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13 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dupray v. Jai Dininggreen2 sentences2021Dupray, 245 Ariz. at 583, ¶ 17 . 2020Dupray, 245 Ariz. at 583, ¶ 17 . | 2 | 2 |
Dorsey v. Yoder Companygreen2 sentences1985We stated: The court in Dorsey, supra, subscribed to the following factor analysis prepared by Dean Wade to determine if a defect is unreasonably dangerous: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), *246 (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), 1985We stated: The court in Dorsey, supra, subscribed to the following factor analysis prepared by Dean Wade to determine if a defect is unreasonably dangerous: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), *246 (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), | 1 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. Darrel Peter Pandeligreen1 sentence2021We presume jurors follow their instructions, State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 189, ¶ 58 (2017), and the State’s mischaracterization of the factor analysis did not create fundamental error. 13 STATE v. WALDRUP Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶39 We affirm Waldrup’s convictions and sentences. | 1 | 1 |
Troxel v. Granvillegreen1 sentence2017In Goodman, we also admonished that “[t]he court’s role is not to engineer what it perceives to be the optimal situation for the child, but to determine whether compelling circumstances warrant state interference with a fit parent’s decisions.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (rejecting “presumption in favor of grandparent visitation,” cautioning that states may not infringe on fundamental right to parent “simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made”). 9 Goodman reflects appropriate respect for the fundamental nature of parental rights. | 1 | 1 |
Law v. Superior Court of State of Ariz.green2 sentences2017In Goodman, we also admonished that “[t]he court’s role is not to engineer what it perceives to be the optimal situation for the child, but to determine whether compelling circumstances warrant state interference with a fit parent’s decisions.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (rejecting “presumption in favor of grandparent visitation,” cautioning that states may not infringe on fundamental right to parent “simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made”). 9 Goodman reflects appropriate respect for the fundamental nature of parental rights. 2017In Goodman, we also admonished that “[t]he court’s role is not to engineer what it perceives to be the optimal situation for the child, but to determine whether compelling circumstances warrant state interference with a fit parent’s decisions.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (rejecting “presumption in favor of grandparent visitation,” cautioning that states may not infringe on fundamental right to parent “simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made”). 9 Goodman reflects appropriate respect for the fundamental nature of parental rights. | 1 | 1 |
McGovern v. McGoverngreen2 sentences2016See McGovern, 201 Ariz. at 178, ¶ 19 , 33 P.3d 506 (holding that the evidentiary principles announced by the Troxel plurality “affect but do not necessarily control a trial court’s determinations of ‘best interests of the child’ ”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 254 , 773 S.E.2d 20, 31 (2015) (“[T]he pronouncements of Troxel do not predispose every case to an ultimate determination favoring the natural parent in a complete and conclusive manner. 2016See McGovern, 201 Ariz. at 178, ¶ 19 , 33 P.3d 506 (holding that the evidentiary principles announced by the Troxel plurality “affect but do not necessarily control a trial court’s determinations of ‘best interests of the child’ ”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 254 , 773 S.E.2d 20, 31 (2015) (“[T]he pronouncements of Troxel do not predispose every case to an ultimate determination favoring the natural parent in a complete and conclusive manner. | 1 | 1 |
In Re K.H.green2 sentences2016See McGovern, 201 Ariz. at 178, ¶ 19 , 33 P.3d 506 (holding that the evidentiary principles announced by the Troxel plurality “affect but do not necessarily control a trial court’s determinations of ‘best interests of the child’ ”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 254 , 773 S.E.2d 20, 31 (2015) (“[T]he pronouncements of Troxel do not predispose every case to an ultimate determination favoring the natural parent in a complete and conclusive manner. 2016See McGovern, 201 Ariz. at 178, ¶ 19 , 33 P.3d 506 (holding that the evidentiary principles announced by the Troxel plurality “affect but do not necessarily control a trial court’s determinations of ‘best interests of the child’ ”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 254 , 773 S.E.2d 20, 31 (2015) (“[T]he pronouncements of Troxel do not predispose every case to an ultimate determination favoring the natural parent in a complete and conclusive manner. | 1 | 1 |
Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2014Decision of the Court (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue. 196 Ariz. at 251-52, ¶ 29 , 995 P.2d at 2014Decision of the Court (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue. 196 Ariz. at 251-52, ¶ 29 , 995 P.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Magna Investment & Development Corp. v. Pima Countygreen1 sentence2007See generally id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2000State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 407, 414 , 857 P.2d 1261, 1268 (1993). 2000State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 407, 414 , 857 P.2d 1261, 1268 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. De La Cruzgreen2 sentences1988A ground for new trial is stated with sufficient particularity when the reviewing court is provided “an adequately detailed idea of the specific factor or factors which prompted the trial judge to exercise his discretion on this ground.” Brooks v. De La Cruz, 12 Ariz.App. 591, 593 , 473 P.2d 793, 795 (1970). 1988A ground for new trial is stated with sufficient particularity when the reviewing court is provided “an adequately detailed idea of the specific factor or factors which prompted the trial judge to exercise his discretion on this ground.” Brooks v. De La Cruz, 12 Ariz.App. 591, 593 , 473 P.2d 793, 795 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2004B. ¶ 19 In addressing the question of whether Blakely error is structural error, we look first to Blakely's predecessors, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (" Ring II "). ¶ 20 The law regarding Apprendi error is a substantial factor in our analysis. 2004B. ¶ 19 In addressing the question of whether Blakely error is structural error, we look first to Blakely's predecessors, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (" Ring II "). ¶ 20 The law regarding Apprendi error is a substantial factor in our analysis. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2004B. ¶ 19 In addressing the question of whether Blakely error is structural error, we look first to Blakely's predecessors, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (" Ring II "). ¶ 20 The law regarding Apprendi error is a substantial factor in our analysis. 2004B. ¶ 19 In addressing the question of whether Blakely error is structural error, we look first to Blakely's predecessors, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (" Ring II "). ¶ 20 The law regarding Apprendi error is a substantial factor in our analysis. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Byrns v. Riddell, Incorporated
green
2 sentences1985We stated: The court in Dorsey, supra, subscribed to the following factor analysis prepared by Dean Wade to determine if a defect is unreasonably dangerous: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), *246 (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), 1985We stated: The court in Dorsey, supra, subscribed to the following factor analysis prepared by Dean Wade to determine if a defect is unreasonably dangerous: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), *246 (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Taylor v. Fitzpatrick
green
2 sentences1980In Coyner Crop Dusters, supra, we warned that the use of an instruction which directs the jury to find a certain way dependent upon their belief in certain facts set forth in the instruction was “fraught with danger.” We went on to state: “If an essential fact is omitted, the instruction standing alone is erroneous, Taylor v. Fitzpatrick, 235 Ind. 238 , 132 N.E.2d 919 (1956). 1980In Coyner Crop Dusters, supra, we warned that the use of an instruction which directs the jury to find a certain way dependent upon their belief in certain facts set forth in the instruction was “fraught with danger.” We went on to state: “If an essential fact is omitted, the instruction standing alone is erroneous, Taylor v. Fitzpatrick, 235 Ind. 238 , 132 N.E.2d 919 (1956). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh
green
2 sentences1980Vol. XIV, p. 2115.) The appellant asserts that the instruction was inappropriate for several reasons: (1) contributory negligence was an issue raised in the case and was a factor which the instruction did not take into account; (2) the use of the term “near future” was so ambiguous as to confuse the jury concerning the character of proximate cause because it implied liability and consequent damages were not related to the existing physical condition of the decedent; (3) the instruction was a one-sentence formulation of the plaintiff’s theory of recovery, the use of which was condemned by this 1980Vol. XIV, p. 2115.) The appellant asserts that the instruction was inappropriate for several reasons: (1) contributory negligence was an issue raised in the case and was a factor which the instruction did not take into account; (2) the use of the term “near future” was so ambiguous as to confuse the jury concerning the character of proximate cause because it implied liability and consequent damages were not related to the existing physical condition of the decedent; (3) the instruction was a one-sentence formulation of the plaintiff’s theory of recovery, the use of which was condemned by this | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.