl.Cr., 363 P.2d 377 (1961), we stated: ‘The constitutional right to be tried in the county in which an offense is committed is a personal privilege which may be waived. 1971In Morris v. State, Okl.Cr., 363 P.2d 377 (1961), we stated: “The constitutional right to be tried in the county in which an offense is committed is a personal privilege which may be waived. | 3 | 1971–1990 |
Application of Poston
green
2 sentences1972In re Poston, Okl.Cr., 281 P.2d 776 and general 14 Am.Jur. § 233, page 30. ‘Where it is apparent that the court and the jurors have personal knowledge of the places named by different witnesses, tending to show that the offense was committed within the county of trial, and defendant decides to challenge the venue, he should request an instructed verdict because of insufficient proof of venue and move for a new trial on that ground in order that the trial court may determine the issue.’ “In the instant case, the defendant’s failure to properly raise the question of the venue in the trial court 1971In re Poston, Okl.Cr., 281 P.2d 776 and generally 14 Am.Jur. § 233, page 30. | 3 | 1961–1972 |
Simpson v. State
green
2 sentences2017We review Appellant's claim pursuant to the test for plain error set forth in Simpson v. State , 1994 OK CR 40 , 876 P.2d 690 . 2017We review Appellant's claim pursuant to the test for plain error set forth in Simpson v. State , 1994 OK CR 40 , 876 P.2d 690 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Ex Parte Pruitt
neutral
2 sentences2010The district court overruled the objection and admitted the document in evidence, relying largely on State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73 , 815 P.2d 190 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72 , 877 P.2d 1136 . [2] ¶ 27 The preliminary examination provided by Article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution is "a personal privilege for benefit of accused, which may be waived by him." Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66 , 89 Okla.Crim. 312 , 207 P.2d 337, 339 . 2010The district court overruled the objection and admitted the document in evidence, relying largely on State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73 , 815 P.2d 190 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72 , 877 P.2d 1136 . [2] ¶ 27 The preliminary examination provided by Article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution is "a personal privilege for benefit of accused, which may be waived by him." Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66 , 89 Okla.Crim. 312 , 207 P.2d 337, 339 . | 2 | 1969–2010 |
Ex Parte Kirk
green
2 sentences1973We are of the opinion that the defendant’s unqualified plea of guilty waived any objection the defendant might have to the defense of former jeopardy.” In the case of Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okl.Cr. 272 , 252 P.2d 1032 (1953), this Court stated as follows: “ ‘Constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege for the sole benefit of the accused. 1971In Ex parte Zeligson, 47 Okl.Cr. 45 , 287 P. 731 , we stated: “Immunity from second jeopardy can be waived by express consent, or by implication by failure to claim or assert right.” Again in Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okl.Cr. 272 , 252 P.2d 1032 , we stated: “Constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege for the sole benefit of the accused, and it may be waived by the express consent or by implication from conduct indicative of consent or by failure to claim or assert the right in seasonable time.” [Emphasis added] In the case of People ex rel. | 2 | 1971–1973 |
City of Shawnee v. Jeter
green
2 sentences1973We are of the opinion that the defendant’s unqualified plea of guilty waived any objection the defendant might have to the defense of former jeopardy.” In the case of Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okl.Cr. 272 , 252 P.2d 1032 (1953), this Court stated as follows: “ ‘Constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege for the sole benefit of the accused. 1971In Ex parte Zeligson, 47 Okl.Cr. 45 , 287 P. 731 , we stated: “Immunity from second jeopardy can be waived by express consent, or by implication by failure to claim or assert right.” Again in Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okl.Cr. 272 , 252 P.2d 1032 , we stated: “Constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege for the sole benefit of the accused, and it may be waived by the express consent or by implication from conduct indicative of consent or by failure to claim or assert the right in seasonable time.” [Emphasis added] In the case of People ex rel. | 2 | 1971–1973 |
Tanner v. State
green
2 sentences1972Tanner v. State, Okl.Cr., 381 P.2d 888 (1963); Thompson v. State, supra; Carney v. State, Okl.Cr., 406 P.2d 1003 (1965); People v. Pitman, 25 A.D.2d 637 , 268 N.Y.S.2d 83 ; Danks v. State, 18 Utah 2d 212 , 418 P.2d 488 . 1965Defendant then cites, and purports to quote from the case of Tanner v. State, Okl.Cr., 381 P.2d 888 , as follows: “A constitutional right is largely for the benefit of the accused or in the nature of a personal privilege and may be waived by accused.” This quotation was taken from a paragraph of the West Publishing Company syllabus, and is misquoted. | 2 | 1965–1972 |
Ex Parte Zeligson
green
2 sentences1971In Ex parte Zeligson, 47 Okl.Cr. 45 , 287 P. 731 , we stated: “Immunity from second jeopardy can be waived by express consent, or by implication by failure to claim or assert right.” Again in Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okl.Cr. 272 , 252 P.2d 1032 , we stated: “Constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege for the sole benefit of the accused, and it may be waived by the express consent or by implication from conduct indicative of consent or by failure to claim or assert the right in seasonable time.” [Emphasis added] In the case of People ex rel. 1971In Ex parte Zeligson, 47 Okl.Cr. 45 , 287 P. 731 , we stated: “Immunity from second jeopardy can be waived by express consent, or by implication by failure to claim or assert right.” Again in Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okl.Cr. 272 , 252 P.2d 1032 , we stated: “Constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege for the sole benefit of the accused, and it may be waived by the express consent or by implication from conduct indicative of consent or by failure to claim or assert the right in seasonable time.” [Emphasis added] In the case of People ex rel. | 2 | 1953–1971 |
Short v. State
neutral
2 sentences1947Short v. State, 48 Okla. 1947Short v. State, 48 Okla. | 2 | 1947–1947 |
Canard v. State
neutral
2 sentences1946Canard v. State, 2 Okla. 1935Canard v. State, 2 Okla. | 2 | 1935–1946 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences1945In the case of State v. Adams, 20 Kan. 311 , Mr. Justice Brewer said: “ ‘ . . . 1945In the case of State v. Adams, 20 Kan. 311 , Mr. Justice Brewer said: ‘So far as the provision in the Bill of Rights is concerned, there are two question's: (1) Is it anything more than the grant of certain privileges, which an accused may waive? | 2 | 1945–1945 |
Walker v. State
neutral
2 sentences1945Cr. 533 , 139 P. 711, 713 , Judge Doyle, speaking for the court, said: , “Where a constitutional right is largely for the benefit of the accused, or in the nature of a personal privilege, the law is well settled that an accused may waive such right,” citing with approval the cases of Blair v. State, and Starr v. State, supra. ‘ Further along in the opinion, it is said: “In the case of Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 -304, 12 S. Ct. 617, 630 , 36 L. 1924Walker v. State, 10 Okla. | 2 | 1924–1945 |
Arnold v. Richardson
green
2 sentences1935The statute only applies '.where administrators take an appeal in the interest of the estate and in order to preserve or protect the estate, and has no application where an appeal is taken to defeat a personal claim against them.-” *77 “This court construed this section of the statute in the case of Arnold v. Richardson, Adm’r., 90 Okla. 220 , 217 P. 381 .” In the eases cited above and while section 565, O. 1935The statute only applies '.where administrators take an appeal in the interest of the estate and in order to preserve or protect the estate, and has no application where an appeal is taken to defeat a personal claim against them.-” *77 “This court construed this section of the statute in the case of Arnold v. Richardson, Adm’r., 90 Okla. 220 , 217 P. 381 .” In the eases cited above and while section 565, O. | 2 | 1931–1935 |
State v. Frisbee
green
2 sentences1925State v. Frisbee, 8 Okla. 1913Cr. 440 , 115 Pac. 356 , Judge Doyle, speaking for the court, said: “Where a constitutional right in a criminal cause is largely for the benefit of the accused or in the nature of a personal privilege, the law is well settled that an accused may waive such right.” In the ease of State v. Frisbee, 8 Okla. | 2 | 1913–1925 |
State v. Tinkler
green
2 sentences2010The district court overruled the objection and admitted the document in evidence, relying largely on State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73 , 815 P.2d 190 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72 , 877 P.2d 1136 . [2] ¶ 27 The preliminary examination provided by Article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution is "a personal privilege for benefit of accused, which may be waived by him." Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66 , 89 Okla.Crim. 312 , 207 P.2d 337, 339 . 2010The district court overruled the objection and admitted the document in evidence, relying largely on State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73 , 815 P.2d 190 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72 , 877 P.2d 1136 . [2] ¶ 27 The preliminary examination provided by Article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution is "a personal privilege for benefit of accused, which may be waived by him." Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66 , 89 Okla.Crim. 312 , 207 P.2d 337, 339 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2010The district court overruled the objection and admitted the document in evidence, relying largely on State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73 , 815 P.2d 190 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72 , 877 P.2d 1136 . [2] ¶ 27 The preliminary examination provided by Article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution is "a personal privilege for benefit of accused, which may be waived by him." Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66 , 89 Okla.Crim. 312 , 207 P.2d 337, 339 . 2010The district court overruled the objection and admitted the document in evidence, relying largely on State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73 , 815 P.2d 190 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72 , 877 P.2d 1136 . [2] ¶ 27 The preliminary examination provided by Article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution is "a personal privilege for benefit of accused, which may be waived by him." Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66 , 89 Okla.Crim. 312 , 207 P.2d 337, 339 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Black v. State
green
2 sentences1997In so doing, we have noted that "the right to remain silent is a personal privilege which does not vicariously extend to the pretrial silence of third persons." Id. 1997In so doing, we have noted that “the right to remain silent is a personal privilege which does not vicariously extend to the pretrial silence of third persons.” Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Dancy v. Owens
green
2 sentences1982Dancy v. Owens, 126 Okl. 37 , 258 P. 879 (1927). 1982Dancy v. Owens, 126 Okl. 37 , 258 P. 879 (1927). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Wright v. State
green
1 sentence1975Glover v. State, Okl.Cr., 531 P.2d 689 (1975) and Wright v. State, Okl.Cr., 531 P.2d 696 (1975). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Caso v. 323 Edgecombe Realty Corp. neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| People v. Pitman neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Carney v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Danks v. State neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Rodgers v. State neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Cox v. State green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Spears v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Hornbeck v. Jackson green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| People ex rel. Hornbeck v. Jackson neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Flowers v. State neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Clark v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Ex Parte Musgrave neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| One 1949 Pickup Truck Motor No. 87HY157418 v. State Ex Rel. Rhoads neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Wood v. State green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Magee v. People green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| In re Mote green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| People v. Fontuccio neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| State v. Browning neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Landon v. State neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Ex Parte Gilbert green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.