personal privilege in New York

2020"The right to indictment by a [g]rand [j]ury has . . . been recognized as not merely a personal privilege of the defendant but a public fundamental right, which is the basis of jurisdiction to try and punish an individual" ( People v Boston , 75 NY2d 585, 588 [1990] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Hansen , 95 NY2d 227, 231 [2000]). "[S]ince an infringement of defendant's right to be prosecuted only by indictment implicates the jurisdiction of the court," this claim is not waived by a guilty plea and may be raised for the first time on appeal ( People v Zanghi , 7

2020"The right to indictment by a [g]rand [j]ury has . . . been recognized as not merely a personal privilege of the defendant but a public fundamental right, which is the basis of jurisdiction to try and punish an individual" ( People v Boston , 75 NY2d 585, 588 [1990] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Hansen , 95 NY2d 227, 231 [2000]). "[S]ince an infringement of defendant's right to be prosecuted only by indictment implicates the jurisdiction of the court," this claim is not waived by a guilty plea and may be raised for the first time on appeal ( People v Zanghi , 7

2023State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 172 AD3d at 1590; Matter of Scism v Fiala , 122 AD3d 1197 , 1199 [3d Dept 2014]), especially when taking into consideration that "a driver's license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions" ( Matter of Kenny v Fiala , 127 AD3d 1359, 1360 [3d Dept 2015] [internal [*3]quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]).

2015“Impermissible retroactive application of a statute generally occurs when a vested right is impaired or a past transaction is altered by such application” (Matter of Kenny v Fiala, 127 AD3d 1359, 1359 [2015]; see Matter of Scism v Fiala, 122 AD3d 1197, 1198 [2014]). “[Hjowever, ‘[a] driver’s license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but [it is] merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions’ ” (Kenny, 127 AD3d at 1360 , quoting Scism, 122 AD3d at 1198 ).

2019"Where, as here, an inmate initially agrees to testify and later refuses, 'it is incumbent upon the Hearing Officer to conduct a personal inquiry unless a genuine reason for the refusal is apparent from the record and the Hearing Officer makes a sufficient inquiry into the facts surrounding the refusal to ascertain its authenticity'" ( Matter of Radcliffe v Annucci , 157 AD3d 1177 , 1178 [2018], quoting Matter of Banks v Annucci , 146 AD3d 1267, 1268 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citations omitted]; see Matter of Abdur-Raheem v Prack , 98 AD3d 1152, 1153 [2012]; Matt

2019Although "an inmate's refusal that is based upon a desire not to be involved is not adequate to excuse a personal inquiry by the Hearing Officer" ( Matter of Banks v Annucci , 146 AD3d at 1268 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]), the record reflects that the Hearing Officer conducted the requisite personal inquiry and explained to petitioner that the witness did not want to testify because, in addition to not wanting to be involved, he could not recall the incident in detail and was being paroled ( compare Matter of Joseph v LaClair , 112 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2013]; Matter of Abdur—R

2023State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 172 AD3d at 1590; Matter of Scism v Fiala , 122 AD3d 1197 , 1199 [3d Dept 2014]), especially when taking into consideration that "a driver's license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions" ( Matter of Kenny v Fiala , 127 AD3d 1359, 1360 [3d Dept 2015] [internal [*3]quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]).

2015“Impermissible retroactive application of a statute generally occurs when a vested right is impaired or a past transaction is altered by such application” (Matter of Kenny v Fiala, 127 AD3d 1359, 1359 [2015]; see Matter of Scism v Fiala, 122 AD3d 1197, 1198 [2014]). “[Hjowever, ‘[a] driver’s license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but [it is] merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions’ ” (Kenny, 127 AD3d at 1360 , quoting Scism, 122 AD3d at 1198 ).

2015As we have iterated, a driver’s license is “a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions and revocation by [the Commissioner in] her discretionary powers,” not a vested right (Matter of Scism v Fiala, 122 AD3d at 1198; see Matter of Kenny v Fiala, 127 AD3d 1359, 1360 [2015]; see also Matter of Lap v Axelrod, 95 AD2d 457, 459 [1983], lv denied 61 NY2d 603 [1984]).

2015As this Court has emphasized, however, “[a] driver’s license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions” (Matter of Scism v Fiala, 122 AD3d at 1198 ; see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 510 [2] [c]; 1192 [2]; Matter of Lap v Axelrod, 95 AD2d 457, 459 [1983], Iv denied 61 NY2d 603 [1984]).

2019"Where, as here, an inmate initially agrees to testify and later refuses, 'it is incumbent upon the Hearing Officer to conduct a personal inquiry unless a genuine reason for the refusal is apparent from the record and the Hearing Officer makes a sufficient inquiry into the facts surrounding the refusal to ascertain its authenticity'" ( Matter of Radcliffe v Annucci , 157 AD3d 1177 , 1178 [2018], quoting Matter of Banks v Annucci , 146 AD3d 1267, 1268 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citations omitted]; see Matter of Abdur-Raheem v Prack , 98 AD3d 1152, 1153 [2012]; Matt

2019Although "an inmate's refusal that is based upon a desire not to be involved is not adequate to excuse a personal inquiry by the Hearing Officer" ( Matter of Banks v Annucci , 146 AD3d at 1268 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]), the record reflects that the Hearing Officer conducted the requisite personal inquiry and explained to petitioner that the witness did not want to testify because, in addition to not wanting to be involved, he could not recall the incident in detail and was being paroled ( compare Matter of Joseph v LaClair , 112 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2013]; Matter of Abdur—R

2017Such fiduciary will not be permitted to jeopardize the interests of [the beneficiaries] by . . . forcing] them to demonstrate the substantially impossible,” i.e., that the stock was not transferred to the fiduciary by decedents (Matter of Greenberg, 158 Misc 446, 448 [1936]; see Matter of Zuckerman, 8 Misc 2d 57, 59 [1957]; see generally Matter of Camarda, 63 AD2d 837, 839 [1978]).

2017Such fiduciary will not be permitted to jeopardize the interests of [the beneficiaries] by . . . forcing] them to demonstrate the substantially impossible,” i.e., that the stock was not transferred to the fiduciary by decedents (Matter of Greenberg, 158 Misc 446, 448 [1936]; see Matter of Zuckerman, 8 Misc 2d 57, 59 [1957]; see generally Matter of Camarda, 63 AD2d 837, 839 [1978]).

2017Such fiduciary will not be permitted to jeopardize the interests of [the beneficiaries] by . . . forcing] them to demonstrate the substantially impossible,” i.e., that the stock was not transferred to the fiduciary by decedents (Matter of Greenberg, 158 Misc 446, 448 [1936]; see Matter of Zuckerman, 8 Misc 2d 57, 59 [1957]; see generally Matter of Camarda, 63 AD2d 837, 839 [1978]).

2017Such fiduciary will not be permitted to jeopardize the interests of [the beneficiaries] by . . . forcing] them to demonstrate the substantially impossible,” i.e., that the stock was not transferred to the fiduciary by decedents (Matter of Greenberg, 158 Misc 446, 448 [1936]; see Matter of Zuckerman, 8 Misc 2d 57, 59 [1957]; see generally Matter of Camarda, 63 AD2d 837, 839 [1978]).

2012It was incumbent upon the Hearing Officer, under these circumstances, to conduct a personal inquiry unless a genuine reason for the refusal is apparent from the record and the Hearing Officer made a sufficient inquiry into the facts surrounding the refusal to ascertain its authenticity (see Matter of Hill v Selsky, 19 AD3d 64, 67 [2005]; see also 7 NYCRR 254.5 [a]; compare Matter of Colon v Goord, 245 AD2d 582, 584 [1997]).

2012It was incumbent upon the Hearing Officer, under these circumstances, to conduct a personal inquiry unless a genuine reason for the refusal is apparent from the record and the Hearing Officer made a sufficient inquiry into the facts surrounding the refusal to ascertain its authenticity (see Matter of Hill v Selsky, 19 AD3d 64, 67 [2005]; see also 7 NYCRR 254.5 [a]; compare Matter of Colon v Goord, 245 AD2d 582, 584 [1997]).

2017Such fiduciary will not be permitted to jeopardize the interests of [the beneficiaries] by . . . forcing] them to demonstrate the substantially impossible,” i.e., that the stock was not transferred to the fiduciary by decedents (Matter of Greenberg, 158 Misc 446, 448 [1936]; see Matter of Zuckerman, 8 Misc 2d 57, 59 [1957]; see generally Matter of Camarda, 63 AD2d 837, 839 [1978]).

2017Such fiduciary will not be permitted to jeopardize the interests of [the beneficiaries] by . . . forcing] them to demonstrate the substantially impossible,” i.e., that the stock was not transferred to the fiduciary by decedents (Matter of Greenberg, 158 Misc 446, 448 [1936]; see Matter of Zuckerman, 8 Misc 2d 57, 59 [1957]; see generally Matter of Camarda, 63 AD2d 837, 839 [1978]).

1996Corp. v Matrix Props., 96 AD2d 930 ), which "confers a personal privilege to do some act or acts on the land without possessing any interest therein” (Todd v Krolick, supra, at 696).

1996"An easement always implies an interest in the land in and over which it is to be enjoyed, whereas a license merely confers a personal privilege to do some act or acts on the land without possessing any interest therein” (Todd v Krolick, 96 AD2d 695, 696 , affd 62 NY2d 836 ).

2019Trust Co. v Flagstar Capital Mkts. , 32 NY3d 139, 151 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Ajdler v Province of Mendoza , __ NY3d __, 2019 NY Slip Op 02151 , *4 n 6 [March 21, 2019] ["Our statute of limitations doctrine serves the objectives of finality, certainty and predictability"] [internal quotation marks and alterations omitted]).

2019Trust Co. v Flagstar Capital Mkts. , 32 NY3d 139, 151 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Ajdler v Province of Mendoza , __ NY3d __, 2019 NY Slip Op 02151 , *4 n 6 [March 21, 2019] ["Our statute of limitations doctrine serves the objectives of finality, certainty and predictability"] [internal quotation marks and alterations omitted]).

2019"Where, as here, an inmate initially agrees to testify and later refuses, 'it is incumbent upon the Hearing Officer to conduct a personal inquiry unless a genuine reason for the refusal is apparent from the record and the Hearing Officer makes a sufficient inquiry into the facts surrounding the refusal to ascertain its authenticity'" ( Matter of Radcliffe v Annucci , 157 AD3d 1177 , 1178 [2018], quoting Matter of Banks v Annucci , 146 AD3d 1267, 1268 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citations omitted]; see Matter of Abdur-Raheem v Prack , 98 AD3d 1152, 1153 [2012]; Matt

2019Although "an inmate's refusal that is based upon a desire not to be involved is not adequate to excuse a personal inquiry by the Hearing Officer" ( Matter of Banks v Annucci , 146 AD3d at 1268 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]), the record reflects that the Hearing Officer conducted the requisite personal inquiry and explained to petitioner that the witness did not want to testify because, in addition to not wanting to be involved, he could not recall the incident in detail and was being paroled ( compare Matter of Joseph v LaClair , 112 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2013]; Matter of Abdur—R

2014While, as defendants assert, the statute of frauds is a personal defense and their agreement (which amounts to a lease with an option to purchase) is not rendered voidable solely by the absence of a writing, the lack of corroboration of their purported contract remains material to the issue of fraud (see Durack v Wilson, 46 Misc 237, 241 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1905]).

2014While, as defendants assert, the statute of frauds is a personal defense and their agreement (which amounts to a lease with an option to purchase) is not rendered voidable solely by the absence of a writing, the lack of corroboration of their purported contract remains material to the issue of fraud (see Durack v Wilson, 46 Misc 237, 241 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1905]).

2011(Anello, 22 AD2d 694 [1964]; Vanderbilt v Vanderbilt, 354 US 416, 418 [1957] [“(A) court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant”].) Since the property at issue is located in New York, in rem jurisdiction was not available and the California court, therefore, was required to have in personam jurisdiction over both parties for this State to give full faith and credit to that court’s decision as to the distribution of the marital assets.

1984Here, the Nevada divorce court was as powerless to cut off the wife’s support right as it would have been to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife had brought the divorce action and he had not been subject to the divorce court’s jurisdiction” (Vanderbilt v Vanderbilt, supra, pp 418-419 [footnotes omitted]).

2018The Court observed that the statute of limitations is not only a personal defense but also "expresses a societal interest or public policy 'of giving repose to human affairs' " ( id. at 550 , quoting Flanagan v Mount Eden Gen.

2018"Although the Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense to afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims,' it also expresses a societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs' ( id. at 550 , quoting Flanagan v Mt.

2020"The right to indictment by a [g]rand [j]ury has . . . been recognized as not merely a personal privilege of the defendant but a public fundamental right, which is the basis of jurisdiction to try and punish an individual" ( People v Boston , 75 NY2d 585, 588 [1990] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Hansen , 95 NY2d 227, 231 [2000]). "[S]ince an infringement of defendant's right to be prosecuted only by indictment implicates the jurisdiction of the court," this claim is not waived by a guilty plea and may be raised for the first time on appeal ( People v Zanghi , 7

2020To that end, an indictment ensures that "the crime for which the defendant is brought to trial is in fact one for which he [or she] was indicted by the [g]rand [j]ury, rather than some alternative seized upon by the prosecution" ( People v Sanchez , 84 NY2d 440, 445 [1994]), providing a safeguard against prosecutorial authority by requiring the grand jury to "assess[] the sufficiency of the prosecutor's case" ( People v Pelchat , 62 NY2d 97, 104 [1984]; see People v Perez , 83 NY2d at 273 ; People v Iannone , 45 NY2d at 594 ).

2006In addition, this Court has consistently held that where an inmate witness agreed to testify but later refuses to do so without giving a reason, the hearing officer must personally attempt to ascertain the reason for the inmate’s unwillingness to testify; failure to make a personal inquiry constitutes a regulatory violation tantamount to a constitutional violation, thus requiring ex-pungement (see Matter of Hill v Selsky, supra; Matter of Brodie v Selsky, 203 AD2d 671 [1994]; Matter of Contras v Coughlin, supra).

2005When an inmate witness previously agreed to testify, but later refuses to do so without giving a reason, we have consistently held that the hearing officer is required to personally ascertain the reason for the inmate’s unwillingness to testify (see Matter of Brodie v Selsky, 203 AD2d 671, 672 [1994]; Matter of Contras v Coughlin, 199 AD2d 601, 602 [1993], supra; Matter of Codrington v Mann, 174 AD2d 868, 869 [1991]).