factor test in Kansas

2016Accordingly, the exception employs a "'practical rather than a technical construction'" of the statute and uses a factor test to determine whether a decision that fails to terminate the action as a whole is nonetheless appealable under § 1291. 431 U.S. at 658 . 4 After considering the various facets of the collateral order exception, the United States Supreme Court determined that pretrial orders to dismiss for double jeopardy reasons were indeed immediately appealable. 431 U.S. at 659 .

2016Accordingly, the exception employs- a “ ‘practical rather than a technical construction’ ” of the statute and uses a factor test to determine whether a decision that fails to terminate the action as a whole is nonetheless appeal-able under § 1291. 431 U.S. at 658 .

2010Pase and the City erroneously argue Kansas employs the substantial factor test used by the Tenth Circuit, relying primarily on a decision by this court, Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006 , 686 P.2d 149 (1984).

2010Pase and the City erroneously argue Kansas employs the substantial factor test used by the Tenth Circuit, relying primarily on a decision by this court, Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006 , 686 P.2d 149 (1984).

2025And when applying a factor test: "No one factor is controlling, and other factors also may be relevant to the . . . analysis." State v. Sanders, 310 Kan. 279 , 295, 445 P.3d 1144 (2019) (applying factors test under attenuation doctrine). 14 "[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 , 132 S. Ct. 945 , 181 L.

2025And when applying a factor test: "No one factor is controlling, and other factors also may be relevant to the . . . analysis." State v. Sanders, 310 Kan. 279 , 295, 445 P.3d 1144 (2019) (applying factors test under attenuation doctrine). 14 "[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 , 132 S. Ct. 945 , 181 L.

2025And when applying a factor test: "No one factor is controlling, and other factors also may be relevant to the . . . analysis." State v. Sanders, 310 Kan. 279 , 295, 445 P.3d 1144 (2019) (applying factors test under attenuation doctrine). 14 "[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 , 132 S. Ct. 945 , 181 L.

2024State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 706-07 , 207 P.3d 208 (2009).

2024State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 706-07 , 207 P.3d 208 (2009).

2021It added that when imposing those sanctions, the trial court cited to no caselaw, including the factor test identified by our Supreme Court in Canaan v. Bartee, 272 Kan. 720, 727 , 35 P.3d 841 (2001), for determining whether a party's discovery order violations warrant the severest sanctions.

2021It added that when imposing those sanctions, the trial court cited to no caselaw, including the factor test identified by our Supreme Court in Canaan v. Bartee, 272 Kan. 720, 727 , 35 P.3d 841 (2001), for determining whether a party's discovery order violations warrant the severest sanctions.

2018But contrary to the district court's apparent holding, "standing alone [it] was not a threshold bar to the untimely appeal as a matter of law." *534 State v. Smith , 304 Kan. 916 , 922, 377 P.3d 414 (2016).

2018But contrary to the district court's apparent holding, "standing alone [it] was not a threshold bar to the untimely appeal as a matter of law." *534 State v. Smith , 304 Kan. 916 , 922, 377 P.3d 414 (2016).

2014See Mitchell, 294 Kan. at 481 ; State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450 , Syl. ¶ 2, 276 P.3d 200 , cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 529 (2012).

2014See Mitchell, 294 Kan. at 481 ; State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450 , Syl. ¶ 2, 276 P.3d 200 , cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 529 (2012).

2014See Mitchell, 294 Kan. at 481 ; State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450 , Syl. ¶ 2, 276 P.3d 200 , cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 529 (2012).

2010State v. Bly , 215 Kan. [168,] 176[, 523 P.2d 397 (1974)]." (Emphasis added.) If Hart had made a timely and specific objection to the evidence of prior bad acts, we would have determined that none of the material facts for which the evidence was offered under K.S.A.2009 Supp. 60-455(b) was in dispute or substantially at issue and that the prior bad acts evidence was not probative for those facts.

2010Delaney v. Cade, 255 Kan. 199, 211 , 873 P.2d 175 (1994).

2010Delaney v. Cade, 255 Kan. 199, 211 , 873 P.2d 175 (1994).

2010Allen Realty, 16 Kan.App.2d at 103 , 819 P.2d 138 ; see In re Dept. of Energy Stripper Well Exemption, 520 F.Supp. 1232, 1269 (D.Kan.1981), rev'd on other grounds 690 F.2d 1375 (Temp Emerg.Ct.App.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1127 , 103 S.Ct. 763 , 74 L.Ed.2d 978 (1983).

2010Allen Realty, 16 Kan.App.2d at 103 , 819 P.2d 138 ; see In re Dept. of Energy Stripper Well Exemption, 520 F.Supp. 1232, 1269 (D.Kan.1981), rev'd on other grounds 690 F.2d 1375 (Temp Emerg.Ct.App.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1127 , 103 S.Ct. 763 , 74 L.Ed.2d 978 (1983).

2006The states which have utilized the substantial factor test have been motivated by a desire to protect as many investors as possible.” 133 Idaho at 849-50 .

2006The states which have utilized the substantial factor test have been motivated by a desire to protect as many investors as possible.” 133 Idaho at 849-50 .

2006The statute does not require that the witness be physically present in tire courtroom at the time the hearsay testimony is given.” State v. Hicks, 240 Kan. 302 , Syl. ¶ 2, 729 P.2d 1146 (1986).

2006The statute does not require that the witness be physically present in tire courtroom at the time the hearsay testimony is given.” State v. Hicks, 240 Kan. 302 , Syl. ¶ 2, 729 P.2d 1146 (1986).

2006According to Hoffer , in Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107 , 744 P.2d 1032 (1987), the Washington court rejected a strict privity test in favor of the substantial factor test. 113 Wash. 2d at 151 .

2006According to Hoffer , in Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107 , 744 P.2d 1032 (1987), the Washington court rejected a strict privity test in favor of the substantial factor test. 113 Wash. 2d at 151 .

2006The Nebraska court noted that the state and federal statutory definitions of “sale” and “sell” are “almost identical”, 244 Neb. at 534-35 , and adopted the Pinter test with no discussion of alternatives *345 except to note that the substantial factor test was rejected in Pinter. 244 Neb. at 536-38 .

2006The Nebraska court noted that the state and federal statutory definitions of “sale” and “sell” are “almost identical”, 244 Neb. at 534-35 , and adopted the Pinter test with no discussion of alternatives *345 except to note that the substantial factor test was rejected in Pinter. 244 Neb. at 536-38 .

2001Burger, 482 U.S. at 711 n. 21.

1984The Constitution does not ‘invalidat[e] an apportionment formula whenever it may result in taxation of some income that did not have its source in the taxing State.’ ”_ U.S. at_, 77 L.Ed.2d at 556 .

1980State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153 , 551 P.2d 1247 (1976).

1980State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153 , 551 P.2d 1247 (1976).

1970The incidental revenue would not characterize transaction as commercial rather than governmental.” (p. 329.) The court further quoted approvingly from 3 Dillon s Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., § 1096, p. 1749, as follows: “A park may be devoted to any use which tends to promote popular enjoyment and recreation.” (p. 330.) In City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100 , 263 Pac. 12 , this court indicated the wide range of enterprises which have been sanctioned in public parks, saying: “Under various authorities, the expression ‘park purposes’ has been held to include a race track, a tourist camp,

1970The incidental revenue would not characterize transaction as commercial rather than governmental.” (p. 329.) The court further quoted approvingly from 3 Dillon s Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., § 1096, p. 1749, as follows: “A park may be devoted to any use which tends to promote popular enjoyment and recreation.” (p. 330.) In City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100 , 263 Pac. 12 , this court indicated the wide range of enterprises which have been sanctioned in public parks, saying: “Under various authorities, the expression ‘park purposes’ has been held to include a race track, a tourist camp,