factor defense in Georgia

2012See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 82-83 (III) (A) (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985) (noting that a “defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding,” and that when the defendant is able to make a threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent; holding that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must assure the defendant ac

2012See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 82-83 (III) (A) (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985) (noting that a “defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding,” and that when the defendant is able to make a threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to he a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent; holding that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must assure the defendant ac

2004“The trial court is authorized to order a psychiatrist, or perhaps some other competent mental health expert, to examine the defendant in order to determine whether his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense.” Id. at 449 .

1995Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F3d 1280, 1290-1291 (8th Cir. 1994); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F2d 640, 644 (11th Cir. 1991); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F2d 1153, 1157-1160 (9th Cir. 1990). [5] Although we held in Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 449 ( 330 SE2d 563 ) (1985), that a trial court is authorized to appoint an expert to assist it in determining whether the defendant's sanity will be a significant factor in his defense, we did not indicate whether we were contemplating an expert appointed under § 17-7-130.1 who would report back to the prosecutor.

2026Id. at 243 (“The determination as to whether the police have scrupulously honored the defendant’s right to remain silent rests in part upon their immediate response to the defendant’s invocation of the right; a showing of respect for the defendant’s right, by immediately ceasing questioning upon its invocation, is a significant factor in this analysis.”).

2026Id. at 243 (“The determination as to whether the police have scrupulously honored the defendant’s right to remain silent rests in part upon their immediate response to the defendant’s invocation of the right; a showing of respect for the defendant’s right, by immediately ceasing questioning upon its invocation, is a significant factor in this analysis.”).

2017See Norris v. State, 282 Ga. 430, 431 (2) ( 651 SE2d 40 ) (2007).

2017See Norris v. State, 282 Ga. 430, 431 (2) ( 651 SE2d 40 ) (2007).

2017As found by the trial court, there is no indication that the police contacted family when they picked him up or before they initiated questioning. 8 Although a parent’s absence or presence is not dispositive of the question of whether a juvenile’s confession is admissible, see Allen v. State, 283 Ga. 304, 306 (2) (a) ( 658 SE2d 580 ) (2008), it is a significant factor in the analysis.

2017As found by the trial court, there is no indication that the police contacted family when they picked him up or before they initiated questioning. 8 Although a parent’s absence or presence is not dispositive of the question of whether a juvenile’s confession is admissible, see Allen v. State, 283 Ga. 304, 306 (2) (a) ( 658 SE2d 580 ) (2008), it is a significant factor in the analysis.

2012See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 82-83 (III) (A) (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985) (noting that a “defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding,” and that when the defendant is able to make a threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent; holding that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must assure the defendant ac

2012Godinez, supra at 401 (II) (B), n. 12.

2004“The mere filing of a motion does not constitute a *355 preliminary showing that sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial. [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 767, 768 ( 368 SE2d 533 ) (1988). 5 LaCount asserts that, with a second evaluation, he could have established an insanity defense.

2004“The mere filing of a motion does not constitute a *355 preliminary showing that sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial. [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 767, 768 ( 368 SE2d 533 ) (1988). 5 LaCount asserts that, with a second evaluation, he could have established an insanity defense.

2025See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 888-889 (3); Ammons, 315 Ga. at 173 (2) n.21 (Pinson, J., concurring).

2025See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 888-889 (3); Ammons, 315 Ga. at 173 (2) n.21 (Pinson, J., concurring).

2025See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 888-889 (3); Ammons, 315 Ga. at 173 (2) n.21 (Pinson, J., concurring).

2025See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 888-889 (3); Ammons, 315 Ga. at 173 (2) n.21 (Pinson, J., concurring).

2022Regarding the fourth factor, the trial court’s finding that Burton did not consult with a parent or relative and that Detective Ross did not contact Burton’s parents was based, at least in part, on Detective Ross’s testimony that he did not notify Burton’s parents that their son was in custody or why he was in custody “[a]t any point in time during that day.” See Oubre v. Woldemichael, 301 Ga. 299, 305-306 ( 800 SE2d 518 ) (2017) (noting, in analyzing the Riley factors in the context of due process voluntariness, that “[a]lthough a parent’s absence or presence is not dispositive of the questio

2022Regarding the fourth factor, the trial court’s finding that Burton did not consult with a parent or relative and that Detective Ross did not contact Burton’s parents was based, at least in part, on Detective Ross’s testimony that he did not notify Burton’s parents that their son was in custody or why he was in custody “[a]t any point in time during that day.” See Oubre v. Woldemichael, 301 Ga. 299, 305-306 ( 800 SE2d 518 ) (2017) (noting, in analyzing the Riley factors in the context of due process voluntariness, that “[a]lthough a parent’s absence or presence is not dispositive of the questio

2022Cf. Daniels v. State, 313 Ga. 400, 413 ( 870 SE2d 409 ) (2022) (“[A] parent’s presence, although not required, is a significant factor in support of a finding of waiver.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022Cf. Daniels v. State, 313 Ga. 400, 413 ( 870 SE2d 409 ) (2022) (“[A] parent’s presence, although not required, is a significant factor in support of a finding of waiver.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014See Mosley, 423 U. S. at 105-106 (right to remain silent was scrupulously honored where, inter alia, police “immediately ceased the interrogation” upon defendant’s invocation of right); Griffin, 280 Ga. at 686 (right was scrupulously honored where, upon invocation of the right, police “immediately stopp[ed] [the] interview and physically exitfed] the interview room”); Fields, 266 Ga. at 243 (right was scrupulously honored where “police immediately ceased all questioning when [defendant] exercised his right to remain silent”).

2014See Mosley, 423 U. S. at 105-106 (right to remain silent was scrupulously honored where, inter alia, police “immediately ceased the interrogation” upon defendant’s invocation of right); Griffin, 280 Ga. at 686 (right was scrupulously honored where, upon invocation of the right, police “immediately stopp[ed] [the] interview and physically exitfed] the interview room”); Fields, 266 Ga. at 243 (right was scrupulously honored where “police immediately ceased all questioning when [defendant] exercised his right to remain silent”).

2014See Mosley, 423 U. S. at 105-106 (right to remain silent was scrupulously honored where, inter alia, police “immediately ceased the interrogation” upon defendant’s invocation of right); Griffin, 280 Ga. at 686 (right was scrupulously honored where, upon invocation of the right, police “immediately stopp[ed] [the] interview and physically exitfed] the interview room”); Fields, 266 Ga. at 243 (right was scrupulously honored where “police immediately ceased all questioning when [defendant] exercised his right to remain silent”).

2012See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 82-83 (III) (A) (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985) (noting that a “defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding,” and that when the defendant is able to make a threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent; holding that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must assure the defendant ac

2012See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 82-83 (III) (A) (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985) (noting that a “defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding,” and that when the defendant is able to make a threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent; holding that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must assure the defendant ac

2011Here, however, the trial court’s order completely omitted this factor from its analysis. 1 Moreover, the Court of Appeals first erroneously stated that the trial court properly weighed this factor against Porter, see 300 Ga. App. at 132 , and then erred further by failing to give weight to this factor in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Porter’s motion to dismiss.

2011See id. at 132-133 . (4) Prejudice The final factor in the Barker analysis is prejudice to the defendant.

1995Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F3d 1280, 1290-1291 (8th Cir. 1994); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F2d 640, 644 (11th Cir. 1991); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F2d 1153, 1157-1160 (9th Cir. 1990). [5] Although we held in Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 449 ( 330 SE2d 563 ) (1985), that a trial court is authorized to appoint an expert to assist it in determining whether the defendant's sanity will be a significant factor in his defense, we did not indicate whether we were contemplating an expert appointed under § 17-7-130.1 who would report back to the prosecutor.

1995State v. Grant, 257 Ga. 123, 126 (2) ( 355 SE2d 646 ) (1987).

1995State v. Grant, 257 Ga. 123, 126 (2) ( 355 SE2d 646 ) (1987).

1992See Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39 (3) ( 365 SE2d 115 ) (1988).

1992See Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39 (3) ( 365 SE2d 115 ) (1988).

1989(Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Raines v. State, 186 Ga. App. 239, 242 (4) (c) ( 366 SE2d 841 ) (1988).

1989(Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Raines v. State, 186 Ga. App. 239, 242 (4) (c) ( 366 SE2d 841 ) (1988).