personal privilege in Indiana

1980Couch v. United States, (1973) 409 U.S. 322 , 93 S. Ct. 611 , 34 L.

1980Couch v. United States, (1973) 409 U.S. 322 , 93 S. Ct. 611 , 34 L.

2019She cites Curry v. Orwig , 429 N.E.2d 268 , 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), for the proposition that a lis pendens notice may not be used to secure a personal claim against a party.

2015“The opposite end of the spectrum is reached when a plaintiff files a lis pendens notice while asserting a personal claim against a defendant.” Id.

1959Herman v. Baker, supra ( 214 Ind. 308 , 15 N. E. 2d 365 ).

1959Herman v. Baker, supra ( 214 Ind. 308 , 15 N. E. 2d 365 ).

1942Watson v. Wrightsman, (1901), 26 Ind. App. 437 , 59 N. E. 1064 ; Cohee v. Baer (1893), 134 Ind. 375 , 32 N. E. 920 ; Daugherty v. Reveal (1913), 54 Ind. App. 71 , 102 N. E. 381 .

1901In Cohee v. Baer, supra, the court quotes approvingly from Freeman the following: “Though the statute requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of minors who have no general guardian, it is well settled that where process has been served upon a minor the failure to appoint a guardian ad lilem for him is a mere irregularity not affecting the validity of the judgment,” and adds: “This statement of the law by Ereeman is in harmony with the decisions of this court.” Again, in the same case, it was said: “As early as the case of Blake v. Douglass, 27 Ind. 416 , it wa

2012Id.

1988Id.

1959If the act is one for the benefit of the employer or for the mutual benefit of both an injury arising out of it will usually be compensable; on the other hand, if the act being performed is for the exclusive benefit of the employee so that it is a personal privilege, or is one which the employer permits the employee to undertake for the benefit of some other person or for some cause apart from his own interests, an injury arising out of it will not be compensable.” (Our emphasis.) Smith v. Seamless Rubber Co. (1930), 111 Conn. 365 , 150 Atl. 110 .

1959If the act is one for the benefit of the employer or for the mutual benefit of both an injury arising out of it will usually be compensable; on the other hand, if the act being performed is for the exclusive benefit of the employee so that it is a personal privilege, or is one which the employer permits the employee to undertake for the benefit of some other person or for some cause apart from his own interests, an injury arising out of it will not be compensable.” (Our emphasis.) Smith v. Seamless Rubber Co. (1930), 111 Conn. 365 , 150 Atl. 110 .

1931Bradley v. Ely, supra. See, also, Macy v. Combs (1860), 15 Ind. 469 , 77 Am.

1907In other words, a property right in them from the start in one associate as much as in the other.” Bradley v. Ely, supra. See, also, Macy v. Kombs (1860), 15 Ind. 469 , 77 Am.

1922Bennett v. Mattingly (1887), 110 Ind. 197 , 10 N. E. 299 , 11 N. E. 792 ; Lackey v. Boruff (1899), 152 Ind. 371 , 53 N. E. 412 ; Irwin v. Marquett (1901), 26 Ind. App. 383 , 59 N. E. 38 , 84 Am.

1922Bennett v. Mattingly (1887), 110 Ind. 197 , 10 N. E. 299 , 11 N. E. 792 ; Lackey v. Boruff (1899), 152 Ind. 371 , 53 N. E. 412 ; Irwin v. Marquett (1901), 26 Ind. App. 383 , 59 N. E. 38 , 84 Am.

1911In other words, a property right in them from the start in one associate as much as in the other. ’ ’ To the same effect are the following cases: Bradley v. Ely (1900), 24 Ind. App. 2, 5 , 56 N. E. 44 , 79 Am.

1911In other words, a property right in them from the start in one associate as much as in the other. ’ ’ To the same effect are the following cases: Bradley v. Ely (1900), 24 Ind. App. 2, 5 , 56 N. E. 44 , 79 Am.

1901In Cohee v. Baer, supra, the court quotes approvingly from Freeman the following: “Though the statute requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of minors who have no general guardian, it is well settled that where process has been served upon a minor the failure to appoint a guardian ad lilem for him is a mere irregularity not affecting the validity of the judgment,” and adds: “This statement of the law by Ereeman is in harmony with the decisions of this court.” Again, in the same case, it was said: “As early as the case of Blake v. Douglass, 27 Ind. 416 , it wa

1893As early as the case of Blake v. Douglass, 27 Ind. 416 , it was held that the plea of infancy is a personal privilege, that may be waived.

1901If not pleaded, a judgment against an infant is binding upon him.” See McBride v. State, 130 Ind. 525 .

1893In McBride v. State, for use, 130 Ind. 525 , 30 N. E.

2019Habitual-Offender Enhancement [19] Last, Teague contends that the trial court was required to hold a jury trial on the habitual-offender charge because it did not get a personal waiver from him (and in fact could not have done so since he was not present) of his right to a jury trial on the habitual-offender charge.2 In Saylor v. State, 55 N.E.3d 354 2 The State does not object to Teague raising this issue on direct appeal.

2018Cf. id. at 736-38 .

2018Id.

2017Moreover, in arguing invited error, the State directs us to reasoning articulated in Bunting v. State, 854 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, a case in which this Court determined that the right to a jury trial was not violated.

2017In'support of his argument that there is nevertheless a personal waiver requirement emanating from the Sixth Amendment and applicable where a defendant is charged only with misdemeanors, Martinez directs our' attention to Jean-Baptiste v. State, 71 N.E.3d 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), petition for trans. filed.

2016Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1159 (Ind. 2016) (holding the defendant must personally waive his right to a jury trial on a habitual-offender charge.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1603-CR-639 | November 15, 2016 Page 14 of 18 the issue, the issue was never put to the jury, and the trial court proceeded directly to sentencing. [25] The same scenario led our supreme court to conclude in Tumulty that the defendant had pleaded guilty to a habitual offender enhancement.4 666 N.E.2d at 395-96 .

2014Further, the waiver must be personal; in a misdemeanor case, a personal waiver “can be inferred where the defendant fails to assert the right to a jury trial and there is evidence that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 843 .

2011I am further mindful of the Blair court’s cautionary words: “[Wjhile declining to mandate any additional formal protocol beyond that we find sufficient here, we remind trial courts of the importance of securing a personal waiver and of conducting an ‘appropriate oral colloquy1 to be certain that any waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” 698 So.2d at 1218 .