factor test in Montana

2020In Busta, in reviewing this Court’s approach to foreseeability in terms of causation and duty, we noted that “[i]n those cases where there are allegations that more than one person combined to produce a result (e.g., when the plaintiff alleges negligence and the defendant alleges contributory negligence, or when there are multiple defendants) . . . we recommend continued use of the substantial factor instruction[.]” Busta, 276 Mont. at 371 , 916 P.2d at 139 (emphasis added).

2020In Busta, in reviewing this Court’s approach to foreseeability in terms of causation and duty, we noted that “[i]n those cases where there are allegations that more than one person combined to produce a result (e.g., when the plaintiff alleges negligence and the defendant alleges contributory negligence, or when there are multiple defendants) . . . we recommend continued use of the substantial factor instruction[.]” Busta, 276 Mont. at 371 , 916 P.2d at 139 (emphasis added).

2003After discussing the inadequacies of the "but for" test under the facts of that case, the Court properly concluded the substantial factor test was appropriate. *1034 Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 52-54 , 709 P.2d at 628-29 .

2003After discussing the inadequacies of the "but for" test under the facts of that case, the Court properly concluded the substantial factor test was appropriate. *1034 Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 52-54 , 709 P.2d at 628-29 .

2003Compare White v. Murdock (1994), 265 Mont. 386, 392 , 877 P.2d 474, 478 (“each of several acts, alone, could have caused the damages”)(emphasis added); Bickler v. Racquet Club Heights Assocs. (1993), 258 Mont. 19, 23 , 850 P.2d 967, 970 (“because the conduct of one or more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result”)(emphasis added); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank (1990), 242 Mont. 155, 167 , 789 P.2d 567, 574 (“If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is nee

2003Compare White v. Murdock (1994), 265 Mont. 386, 392 , 877 P.2d 474, 478 (“each of several acts, alone, could have caused the damages”)(emphasis added); Bickler v. Racquet Club Heights Assocs. (1993), 258 Mont. 19, 23 , 850 P.2d 967, 970 (“because the conduct of one or more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result”)(emphasis added); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank (1990), 242 Mont. 155, 167 , 789 P.2d 567, 574 (“If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is nee

2021McCauley argues that a more suitable legal standard for examining the conditions of McCauley’s confinement at FCDC can be found in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, under which prison officials may not act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” or in knowing disregard of an “excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 , 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976) (emphasis added); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 , 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). ¶34 The “deliberate indifference” standard encompasses a culpable level of subjective intent on th

2021McCauley argues that a more suitable legal standard for examining the conditions of McCauley’s confinement at FCDC can be found in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, under which prison officials may not act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” or in knowing disregard of an “excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 , 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976) (emphasis added); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 , 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). ¶34 The “deliberate indifference” standard encompasses a culpable level of subjective intent on th

2021An additional factor in the analysis is the “informality of the situation and the interrogation.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377, 131 S. Ct. at 1166.

2021An additional factor in the analysis is the “informality of the situation and the interrogation.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377, 131 S. Ct. at 1166.

2021McCauley argues that a more suitable legal standard for examining the conditions of McCauley’s confinement at FCDC can be found in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, under which prison officials may not act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” or in knowing disregard of an “excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 , 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976) (emphasis added); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 , 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). ¶34 The “deliberate indifference” standard encompasses a culpable level of subjective intent on th

2021McCauley argues that a more suitable legal standard for examining the conditions of McCauley’s confinement at FCDC can be found in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, under which prison officials may not act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” or in knowing disregard of an “excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 , 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976) (emphasis added); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 , 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). ¶34 The “deliberate indifference” standard encompasses a culpable level of subjective intent on th

2003Compare White v. Murdock (1994), 265 Mont. 386, 392 , 877 P.2d 474, 478 (“each of several acts, alone, could have caused the damages”)(emphasis added); Bickler v. Racquet Club Heights Assocs. (1993), 258 Mont. 19, 23 , 850 P.2d 967, 970 (“because the conduct of one or more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result”)(emphasis added); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank (1990), 242 Mont. 155, 167 , 789 P.2d 567, 574 (“If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is nee

2003Compare White v. Murdock (1994), 265 Mont. 386, 392 , 877 P.2d 474, 478 ("each of several acts, alone, could have caused the damages")(emphasis added); Bickler v. Racquet Club Heights Assocs. (1993), 258 Mont. 19, 23 , 850 P.2d 967, 970 ("because the conduct of one or more others *1035 would have been sufficient to produce the same result")(emphasis added); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank (1990), 242 Mont. 155, 167 , 789 P.2d 567, 574 ("If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test

2003Compare White v. Murdock (1994), 265 Mont. 386, 392 , 877 P.2d 474, 478 (“each of several acts, alone, could have caused the damages”)(emphasis added); Bickler v. Racquet Club Heights Assocs. (1993), 258 Mont. 19, 23 , 850 P.2d 967, 970 (“because the conduct of one or more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result”)(emphasis added); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank (1990), 242 Mont. 155, 167 , 789 P.2d 567, 574 (“If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is nee

2003Compare White v. Murdock (1994), 265 Mont. 386, 392 , 877 P.2d 474, 478 (“each of several acts, alone, could have caused the damages”)(emphasis added); Bickler v. Racquet Club Heights Assocs. (1993), 258 Mont. 19, 23 , 850 P.2d 967, 970 (“because the conduct of one or more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result”)(emphasis added); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank (1990), 242 Mont. 155, 167 , 789 P.2d 567, 574 (“If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is nee

2003Corp. (1996), 276 Mont. 342, 364 , 916 P.2d 122, 135 (“if two or more causes concur to bring about an event, then cause-in-fact is established by the ‘substantial factor’ test”); Roe v. Kornder-Owen (1997), 282 Mont. 287, 293 , 937 P.2d 39, 43 (“when multiple causes of an event are alleged, the test of causation is whether the conduct in question was a substantial factor in bringing about the event”) 4 . ¶69 Despite the lack of precision in the above Montana cases regarding the substantial factor test, other states have dealt with these causation issues by simply ignoring the distinction betwe

2003Corp. (1996), 276 Mont. 342, 364 , 916 P.2d 122, 135 (“if two or more causes concur to bring about an event, then cause-in-fact is established by the ‘substantial factor’ test”); Roe v. Kornder-Owen (1997), 282 Mont. 287, 293 , 937 P.2d 39, 43 (“when multiple causes of an event are alleged, the test of causation is whether the conduct in question was a substantial factor in bringing about the event”) 4 . ¶69 Despite the lack of precision in the above Montana cases regarding the substantial factor test, other states have dealt with these causation issues by simply ignoring the distinction betwe

2003See 1BAJI, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 3.76, 3.77 (9th ed. 2002); see also Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 863 (Missouri uses “direct” causation language for all cases). ¶70 For whatever merit there may be in the straightforward approach of using one test, at this point in time Montana endorses both a but for test and a substantial factor test.

2003See 1 BAJI, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 3.76, 3.77 (9th ed.2002); see also Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 863 (Missouri uses "direct" causation language for all cases). ¶ 70 For whatever merit there may be in the straightforward approach of using one test, at this point in time Montana endorses both a but for test and a substantial factor test.

2003See Bromme v. Pavitt (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 608, 614 (because death could have been caused by preexisting cancer or failure to diagnose it, substantial factor test applies and plaintiff had to establish “reasonable medical probability’ that the negligence was sufficient of itself to bring about the death, i.e., the death was “more likely than not” the result of the negligence); Hilden v. Ball (Idaho 1989), 787 P.2d 1122, 1143 (the substantial factor instruction applies to medical negligence case, but it was harmless error to give a “but for” instruction when only one doctor’s negl

2003See Bromme v. Pavitt (1992), 5 Cal.App.4th 1487 , 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 608, 614 (because death could have been caused by preexisting cancer or failure to diagnose it, substantial factor test applies and plaintiff had to establish "reasonable medical probability" that the negligence was sufficient of itself to bring about the death, i.e., the death was "more likely than not" the result of the negligence); Hilden v. Ball (1989), 117 Idaho 314 , 787 P.2d 1122, 1143 (the substantial factor instruction applies to medical negligence case, but it was harmless error to give a "but for" instruction when only

2003See Bromme v. Pavitt (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 608, 614 (because death could have been caused by preexisting cancer or failure to diagnose it, substantial factor test applies and plaintiff had to establish “reasonable medical probability’ that the negligence was sufficient of itself to bring about the death, i.e., the death was “more likely than not” the result of the negligence); Hilden v. Ball (Idaho 1989), 787 P.2d 1122, 1143 (the substantial factor instruction applies to medical negligence case, but it was harmless error to give a “but for” instruction when only one doctor’s negl

2003See Bromme v. Pavitt (1992), 5 Cal.App.4th 1487 , 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 608, 614 (because death could have been caused by preexisting cancer or failure to diagnose it, substantial factor test applies and plaintiff had to establish "reasonable medical probability" that the negligence was sufficient of itself to bring about the death, i.e., the death was "more likely than not" the result of the negligence); Hilden v. Ball (1989), 117 Idaho 314 , 787 P.2d 1122, 1143 (the substantial factor instruction applies to medical negligence case, but it was harmless error to give a "but for" instruction when only