factor analysis (Kentucky) · Go Syfert
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factor analysis in Kentucky

26 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2024 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Adkins v. Commonwealthgreen
ky · 2003 · cited in 4 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2008–2024
2 sentences

2024Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky. 2003) (“Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.”); Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (“The police are permitted to take into account their surroundings - and whether a particular location has a reputation for being a ‘known drug’ area -when forming a reasonable and articulable suspicion.”).

2023“Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.” Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).

44
Deutsch v. Sheinred
ky · 1980 · cited in 7 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1981–2020
2 sentences

2003Causation In Deutsch v. Skein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (1980), we adopted the substantial factor test for causation set forth in § 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is entitled “What Constitutes Legal Cause.” This section states in pertinent part that the “actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” Comment (a) to § 431 explains what is meant by “substantial factor”: In order to be a legal cause of another’s harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been

2003Causation In Deutsch v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (1980), we adopted the substantial factor test for causation set forth in § 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is entitled "What Constitutes Legal Cause." This section states in pertinent part that the "actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if *92 his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." Comment (a) to § 431 explains what is meant by "substantial factor": In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not b

27
State v. Ballardgreen
tenn · 1993 · cited in 3 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020Id. at 795 (citing State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 , 560–61 (Tenn. 1993)). 72 Id. at 795–96.

2020Id. at 795 (citing State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 , 560–61 (Tenn. 1993)). 72 Id. at 795–96.

13
Commonwealth v. Marrgreen
ky · 2008 · cited in 2 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2021–2024
2 sentences

2024Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky. 2003) (“Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.”); Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (“The police are permitted to take into account their surroundings - and whether a particular location has a reputation for being a ‘known drug’ area -when forming a reasonable and articulable suspicion.”).

2021“Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

12
United States v. McRaegreen
ca10 · 1996 · cited in 2 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2003–2013
2 sentences

2013Adkins, 96 S.W.3d at 788 (“Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.”); see also United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528 , 1534 n. 4 (10th Cir.1996) (“We have held that nervousness alone is not sufficient to justify further detention; however, in combination with other suspicious circumstances, it might contribute to a finding of articulable suspicion.”).

2003United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528 , 1534 n. 4 (10th Cir.1996).

12
Moberly v. Commonwealthgreen
moctapp · 2018 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023While nervousness can be a contributing factor, it is not the tipping point in this scenario just as this Court determined it was not with the very similar circumstances presented in Jones. 2019 WL 2321654 , at *4; see also Moberly v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Ky. 2018) (“Heightened nervousness is common among drivers detained by a police officer for a traffic violation.”). -17- This brings us to the remaining factor in this analysis which is Hale’s untruthfulness regarding his previous whereabouts.

11
Asbury University v. Powellgreen
ky · 2016 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016In a civil action seeking damages for a discharge motivated by sex discrimination, a ‘but for’ test is a fair interpretation of the substantial factor standard.”); see also Asbury University v. Powell, 486 S.W.3d 246, 255 (Ky,2016) (“since the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff,-“but for” causation suffices. ...”).

11
House v. Kellermangreen
kyctapphigh · 1975 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980See, e. g., Harris v. Thompson, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 422, 431 (1973) (“substantial factor in causing the accident”); House v. Kellerman, supra at 385 (“substantial factor . accident”).

11
Harris v. Thompsongreen
kyctapphigh · 1973 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980See, e. g., Harris v. Thompson, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 422, 431 (1973) (“substantial factor in causing the accident”); House v. Kellerman, supra at 385 (“substantial factor . accident”).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Deutsch v. Sheinred
ky · 1980 · cited in 7 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1981–2020
2 sentences

2003Causation In Deutsch v. Skein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (1980), we adopted the substantial factor test for causation set forth in § 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is entitled “What Constitutes Legal Cause.” This section states in pertinent part that the “actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” Comment (a) to § 431 explains what is meant by “substantial factor”: In order to be a legal cause of another’s harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been

2003Causation In Deutsch v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (1980), we adopted the substantial factor test for causation set forth in § 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is entitled "What Constitutes Legal Cause." This section states in pertinent part that the "actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if *92 his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." Comment (a) to § 431 explains what is meant by "substantial factor": In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not b

17

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Osborne v. Keeney green
ky · 2012
2 sentences

2020Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Ky. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2012).

2014In doing so this Court stated: “Our use of the substantial factor test in fashioning instructions in prior cases shows the test applied to the event which results in the injury, not the injury itself.” Id. at 145 .

32014–2020
State v. Taylor green
tenn · 2007
2 sentences

2020Id. at 795 (citing State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 , 560–61 (Tenn. 1993)). 72 Id. at 795–96.

2020Id. at 795 (citing State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 , 560–61 (Tenn. 1993)). 72 Id. at 795–96.

22020–2020
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc. green
ky · 1992
2 sentences

2011Id.

1993In a civil action seeking damages for a discharge motivated by sex discrimination, a ‘but for’ test is a fair interpretation of the substantial factor standard.” Id. at 824 .

21993–2011
First Property Management Corp. v. Zarebidaki green
ky · 1993
1 sentence

2016Zarebidaki 867 S.W.2d at 188 .

12016–2016
United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club green
paed · 1989
2 sentences

1993Other elements described in Lansdowne, supra, are the membership’s control over the operation of the establishment, the purpose of the club’s existence, use of the facility by nonmembers and history of the organization.

1993Other elements described in Lansdowne, supra , are the membership's control over the operation of the establishment, the purpose of the club's existence, use of the facility by nonmembers and history of the organization.

11993–1993
Ake v. Oklahoma green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

1985The recent case of Ake v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) reenforces the accused's right to access to a psychiatrist's assistance at his trial when it is clear that his mental state at the time of the offense is a substantial factor in his defense.

1985The recent case of Ake v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) reenforces the accused's right to access to a psychiatrist's assistance at his trial when it is clear that his mental state at the time of the offense is a substantial factor in his defense.

11985–1985
Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Mayes green
kyctapphigh · 1965
1 sentence

1965Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Mayes, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 125 (1965).

11965–1965

Statutes the citing opinions construe

KY § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.040 (4) KY § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.020 (3) USC § 42u.s.c.2000e-2(m) (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 234 (1935–2026) TX 88 (1972–2026) WA 63 (1982–2025) CT 60 (1980–2022) NJ 57 (1976–2026) IL 56 (1984–2026) PA 55 (1947–2026) WI 50 (1979–2026) LA 48 (1992–2023) VA 46 (1985–2025) MD 45 (1985–2025) OR 36 (1983–2025) TN 28 (1995–2026) KY 26 (1965–2024) OH 25 (1988–2026) NC 22 (1983–2026) UT 21 (1955–2022) ID 21 (1990–2025) MA 20 (1976–2025) GA 19 (1986–2026) KS 19 (1970–2025) IA 18 (1994–2026) MO 17 (1972–2024) AK 16 (1976–2025) MN 16 (1986–2024) FL 15 (1985–2016) IN 15 (1978–2026) MI 15 (1997–2026) AL 15 (1889–2018) NY 14 (1907–2026) AZ 13 (1976–2021) MS 13 (1989–2025) SC 12 (1991–2025) MT 11 (1976–2021) WY 11 (1994–2024) SD 9 (1981–2017) VT 9 (1992–2025) DC 8 (1979–2021) CO 8 (2002–2026) NM 8 (1992–2014) WV 7 (1980–2024) NH 7 (1988–2018) DE 7 (1998–2024) OK 5 (1987–2002) NV 5 (1988–2020) NE 5 (1994–2013) RI 4 (1996–2019) AR 3 (1991–2003) ME 3 (1990–2007) HI 2 (2017–2020) ND 2 (1997–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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