factor analysis in Wisconsin

2020Joinder is proper if the crimes charged “have a common factor or factors of substantial factual importance, [e].g., time, place, or [m]odus operandi, so that the evidence of each crime is relevant to establish a common scheme or plan that tends to establish the identity of the perpetrator.” Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 560 , 273 N.W.2d 310 (1979).

2020Joinder is proper if the crimes charged “have a common factor or factors of substantial factual importance, [e].g., time, place, or [m]odus operandi, so that the evidence of each crime is relevant to establish a common scheme or plan that tends to establish the identity of the perpetrator.” Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 560 , 273 N.W.2d 310 (1979).

2022This is not the law; the Court in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) and this court as well as other courts applying its holding have already rejected the premise of Justice Dallet's concurrence. ¶54 In J.L., police received an anonymous tip that a person at a bus stop was concealing——not shooting——a firearm.

2022This is not the law; the Court in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) and this court as well as other courts applying its holding have already rejected the premise of Justice Dallet's concurrence. ¶54 In J.L., police received an anonymous tip that a person at a bus stop was concealing——not shooting——a firearm.

2022Cf. Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43 , ¶52 & n.44, 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 (“[f]airness” has not been “adopted” generally “as a factor in the doctrine of claim preclusion,” but in the specific privity context, “courts ask whether the nonparty has had a full and fair opportunity to determine the issue.”). ¶38 Carla asserts that the issue of the obligations of the parties after the initial ten years was merely “dormant and conditional” in the first action, given that it was not known in 2011 if Rodney would want to extend the lease.

2022Cf. Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43 , ¶52 & n.44, 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 (“[f]airness” has not been “adopted” generally “as a factor in the doctrine of claim preclusion,” but in the specific privity context, “courts ask whether the nonparty has had a full and fair opportunity to determine the issue.”). ¶38 Carla asserts that the issue of the obligations of the parties after the initial ten years was merely “dormant and conditional” in the first action, given that it was not known in 2011 if Rodney would want to extend the lease.

2020The joinder statute “is to be broadly construed in favor of initial joinder.” State v. Salinas, 2016 WI 44, ¶31 , 369 Wis. 2d 9 , 879 N.W.2d 609 .

2020The joinder statute “is to be broadly construed in favor of initial joinder.” State v. Salinas, 2016 WI 44, ¶31 , 369 Wis. 2d 9 , 879 N.W.2d 609 .

2025Reynolds did not involve a new factor challenge, see Reynolds, 308 Wis. 2d 666, ¶¶1-2 , and Talley does not explain how its statement—that the subsequent sentencing court must acknowledge the reasoning of the first sentencing court—would apply in the new factor context.

2024Because there may be more than one cause of the patient’s injury, the substantial factor test asks whether the physician’s negligence was “a cause,” not “the cause.” Id. ¶47 Thus, to make a prima facie case for summary judgment with respect to this causation part, Dr. Neuman must demonstrate that her alleged failure to 12 Under the first part of the causation test, Wisconsin courts employ an “objective test” that “focuses on what the attitudes and actions of the reasonable person in the position of the patient would have been rather than on what the attitudes and actions of the particular pati

2024Co. of Wis., 223 Wis. 2d 417, 434-35 , 588 N.W.2d 26 (1999).

2024Co. of Wis., 223 Wis. 2d 417, 434-35 , 588 N.W.2d 26 (1999).

2024Defendants who are already incarcerated on unrelated charges may also experience special forms of prejudice, including the elimination of the possibility of being sentenced to and serving concurrent sentences, see Hadley, 66 Wis. 2d at 364-65 , and “the possible impact that pending 35 No. 2022AP959-CR charges might have on [a defendant’s] prospects for parole and meaningful rehabilitation,” see Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27 (1973). ¶85 Although “prejudice is an important factor in the analysis, it is not necessary that a defendant show prejudice in fact in order to establish a speedy trial

2024Defendants who are already incarcerated on unrelated charges may also experience special forms of prejudice, including the elimination of the possibility of being sentenced to and serving concurrent sentences, see Hadley, 66 Wis. 2d at 364-65 , and “the possible impact that pending 35 No. 2022AP959-CR charges might have on [a defendant’s] prospects for parole and meaningful rehabilitation,” see Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27 (1973). ¶85 Although “prejudice is an important factor in the analysis, it is not necessary that a defendant show prejudice in fact in order to establish a speedy trial

2023As noted above, the sentencing court stated that it possessed “a factual studies file in [its] office” that stated females “younger than 15 that engage in sex:” (1) “have about triple the suicide and depression rates”; (2) “aren’t well 6 Because we affirm the circuit court’s ruling on the first part of the new factor analysis (i.e., that there was not a new factor) for the mandatory minimum and sex offender registration issues, we need not consider the second part of the analysis regarding the court’s discretionary decision as to whether those factors warranted sentence modification. 10 No. 20

2023As noted above, the sentencing court stated that it possessed “a factual studies file in [its] office” that stated females “younger than 15 that engage in sex:” (1) “have about triple the suicide and depression rates”; (2) “aren’t well 6 Because we affirm the circuit court’s ruling on the first part of the new factor analysis (i.e., that there was not a new factor) for the mandatory minimum and sex offender registration issues, we need not consider the second part of the analysis regarding the court’s discretionary decision as to whether those factors warranted sentence modification. 10 No. 20

2023Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 735 , 275 N.W.2d 600 (1979) (explaining that the test of cause-in-fact in negligence actions is the substantial factor standard); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 436 , 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of felony murder); State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 631 , 18 No. 2022AP1872 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of a criminal charge for recklessly causing great bodily harm).

2023Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 735 , 275 N.W.2d 600 (1979) (explaining that the test of cause-in-fact in negligence actions is the substantial factor standard); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 436 , 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of felony murder); State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 631 , 18 No. 2022AP1872 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of a criminal charge for recklessly causing great bodily harm).

2023Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 735 , 275 N.W.2d 600 (1979) (explaining that the test of cause-in-fact in negligence actions is the substantial factor standard); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 436 , 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of felony murder); State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 631 , 18 No. 2022AP1872 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of a criminal charge for recklessly causing great bodily harm).

2023Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 735 , 275 N.W.2d 600 (1979) (explaining that the test of cause-in-fact in negligence actions is the substantial factor standard); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 436 , 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of felony murder); State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 631 , 18 No. 2022AP1872 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of a criminal charge for recklessly causing great bodily harm).

2023However, once we determine that discretion was indeed exercised, we will reverse that decision only if the circuit court “applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts,” and “[w]e look for reasons to sustain a [circuit] court’s discretionary decision.” See State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶18 , 385 Wis. 2d 120 , 921 N.W.2d 730 (citations omitted). ¶24 Contrary to Bear’s assertions, the circuit court “made no error of law, and it explained its reason for concluding that the facts [Bear] presented did not justify modification of [his] sen

2023However, once we determine that discretion was indeed exercised, we will reverse that decision only if the circuit court “applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts,” and “[w]e look for reasons to sustain a [circuit] court’s discretionary decision.” See State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶18 , 385 Wis. 2d 120 , 921 N.W.2d 730 (citations omitted). ¶24 Contrary to Bear’s assertions, the circuit court “made no error of law, and it explained its reason for concluding that the facts [Bear] presented did not justify modification of [his] sen

2023“Wisconsin, like many states, adheres to the doctrine of employment-at-will.” Strozinsky v. School Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶33 , 237 Wis. 2d 19 , 614 N.W.2d 443 .

2023“Wisconsin, like many states, adheres to the doctrine of employment-at-will.” Strozinsky v. School Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶33 , 237 Wis. 2d 19 , 614 N.W.2d 443 .

2023Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 735 , 275 N.W.2d 600 (1979) (explaining that the test of cause-in-fact in negligence actions is the substantial factor standard); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 436 , 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of felony murder); State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 631 , 18 No. 2022AP1872 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of a criminal charge for recklessly causing great bodily harm).

2023Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 735 , 275 N.W.2d 600 (1979) (explaining that the test of cause-in-fact in negligence actions is the substantial factor standard); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 436 , 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of felony murder); State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 631 , 18 No. 2022AP1872 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the substantial factor test in the context of a criminal charge for recklessly causing great bodily harm).

2023Under this test, an actor’s action is a “cause” of a result if the action “was a substantial factor in contributing to the result.” Eau Claire Press Co. v. Gordon, 176 Wis. 2d 154, 160 , 499 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 735 ; Cefalu v. Continental West.

2023Under this test, an actor’s action is a “cause” of a result if the action “was a substantial factor in contributing to the result.” Eau Claire Press Co. v. Gordon, 176 Wis. 2d 154, 160 , 499 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 735 ; Cefalu v. Continental West.

2021Cf., e.g., State v. Casteel, 2001 WI App 188, ¶¶16-17 , 247 Wis. 2d 451 , 634 N.W.2d 338 (where an alleged “new factor” derived from a law passed in 1989, and defendant-appellant had brought seven appeals between then and 2001, the new factor claim was procedurally barred). 6 No. 2020AP241-CR existence of a new factor by clear and convincing evidence.

2021Cf., e.g., State v. Casteel, 2001 WI App 188, ¶¶16-17 , 247 Wis. 2d 451 , 634 N.W.2d 338 (where an alleged “new factor” derived from a law passed in 1989, and defendant-appellant had brought seven appeals between then and 2001, the new factor claim was procedurally barred). 6 No. 2020AP241-CR existence of a new factor by clear and convincing evidence.