factor test in New Mexico

2012Doe, 102 N.M. at 109-10, 717 P.2d at 85-86 .

2012Although the Court of Appeals did not find “authority to support extension of this privilege to communications made so far in advance of litigation,” id., in our opinion, temporal proximity should not be a factor in the analysis.

2011Rendleman directed that “[a]t trial, the subjective motive of the photographer, the circumstances of the photography, and the use of the photo become relevant on the issue of intent.” 2003-NMCA-150, ¶49 , 134 N.M. 744 , 82 P.3d 554 (emphasis added).

2011Rendleman directed that “[a]t trial, the subjective motive of the photographer, the circumstances of the photography, and the use of the photo become relevant on the issue of intent.” 2003-NMCA-150, ¶49 , 134 N.M. 744 , 82 P.3d 554 (emphasis added).

2007Id. at 82-83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . {26} The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the level and specificity of the threshold showing entitling an indigent defendant to an expert's assistance.

2007Id. at 82-83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . {26} The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the level and specificity of the threshold showing entitling an indigent defendant to an expert's assistance.

2003Our Supreme Court expressly rejected the substantial factor test for felony murder in State v. Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 21 , 133 N.M. 84 , 61 P.3d 793 , explaining that the test “only applies to situations where two causes, each alone sufficient to bring about the harmful result, operate together.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Therefore, we find that adopting Oimen would not be in keeping with existing New Mexico law. {42} The State also refers us to the New York case People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 , 624 N.E.2d 661 (1993).

2003Our Supreme Court expressly rejected the substantial factor test for felony murder in State v. Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 21 , 133 N.M. 84 , 61 P.3d 793 , explaining that the test “only applies to situations where two causes, each alone sufficient to bring about the harmful result, operate together.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Therefore, we find that adopting Oimen would not be in keeping with existing New Mexico law. {42} The State also refers us to the New York case People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 , 624 N.E.2d 661 (1993).

2003Our Supreme Court expressly rejected the substantial factor test for felony murder in State v. Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 21 , 133 N.M. 84 , 61 P.3d 793 , explaining that the test “only applies to situations where two causes, each alone sufficient to bring about the harmful result, operate together.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Therefore, we find that adopting Oimen would not be in keeping with existing New Mexico law. {42} The State also refers us to the New York case People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 , 624 N.E.2d 661 (1993).

2003Our Supreme Court expressly rejected the substantial factor test for felony murder in State v. Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 21 , 133 N.M. 84 , 61 P.3d 793 , explaining that the test “only applies to situations where two causes, each alone sufficient to bring about the harmful result, operate together.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Therefore, we find that adopting Oimen would not be in keeping with existing New Mexico law. {42} The State also refers us to the New York case People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 , 624 N.E.2d 661 (1993).

2002Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on paragraph three and the State satisfied this standard of causation, I believe "it is proper and just to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the consequences of his ... unlawful behavior." Muñoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 22 , 126 N.M. 371 , 970 P.2d 143 . {41} I agree with the majority that paragraph three should not be given in isolation, that the substantial factor test is "one of exclusion only," Perkins & Boyce, supra, at 780, and that the jury must also be informed of the requirement of proximate causation.

2002Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on paragraph three and the State satisfied this standard of causation, I believe "it is proper and just to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the consequences of his ... unlawful behavior." Muñoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 22 , 126 N.M. 371 , 970 P.2d 143 . {41} I agree with the majority that paragraph three should not be given in isolation, that the substantial factor test is "one of exclusion only," Perkins & Boyce, supra, at 780, and that the jury must also be informed of the requirement of proximate causation.

2002Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 780 (3d ed.1982), and "[i]n the determination of proximate cause common sense is not to be eliminated," State v. Landgraf, 1996-NMCA-024 , ¶ 31, 121 N.M. 445 , 913 P.2d 252 (quoted authority and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

2002Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 780 (3d ed.1982), and "[i]n the determination of proximate cause common sense is not to be eliminated," State v. Landgraf, 1996-NMCA-024 , ¶ 31, 121 N.M. 445 , 913 P.2d 252 (quoted authority and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

1992Cf. United States v. Pisari, 636 F.2d 855 (1st Cir.1981) (government should have been limited to the negative answer defendant gave on cross-examination under Rule 11-608(B)).