factor test in Washington

2024Where an appellate court overturns an aggravating factor “ ‘but is satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 276 , 76 P.3d 217 (2003)).

2022App. 913, 930 , 344 P.3d 695 (2015). “ ‘Where the reviewing court overturns one or more aggravating factors but is satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors 10 No. 54296-0-II that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 276 , 76 P.3d 217 (2003)).

2024Where an appellate court overturns an aggravating factor “ ‘but is satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 276 , 76 P.3d 217 (2003)).

2022App. 913, 930 , 344 P.3d 695 (2015). “ ‘Where the reviewing court overturns one or more aggravating factors but is satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors 10 No. 54296-0-II that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 276 , 76 P.3d 217 (2003)).

2008The court in Daugert further stated that “[s]uch a change in the test for cause in fact is normally justified only when a plaintiff is unable to show that one event alone was the cause of the injury.” Id. ¶20 Since Daugert , Washington courts have applied the substantial factor test in only four types of cases — those involving (1) discrimination or unfair employment practices; (2) securities; (3) toxic tort cases, including multisupplier asbestos injury cases; and (4) medical malpractice cases where the malpractice reduces a patient’s chance of survival.

2008The court in Daugert further stated that "[s]uch a change in the test for cause in fact is normally justified only when a plaintiff is unable to show that one event alone was the cause of the injury." Id. ¶ 20 Since Daugert , Washington courts have applied the substantial factor test in only four types of cases — those involving: (1) discrimination or unfair employment practices; (2) securities; (3) toxic tort cases, including multi-supplier asbestos injury cases; and (4) medical malpractice cases where the malpractice reduces a patient's chance of survival.

2025If we overturn an aggravating factor but are “‘satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing.’” Weller, 185 Wn.

2024Where an appellate court overturns an aggravating factor “ ‘but is satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 276 , 76 P.3d 217 (2003)).

2020App. 576, 585 , 154 P.3d 282 (2007) (quoting State v. Hughes, 154 4 No. 78242-8- 115 Wn.2d 118 , 134, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 12 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2007As stated in Hughes : Not every aggravating factor cited must be valid to uphold an exceptional sentence: "[w]here the reviewing court overturns one or more aggravating factors but is satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing." Hughes, 154 Wash.2d at 134 , 110 P.3d 192 (quoting State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 276 , 76 P.3d 217 (2003)). ¶ 25 The exceptional sentence can be upheld on the rapid recidivism factor even though the "too lenient" fa

2008Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 778 ; LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154, 159 , 531 P.2d 299 (1975). ¶17 In the present case, Ms. Fabrique urges this court to apply the substantial factor test of proximate cause, under which a defendant’s conduct is a proximate cause of another’s injury if that conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

2008Hartley, 103 Wash.2d at 778 , 698 P.2d 77 ; LaPlante v. State, 85 Wash.2d 154, 159 , 531 P.2d 299 (1975). ¶ 17 In the present case, Ms. Fabrique urges this court to apply the substantial factor test of proximate cause, under which a defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of another's injury if that conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

2007See, e.g., Mackay, 127 Wash.2d at 309-10, 898 P.2d 284 ; Wilmot, 118 Wash.2d at 70 , 821 P.2d 18 ; Allison, 118 Wash.2d at 94 , 821 P.2d 34 (substantial factor test is based more on policy considerations than on the factual inquiry of the "but for" test). ¶ 104 Courts have also used a substantial factor test in securities cases.

2007See, e.g., Mackay, 127 Wn.2d at 309-10; Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 70 ; Allison, 118 Wn.2d at 94 (substantial factor test is based more on policy considerations than on the factual inquiry of the “but for” test). ¶104 Courts have also used a substantial factor test in securities cases.

2022External consistency requires that “ ‘the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.’ ” Id. at 505 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 , 103 S. Ct. 2933 , 77 L.

2022External consistency requires that “ ‘the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.’ ” Id. at 505 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 , 103 S. Ct. 2933 , 77 L.

2020App. 576, 585 , 154 P.3d 282 (2007) (quoting State v. Hughes, 154 4 No. 78242-8- 115 Wn.2d 118 , 134, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 12 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2020App. 576, 585 , 154 P.3d 282 (2007) (quoting State v. Hughes, 154 4 No. 78242-8- 115 Wn.2d 118 , 134, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 12 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2008Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 778 ; LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154, 159 , 531 P.2d 299 (1975). ¶17 In the present case, Ms. Fabrique urges this court to apply the substantial factor test of proximate cause, under which a defendant’s conduct is a proximate cause of another’s injury if that conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

2008Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 778 ; LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154, 159 , 531 P.2d 299 (1975). ¶17 In the present case, Ms. Fabrique urges this court to apply the substantial factor test of proximate cause, under which a defendant’s conduct is a proximate cause of another’s injury if that conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

2008Seybold, 105 Wn.

2008Seybold, 105 Wash.App. at 676 , 19 P.3d 1068 .

2005Although some of the aggravating factors used in each sentence at issue violated Blakely , we must still address whether the sentences here could be saved by independently valid aggravating factors based on prior convictions. ¶31 The United States Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L.

2005Although some of the aggravating factors used in each sentence at issue violated Blakely , we must still address whether the sentences here could be saved by independently valid aggravating factors based on prior convictions. ¶31 The United States Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L.

2005Cunningham, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 . ¶64 Finally, Gausvik relies on Tyner, 141 Wn.2d 68 , for support.

2005Cunningham, 214 F.Supp.2d at 1114 . ¶ 64 Finally, Gausvik relies on Tyner, 141 Wash.2d 68 , 1 P.3d 1148 , for support.

2005Cunningham, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 . ¶64 Finally, Gausvik relies on Tyner, 141 Wn.2d 68 , for support.

2005Cunningham, 214 F.Supp.2d at 1114 . ¶ 64 Finally, Gausvik relies on Tyner, 141 Wash.2d 68 , 1 P.3d 1148 , for support.

2004In Washington, the sole defense is that the wage disparity is "based in good faith on a factor or factors other than sex." RCW 49.12.175; Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 , 123 S.Ct. 854 , 154 L.Ed.2d 781 (2003).

2004In Washington, the sole defense is that the wage disparity is “based in good faith on a factor or factors other than sex.” RCW 49.12.175; Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003).

2004In Washington, the sole defense is that the wage disparity is "based in good faith on a factor or factors other than sex." RCW 49.12.175; Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 , 123 S.Ct. 854 , 154 L.Ed.2d 781 (2003).

2004In Washington, the sole defense is that the wage disparity is “based in good faith on a factor or factors other than sex.” RCW 49.12.175; Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003).

2004Unlike the 10,000 model HD6G tractor loaders at issue in Stark v. Allis-Chalmers, 2 Wn.

2004Unlike the 10,000 model HD6G tractor loaders at issue in Stark v. Allis-Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc., 2 Wash.App. 399 , 467 P.2d 854 , review denied, 78 Wash.2d 993 (1970), the road conditions on the night of August 8-9 were transitory, created by the specific temporary sign placement and the progress of the road work project on the night in question.

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wash.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wash.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wash.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wash.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2003State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 321 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001); State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (affirming sentence while invalidating two of three aggravators).

2002Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61-62 , 720 P.2d 808 . *408 The limitation on government grants of special privileges to certain individuals or groups was recognized prior to the adoption of the Washington Constitution in 1889.

2002Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 61-62 .

1997The sole question is whether a 14-year-old in D.R.'s position would have "reasonably supposed his freedom of action was curtailed." Short, 113 Wash.2d at 41 , 775 P.2d 458 .

1997The sole question is whether a 14-year-old in D.R.’s position would have "reasonably supposed his freedom of action was curtailed.” Short, 113 Wn.2d at 41 .

2025In respect to the substantial factor test, in Sharp v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 569 P.2d at 183-84 , the Alaska Supreme Court held that no reasonable person could regard the Borough school district’s failure to supervise student Sharp at a wrestling tournament as a legal cause of Sharp’s injury.