8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences1980Graham v. Roberts, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 305 , 441 F.2d 995 (1979) and Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84 , 566 F.2d 749 (1975), cited by the majority as having “persuasively upheld the substantial factor test,” exemplify situations which were in marked contrast to the instant case. 1980Dunn v. Marsh, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 245 , 393 F.2d 354 (1968). [2] Graham v. Roberts, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 305 , 441 F.2d 995 (1979) and Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84 , 566 F.2d 749 (1975), cited by the majority as having "persuasively upheld the substantial factor test," exemplify situations which were in marked contrast to the instant case. | 2 | 2 |
McDowell v. Davisgreen2 sentences1980This case therefore differs from the situation in McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69 , 448 P.2d 869 (1968) (en banc), relied upon in our prior opinion, where the jury instruction on the substantial factor test included the following statement: An act or omission cannot be a proximate cause if it contributes only slightly or possibly to the result, for a proximate cause is one which is a material element or a substantial factor in causing the injury. [Id. at 71, 448 P.2d at 871 ; emphasis in original.] Unlike McDowell , nothing in the additional instruction here suggested to the jurors that they s 1980This case therefore differs from the situation in McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69 , 448 P.2d 869 (1968) (en banc), relied upon in our prior opinion, where the jury instruction on the substantial factor test included the following statement: An act or omission cannot be a proximate cause if it contributes only slightly or possibly to the result, for a proximate cause is one which is a material element or a substantial factor in causing the injury. [Id. at 71, 448 P.2d at 871 ; emphasis in original.] Unlike McDowell , nothing in the additional instruction here suggested to the jurors that they s | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015See (James) Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365 (noting that failure to consider a relevant factor or reliance on an improper factor is error). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Freemangreen1 sentence1995E.g., District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1984). 9 .This court declared in Lacy that ”[t]he substantial factor test [is] the best means of resolving the causation in fact issue," 424 A.2d at 321 , and that "the substantial factor test is properly applicable whenever there are concurring causes of a single injury....” Id. at 322 . | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences1980Graham v. Roberts, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 305 , 441 F.2d 995 (1979) and Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84 , 566 F.2d 749 (1975), cited by the majority as having “persuasively upheld the substantial factor test,” exemplify situations which were in marked contrast to the instant case. 1980Dunn v. Marsh, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 245 , 393 F.2d 354 (1968). [2] Graham v. Roberts, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 305 , 441 F.2d 995 (1979) and Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84 , 566 F.2d 749 (1975), cited by the majority as having "persuasively upheld the substantial factor test," exemplify situations which were in marked contrast to the instant case. | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980The trial court’s complete charge on the issue of proximate cause is set out in the margin 1 to illustrate the effect of the substantial factor instruction on the jury, and because “[i]t is axiomatic that ‘a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’ ” Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706, 709 (1976) (en banc) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 , 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). 1980The trial court's complete charge on the issue of proximate cause is set out in the margin [1] to illustrate the effect of the substantial factor instruction on the jury, and because "[i]t is axiomatic that `a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.'" Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706, 709 (1976) (en banc) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 , 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Robert L. Dunn, of the Estate of Ruth E. Hoover, Deceased v. William J. Marsh, of the Estate of Margaret v. Marsh, Deceasedgreen2 sentences1980Additionally, the substantial factor test, as expressed in the instruction under review here, is consistent with Dunn v. Marsh, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 248 , 393 F.2d 354, 357 (1968), and Spar v. Obwoya, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 173, 178 (1977), which hold that the test of proximate cause is whether the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the negligent or wrongful act and ought to be foreseen in light of the circumstances. 1980Additionally, the substantial factor test, as expressed in the instruction under review here, is consistent with Dunn v. Marsh, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 248 , 393 F.2d 354, 357 (1968), and Spar v. Obwoya, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 173, 178 (1977), which hold that the test of proximate cause is whether the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the negligent or wrongful act and ought to be foreseen in light of the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Hazel Morgan Hicks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980See Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 92 , 566 F.2d 749, 757 (1977) (diversity case applying District of Columbia law to negligence claim against hospital for improper care of patient with potentially fatal condition); Hicks v. United States, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 182-84 , 511 F.2d 407, 420-22 (1975) (District of Columbia law applied in suit under Federal Torts Claims Act against mental hospital for negligent release of patient who subsequently killed plaintiff). 1980See Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 92 , 566 F.2d 749, 757 (1977) (diversity case applying District of Columbia law to negligence claim against hospital for improper care of patient with potentially fatal condition); Hicks v. United States, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 182-84 , 511 F.2d 407, 420-22 (1975) (District of Columbia law applied in suit under Federal Torts Claims Act against mental hospital for negligent release of patient who subsequently killed plaintiff). | 1 | 1 |
M. A. P. v. Ryangreen2 sentences1980See M.A.P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971). 1980See M.A.P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc.green2 sentences1980Cf. Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., D.C.App., 379 A.2d 685, 688 (1977) (“If the party’s theory is supported by the evidence then he is of course entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury.”); Evans v. Capital Transit Co., D.C.Mun.App., 39 A.2d 869, 871 (1944) (more general instruction not prejudicial since it fully and accurately informed jury as to the law). 1980Cf. Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., D.C.App., 379 A.2d 685, 688 (1977) ("If the party's theory is supported by the evidence then he is of course entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury."); Evans v. Capital Transit Co., D.C.Mun.App., 39 A.2d 869, 871 (1944) (more general instruction not prejudicial since it fully and accurately informed jury as to the law). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Capital Transit Co.green2 sentences1980Cf. Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., D.C.App., 379 A.2d 685, 688 (1977) (“If the party’s theory is supported by the evidence then he is of course entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury.”); Evans v. Capital Transit Co., D.C.Mun.App., 39 A.2d 869, 871 (1944) (more general instruction not prejudicial since it fully and accurately informed jury as to the law). 1980Cf. Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., D.C.App., 379 A.2d 685, 688 (1977) ("If the party's theory is supported by the evidence then he is of course entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury."); Evans v. Capital Transit Co., D.C.Mun.App., 39 A.2d 869, 871 (1944) (more general instruction not prejudicial since it fully and accurately informed jury as to the law). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCray v. United States
green
1 sentence2021In fact, Fleming confirms that a defendant who did not fire the fatal bullet may be convicted as a but-for cause of the victim’s death if his actions instigated the shooting, by another, that led to the victim’s death.13 12 McCray I, 133 A.3d at 226 . 13 See Fleming, 224 A.3d at 217 (“[A] defendant cannot be held to have personally caused a death unless an action by the defendant is a but-for cause of the death[.]”); id. at 226 (“To illustrate the point concretely, we hold that a defendant can be viewed as having personally caused death if (1) the defendant, acting with an intent to kill, shoo | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Herbin v. United States
green
1 sentence2005In other words, if the judge reasonably finds the recantation to be not credible, that determination properly “ends the inquiry,” Herbin, supra, into whether the movant has met his burden of showing that he was in fact innocent. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.
green
1 sentence1997Here, the trial judge granted ACandS, Inc. a directed verdict in phase one of the case, which was divided into three phases. 7 Under phase one, a plaintiff had to show that he was exposed to Armstrong products, and that that exposure was a substantial contributing factor to the development of his asbestosis. 8 In phase two, according to the trial judge, a determination would be made as to which defendants, if any, ultimately were liable for a plaintiffs asbestosis or mesothelioma, if the disease had progressed to cancer. 9 In phase three, responsibility of defendants for punitive damages, if a | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Claytor v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
green
1 sentence1997Mr. Alliegro argues that the appropriate substantial factor standard is that enunciated in a decision handed down by this court after his phase one trial, Claytor v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 662 A.2d 1374 (D.C.1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lacy v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1995E.g., District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1984). 9 .This court declared in Lacy that ”[t]he substantial factor test [is] the best means of resolving the causation in fact issue," 424 A.2d at 321 , and that "the substantial factor test is properly applicable whenever there are concurring causes of a single injury....” Id. at 322 . 1995E.g., District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1984). 9 .This court declared in Lacy that ”[t]he substantial factor test [is] the best means of resolving the causation in fact issue," 424 A.2d at 321 , and that "the substantial factor test is properly applicable whenever there are concurring causes of a single injury....” Id. at 322 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Martin v. Washington Hospital Center
green
2 sentences1980Martin v. Washington Hospital Center, D.C.App., 423 A.2d 913 (1980). 4 Our conclusion here is reinforced by cases applying District of Columbia law, which, though not binding on us, have persuasively upheld the substantial factor test. 1980Martin v. Washington Hospital Center, D.C.App., 423 A.2d 913 (1980). [4] Our conclusion here is reinforced by cases applying District of Columbia law, which, though not binding on us, have persuasively upheld the substantial factor test. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Lacy v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1980Lacy v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 985 (1979). 1980Lacy v. District of Columbia, supra at 991 nn. 6 & 7. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Raymond Graham v. Vernell R. Roberts
green
2 sentences1980The District of Columbia has not adopted the substantial factor test as a substitute definition of proximate cause; however, use of that test, as an element of proximate cause analysis, has been approved by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Graham v. Roberts, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 305 , 441 F.2d 995 (1970), a case with controlling precedential effect upon our decision here. 1980The District of Columbia has not adopted the substantial factor test as a substitute definition of proximate cause; however, use of that test, as an element of proximate cause analysis, has been approved by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Graham v. Roberts, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 305 , 441 F.2d 995 (1970), a case with controlling precedential effect upon our decision here. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Spar v. Obwoya
green
2 sentences1980Additionally, the substantial factor test, as expressed in the instruction under review here, is consistent with Dunn v. Marsh, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 248 , 393 F.2d 354, 357 (1968), and Spar v. Obwoya, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 173, 178 (1977), which hold that the test of proximate cause is whether the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the negligent or wrongful act and ought to be foreseen in light of the circumstances. 1980Additionally, the substantial factor test, as expressed in the instruction under review here, is consistent with Dunn v. Marsh, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 248 , 393 F.2d 354, 357 (1968), and Spar v. Obwoya, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 173, 178 (1977), which hold that the test of proximate cause is whether the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the negligent or wrongful act and ought to be foreseen in light of the circumstances. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Cupp v. Naughten
green
2 sentences1980The trial court’s complete charge on the issue of proximate cause is set out in the margin 1 to illustrate the effect of the substantial factor instruction on the jury, and because “[i]t is axiomatic that ‘a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’ ” Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706, 709 (1976) (en banc) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 , 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). 1980The trial court’s complete charge on the issue of proximate cause is set out in the margin 1 to illustrate the effect of the substantial factor instruction on the jury, and because “[i]t is axiomatic that ‘a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’ ” Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706, 709 (1976) (en banc) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 , 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.