personal privilege in Maryland

2020Id. at 242–43; see also James v. Prince George’s Cty., 288 Md. 315, 332 (1980) (“As a general rule . . . the master remains liable for the servant’s conduct even through the servant himself is not liable because of a personal immunity.”).

2018See also James v. Prince George's Cnty. , 288 Md. 315 , 332, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980) ("As a general rule ... the master remains liable for the servant's conduct even though the servant is himself not liable because of a personal immunity.").

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by his counsel’s acquiescence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present during the entire adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel without the personal waiver of the defendant); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 556 , 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by his counsel’s acquiescence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present during the entire adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel without the personal waiver of the defendant); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 556 , 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by his counsel’s acquiescence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present during the entire adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel without the personal waiver of the defendant); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 556 , 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by his counsel’s acquiescence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present during the entire adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel without the personal waiver of the defendant); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 556 , 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by counsel’s silence and defendant’s acquiescence), ce rt. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present when evidence was presented by stipulation during adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel with the defendant’s acquiescence without the per

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by his counsel’s acquiescence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present during the entire adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel without the personal waiver of the defendant); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 556 , 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1

1995In Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201 , 438 A.2d 1301 (1981), the Court explained: With respect to all criminal trials or parts of trials ... an effective waiver of the defendant’s right to be present at every stage of the trial will not always require a personal waiver by the defendant.

1995In Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201 , 438 A.2d 1301 (1981), the Court explained: With respect to all criminal trials or parts of trials ... an effective waiver of the defendant’s right to be present at every stage of the trial will not always require a personal waiver by the defendant.

2023Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275 (1965).

1967Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265 , 208 A. 2d 575 ; Sweeney v. State, 1 Md.

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by his counsel’s acquiescence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present during the entire adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel without the personal waiver of the defendant); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 556 , 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1

1992See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 226 , 596 A.2d 1024, 1035 (1991) (although trial judge discouraged defendant from participating in bench conferences, defendant’s right to be present was waived by his counsel’s acquiescence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1590 , 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 235-36 , 522 A.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1987) (defendant’s right to be present during the entire adjudicatory phase of a revocation of probation hearing may be waived by counsel without the personal waiver of the defendant); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 556 , 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1

2021See, e.g., In re Blessen H., 392 Md. 684, 708 , 898 A.2d 980, 995 (2006).

2021See, e.g., In re Blessen H., 392 Md. 684, 708 , 898 A.2d 980, 995 (2006).

2019See Marks v. State, 84 Md.

2016See Zeller v. Cumberland Truck Sales, 272 S.C. 558 , 253 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1979) (“The exemption or immunity from service of process, afforded under Section 19-9-110, is a personal privilege or exemption and may be waived by the person otherwise entitled thereto”) (citations omitted); see also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 49 at 327 (2016) (“Since exemption from arrest is merely a personal privilege, it may be waived, and a party who goes to trial without claiming a privilege from arrest by plea or motion waives any such privilege.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally, E

2016See Zeller v. Cumberland Truck Sales, 272 S.C. 558 , 253 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1979) (“The exemption or immunity from service of process, afforded under Section 19-9-110, is a personal privilege or exemption and may be waived by the person otherwise entitled thereto”) (citations omitted); see also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 49 at 327 (2016) (“Since exemption from arrest is merely a personal privilege, it may be waived, and a party who goes to trial without claiming a privilege from arrest by plea or motion waives any such privilege.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally, E

2016See Zeller v. Cumberland Truck Sales, 272 S.C. 558 , 253 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1979) (“The exemption or immunity from service of process, afforded under Section 19-9-110, is a personal privilege or exemption and may be waived by the person otherwise entitled thereto”) (citations omitted); see also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 49 at 327 (2016) (“Since exemption from arrest is merely a personal privilege, it may be waived, and a party who goes to trial without claiming a privilege from arrest by plea or motion waives any such privilege.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally, E

2016See Zeller v. Cumberland Truck Sales, 272 S.C. 558 , 253 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1979) (“The exemption or immunity from service of process, afforded under Section 19-9-110, is a personal privilege or exemption and may be waived by the person otherwise entitled thereto”) (citations omitted); see also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 49 at 327 (2016) (“Since exemption from arrest is merely a personal privilege, it may be waived, and a party who goes to trial without claiming a privilege from arrest by plea or motion waives any such privilege.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally, E

2016See Zeller v. Cumberland Truck Sales, 272 S.C. 558 , 253 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1979) (“The exemption or immunity from service of process, afforded under Section 19-9-110, is a personal privilege or exemption and may be waived by the person otherwise entitled thereto”) (citations omitted); see also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 49 at 327 (2016) (“Since exemption from arrest is merely a personal privilege, it may be waived, and a party who goes to trial without claiming a privilege from arrest by plea or motion waives any such privilege.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally, E

2016See Zeller v. Cumberland Truck Sales, 272 S.C. 558 , 253 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1979) (“The exemption or immunity from service of process, afforded under Section 19-9-110, is a personal privilege or exemption and may be waived by the person otherwise entitled thereto”) (citations omitted); see also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 49 at 327 (2016) (“Since exemption from arrest is merely a personal privilege, it may be waived, and a party who goes to trial without claiming a privilege from arrest by plea or motion waives any such privilege.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally, E

2015See McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 140-41 , 617 A.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1993) (“As to those fundamental rights, intelligent and knowing waiver requires that the petitioner’s knowledge of the right and the petitioner’s personal waiver of the right be reflected on the record.

2015See McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 140-41 , 617 A.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1993) (“As to those fundamental rights, intelligent and knowing waiver requires that the petitioner’s knowledge of the right and the petitioner’s personal waiver of the right be reflected on the record.

2012Wildlife Trust, Inc., 157 Md.App. 447, 457 , 852 A.2d 996, 1002 (2004) *290 (stating that “a license is merely a personal privilege to do some particular act ... on [another’s] land without possessing any estate or interest therein, while an easement is an interest in land that grants the right to use that land for a specific purpose” (internal quotations omitted)); State ex rel.

2012Wildlife Trust, Inc., 157 Md.App. 447, 457 , 852 A.2d 996, 1002 (2004) *290 (stating that “a license is merely a personal privilege to do some particular act ... on [another’s] land without possessing any estate or interest therein, while an easement is an interest in land that grants the right to use that land for a specific purpose” (internal quotations omitted)); State ex rel.

2012Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487 , 156 P.2d 667, 671 (1945) (holding that because public use of a beach was permissive, “[t]he public [was] a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner”).

2012Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487 , 156 P.2d 667, 671 (1945) (holding that because public use of a beach was permissive, “[t]he public [was] a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner”).

2009In Gianakos v. Magiros, 238 Md. 178, 186 , 208 A.2d 718, 723 (1965), we explained: If an administrator is properly appointed by the court having jurisdiction, he is not disqualified by the filing of a personal claim against the estate; nor, as administrator, is he required to avail himself of a defense of limitations against such a claim.

2009In Gianakos v. Magiros, 238 Md. 178, 186 , 208 A.2d 718, 723 (1965), we explained: If an administrator is properly appointed by the court having jurisdiction, he is not disqualified by the filing of a personal claim against the estate; nor, as administrator, is he required to avail himself of a defense of limitations against such a claim.