personal privilege in Nebraska

1988See, also, id., § 124 at 820: “Venue statutes are generally regarded as conferring a personal privilege which may be waived by the defendant.” In Peitz v. Hausman, 198 Neb. 344 , 252 N.W.2d 628 (1977), an automobile negligence case, this court held that the question of improper venue in a transitory action is waived unless raised in the answer or by an earlier timely objection before answer.

1988See, also, id., § 124 at 820: “Venue statutes are generally regarded as conferring a personal privilege which may be waived by the defendant.” In Peitz v. Hausman, 198 Neb. 344 , 252 N.W.2d 628 (1977), an automobile negligence case, this court held that the question of improper venue in a transitory action is waived unless raised in the answer or by an earlier timely objection before answer.

1966Latimer v. State, 55 Neb. 609 , 76 N. W. 207 , 70 Am.

1907It was held in Latimer v. State, 55 Neb. 609 , that a preliminary examination is a personal privilege, which may be waived.

1959In Gurske v. Strate, 165 Neb. 882 , 87 N. W. 2d 703 , it was held: “The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of the debtor, and can be raised only by such debtor and those in privity with him.” See, also, Neill v. Burke, 81 Neb. 125 , 115 N. W. 321 .

1959In Gurske v. Strate, 165 Neb. 882 , 87 N. W. 2d 703 , it was held: “The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of the debtor, and can be raised only by such debtor and those in privity with him.” See, also, Neill v. Burke, 81 Neb. 125 , 115 N. W. 321 .

1907The 'same rule was also announced in Coffield v. State, 44 Neb. 417 .

1898(Coffield v. State, 44 Neb. 417 .) In the case at bar Latimer was accorded the privilege —the right — of a preliminary examination.

2018SALES & SERV. v. WEGENER Cite as 301 Neb. 1 Whatever they may have been arguing before the district court, however, Wegener and Pribil do not make any argu- ment to us that the buyer was deceived by Lindsay.

2017Cite as 297 Neb. 938 to which he or she is not currently entitled.

1996The Court stated that the tolling protection provided to minors in § 25-213 "exists for the exclusive and personal benefit of Amy Macku and does not toll the time limit restricting prosecution of any parental claim associated with Amy's separate and personal claim." Macku at 183, 343 N.W.2d at 62 .

1992Stat. § 30-2813 (Reissue 1989): “[T]he trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another . . . .” In re Conservatorship of Estate of Martin, 228 Neb. 103 , 421 N.W.2d 463 (1988), declares that § 30-2813 places an external rather than a personal standard of care on a trustee, requiring the trustee to act as would an individual investing property for people to whom the trustee feels morally bound.

1992Stat. § 30-2813 (Reissue 1989): “[T]he trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another . . . .” In re Conservatorship of Estate of Martin, 228 Neb. 103 , 421 N.W.2d 463 (1988), declares that § 30-2813 places an external rather than a personal standard of care on a trustee, requiring the trustee to act as would an individual investing property for people to whom the trustee feels morally bound.

1988The regulators further point to the language of § 53-149 (Reissue 1984), which provides that a liquor license is “purely a personal privilege, good for not to exceed one year after issuance unless sooner revoked as in this act provided, and shall not constitute property . . .” (emphasis supplied), and to § 53-150 (Reissue 1984), which provides that the “renewal privilege herein provided for shall not be construed as a vested right ...” In Bali Hai’, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 195 Neb. 1, 8 , 236 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1975), we stated that under § 53-149, the “ ‘right to engage in t

1968A prior case to the contrary, Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761 , 101 N. W. 1007 , was expressly overruled in State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639 , 150 N. W. 2d 129 .

1968A prior case to the contrary, Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761 , 101 N. W. 1007 , was expressly overruled in State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639 , 150 N. W. 2d 129 .

1968A prior case to the contrary, Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761 , 101 N. W. 1007 , was expressly overruled in State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639 , 150 N. W. 2d 129 .

1968A prior case to the contrary, Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761 , 101 N. W. 1007 , was expressly overruled in State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639 , 150 N. W. 2d 129 .

1968This court, in Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783 , 100 N. W. 2d 844 , held that the constitutional right to trial by jury is a personal privilege which may be waived.

1968This court, in Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783 , 100 N. W. 2d 844 , held that the constitutional right to trial by jury is a personal privilege which may be waived.

1966Berg v. Griffiths, 126 Neb. 235 , 252 N. W. 918 .

1966Berg v. Griffiths, 126 Neb. 235 , 252 N. W. 918 .

1959In Gurske v. Strate, 165 Neb. 882 , 87 N. W. 2d 703 , it was held: “The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of the debtor, and can be raised only by such debtor and those in privity with him.” See, also, Neill v. Burke, 81 Neb. 125 , 115 N. W. 321 .

1959In Gurske v. Strate, 165 Neb. 882 , 87 N. W. 2d 703 , it was held: “The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of the debtor, and can be raised only by such debtor and those in privity with him.” See, also, Neill v. Burke, 81 Neb. 125 , 115 N. W. 321 .

1958There is no reason for a distinction in the case of liens by attachment.” In American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656 , it was held: “The defense of usury is a personal privilege of the debtor, his* privies in representation, in blood, or in estate, as his vendee, execution creditor, or, as in this case, his attachment creditor who' may defend against his debtor’s mortgage on the ground that it secures usury, * * This case is approved in Coleman v. Cole, 158 Mo. 253 , 59 S. W. 106 , and Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503 , 66 S. W. 260 , 89 Am.

1958There is no reason for a distinction in the case of liens by attachment.” In American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656 , it was held: “The defense of usury is a personal privilege of the debtor, his* privies in representation, in blood, or in estate, as his vendee, execution creditor, or, as in this case, his attachment creditor who' may defend against his debtor’s mortgage on the ground that it secures usury, * * This case is approved in Coleman v. Cole, 158 Mo. 253 , 59 S. W. 106 , and Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503 , 66 S. W. 260 , 89 Am.

1958There is no reason for a distinction in the case of liens by attachment.” In American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656 , it was held: “The defense of usury is a personal privilege of the debtor, his* privies in representation, in blood, or in estate, as his vendee, execution creditor, or, as in this case, his attachment creditor who' may defend against his debtor’s mortgage on the ground that it secures usury, * * This case is approved in Coleman v. Cole, 158 Mo. 253 , 59 S. W. 106 , and Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503 , 66 S. W. 260 , 89 Am.

1958There is no reason for a distinction in the case of liens by attachment.” In American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656 , it was held: “The defense of usury is a personal privilege of the debtor, his* privies in representation, in blood, or in estate, as his vendee, execution creditor, or, as in this case, his attachment creditor who' may defend against his debtor’s mortgage on the ground that it secures usury, * * This case is approved in Coleman v. Cole, 158 Mo. 253 , 59 S. W. 106 , and Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503 , 66 S. W. 260 , 89 Am.

1958There is no reason for a distinction in the case of liens by attachment." In American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo.App. 656 , it was held: "The defense of usury is a personal privilege of the debtor, his privies in representation, in blood, or in estate, as his vendee, execution creditor, or, as in this case, his attachment creditor who may defend against his debtor's mortgage on the ground that it secures usury, * * *." This case is approved in Coleman v. Cole, 158 Mo. 253 , 59 S.W. 106 , and Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503 , 66 S.W. 260 , 89 Am.

1958There is no reason for a distinction in the case of liens by attachment.” In American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656 , it was held: “The defense of usury is a personal privilege of the debtor, his* privies in representation, in blood, or in estate, as his vendee, execution creditor, or, as in this case, his attachment creditor who' may defend against his debtor’s mortgage on the ground that it secures usury, * * This case is approved in Coleman v. Cole, 158 Mo. 253 , 59 S. W. 106 , and Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503 , 66 S. W. 260 , 89 Am.

1948As provided in section 53-149: “A license shall be purely a personal privilege, * * * and shall not constitute property, * * Section 53-150 provides: “Any licensee may renew his license at the expiration thereof; Provided, he is then qualified to receive a license * * *; and provided, further, that the renewal privilege herein provided for shall not be construed as a vested right * * In Griffin v. Gass, 133 Neb. 56 , 274 N. W. 193 , this court approved the statement that: “ ‘The right to engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Un

1948As provided in section 53-149: “A license shall be purely a personal privilege, * * * and shall not constitute property, * * Section 53-150 provides: “Any licensee may renew his license at the expiration thereof; Provided, he is then qualified to receive a license * * *; and provided, further, that the renewal privilege herein provided for shall not be construed as a vested right * * In Griffin v. Gass, 133 Neb. 56 , 274 N. W. 193 , this court approved the statement that: “ ‘The right to engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Un

1924The reason for this rule is clearly stated in Hickey v. State, 12 Neb. 490 , as follows: “ Tt is certainly clear that all jurors must have the qualifications of electors; and if one not having such qualifications is retained upon the panel without the knowledge of the party or his counsel, and after reasonable diligence used to ascertain that fact, when the jury is impaneled, a new trial should for that cause be granted.

1924State v. Crinklaw, 40 Neb. 759 ; Kennison v. State, 88 Neb. 391 .

1908Hines v. Hussy, 45 Ala. 496 .

1908Corbey v. Rogers, 152 Ind. 169 , and cases there cited.

1905Co. v. Englehart, 57 Neb. 444 , that a purchaser of lands upon which an easement had been acquired for a public use did not succeed to his grantor’s right to damages therefor in the absence of a special grant or assignment thereof, such right being regarded as a personal claim not attached to or passing with the land.

1904Brownell & Co. v. Stoddard, 42 Neb. 177; Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262, 271 .

1904Brownell & Co. v. Stoddard, 42 Neb. 177; Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262, 271 .