factor defense in North Carolina

1993Ed. 2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held that once a defendant has made “an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense,” fundamental fairness requires “the State ... , at a minimum, [to] assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 , 84 L.

1993Ed. 2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held that once a defendant has made “an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense,” fundamental fairness requires “the State ... , at a minimum, [to] assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 , 84 L.

2026Id. at 721 , 693 S.E.2d at 644 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 , 91 L.

2026Id. at 721 , 693 S.E.2d at 644 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 , 91 L.

2023In 2010, in Waring, our Court rejected the sole factor test. 364 N.C. 443 .

2023In doing so, it explained that “[a]s stated in Miller-El, the third step in a Batson analysis is the less stringent question whether the defendant has shown ‘race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not.’ ” Id. at 480 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252 ).

2023In doing so, it explained that “[a]s stated in Miller-El, the third step in a Batson analysis is the less stringent question whether the defendant has shown ‘race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not.’ ” Id. at 480 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252 ).

2016This Court is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside the findings simply because other conclusions might have been reached." McLeod v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 208 N.C.App. 555 , 560, 703 S.E.2d 471 , 475 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2016This Court is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside the findings simply because other conclusions might have been reached." McLeod v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 208 N.C.App. 555 , 560, 703 S.E.2d 471 , 475 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2015When intoxication is the only factor in the analysis supporting a determination of involuntariness, "[a]n inculpatory statement is admissible unless the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning of his words." *185 State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103 , 114, 711 S.E.2d 122 , 133 (2011) (quoting State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235 , 243, 278 S.E.2d 200 , 205 (1981) (citations omitted)).

2015When intoxication is the only factor in the analysis supporting a determination of involuntariness, "[a]n inculpatory statement is admissible unless the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning of his words." *185 State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103 , 114, 711 S.E.2d 122 , 133 (2011) (quoting State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235 , 243, 278 S.E.2d 200 , 205 (1981) (citations omitted)).

2015However, intoxication "is simply [one] factor to be considered in determining voluntariness." McKoy, 323 N.C. at 22 , 372 S.E.2d at 23 .

2015However, intoxication "is simply [one] factor to be considered in determining voluntariness." McKoy, 323 N.C. at 22 , 372 S.E.2d at 23 .

2015When intoxication is the only factor in the analysis supporting a determination of involuntariness, "[a]n inculpatory statement is admissible unless the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning of his words." *185 State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103 , 114, 711 S.E.2d 122 , 133 (2011) (quoting State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235 , 243, 278 S.E.2d 200 , 205 (1981) (citations omitted)).

2015When intoxication is the only factor in the analysis supporting a determination of involuntariness, "[a]n inculpatory statement is admissible unless the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning of his words." *185 State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103 , 114, 711 S.E.2d 122 , 133 (2011) (quoting State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235 , 243, 278 S.E.2d 200 , 205 (1981) (citations omitted)).

2013Id. (citation omitted).

1994Pursuant to Ake , and subsequent state court decisions under Ake , defendant is required to make “ ‘an ex parte threshold showing’ that the matter subject to expert testimony is ‘likely to be a significant factor’ in the defense.” Moore, 321 N.C. at 344 , 364 S.E.2d at 656-57 .

1994Pursuant to Ake , and subsequent state court decisions under Ake , defendant is required to make “ ‘an ex parte threshold showing’ that the matter subject to expert testimony is ‘likely to be a significant factor’ in the defense.” Moore, 321 N.C. at 344 , 364 S.E.2d at 656-57 .

1994Smith, 328 N.C. at 121 , 400 S.E.2d at 724 .

1994Smith, 328 N.C. at 121 , 400 S.E.2d at 724 .

1994The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “[w]e are not inclined ... to temper the plain meaning of the language by engrafting upon it an extension of the limitations period equal to the asserted reasonable time, inferred from Rule 4, for the service of a timely filed complaint.” Id. at 30 , 91 L.

1994The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “[w]e are not inclined ... to temper the plain meaning of the language by engrafting upon it an extension of the limitations period equal to the asserted reasonable time, inferred from Rule 4, for the service of a timely filed complaint.” Id. at 30 , 91 L.

1988Moreover, although a constitutional right to provision, by the State, of a psychiatrist exists when a defendant has made an ex parte threshold showing that his sanity at the time of the crime is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), such defendant must show a particularized need for the psychiatrist, State v. Gambrell, 318 N.C. 249 , 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986); State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30 , 347 S.E.2d 783 (1986).

1988Moreover, although a constitutional right to provision, by the State, of a psychiatrist exists when a defendant has made an ex parte threshold showing that his sanity at the time of the crime is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), such defendant must show a particularized need for the psychiatrist, State v. Gambrell, 318 N.C. 249 , 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986); State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30 , 347 S.E.2d 783 (1986).

1988Moreover, although a constitutional right to provision, by the State, of a psychiatrist exists when a defendant has made an ex parte threshold showing that his sanity at the time of the crime is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), such defendant must show a particularized need for the psychiatrist, State v. Gambrell, 318 N.C. 249 , 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986); State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30 , 347 S.E.2d 783 (1986).

1988Moreover, although a constitutional right to provision, by the State, of a psychiatrist exists when a defendant has made an ex parte threshold showing that his sanity at the time of the crime is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), such defendant must show a particularized need for the psychiatrist, State v. Gambrell, 318 N.C. 249 , 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986); State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30 , 347 S.E.2d 783 (1986).

1986State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193 , 344 S.E. 2d 775 (1986) (citations omitted).

1986State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193 , 344 S.E. 2d 775 (1986) (citations omitted).

1983Beginning with State v. Morris, 59 N.C.