factor test in New Jersey

2022Instead of the "but for" standard, "New Jersey courts apply the substantial factor test in medical malpractice cases involving preexisting conditions." Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266, 280 (2002).

2020II "New Jersey courts apply the substantial factor test in medical malpractice cases involving preexisting conditions." Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266, 280 (2002).

2025As such, [i]n deciding whether the "character and condition" of a defendant meets the "serious injustice" standard, a A-1775-22 13 trial court should determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that there are relevant mitigating factors present to an extraordinary degree and, if so, whether cumulatively[] they so greatly exceed any aggravating factors that imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence. [Evers, 175 N.J. at 393-94 (emphasis omitted).] "[I]t is the quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in the particular setting t

2025As such, [i]n deciding whether the "character and condition" of a defendant meets the "serious injustice" standard, a A-1775-22 13 trial court should determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that there are relevant mitigating factors present to an extraordinary degree and, if so, whether cumulatively[] they so greatly exceed any aggravating factors that imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence. [Evers, 175 N.J. at 393-94 (emphasis omitted).] "[I]t is the quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in the particular setting t

2021The substantial factor test allows the plaintiff to submit to the jury not whether "but for" defendant's negligence the injury would not have occurred but "whether the defendant's deviation from standard medical practice increased a patient's risk of harm or diminished a patient's chance of survival and whether such increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the ultimate harm." [Ibid. (quoting Gardner, 150 N.J. at 376 ).] Here, during oral argument, the judge asked counsel if the causation issue implicated the Court's decision in Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93 (1990);5 all 5 In Scafi

2013Once a deviation from the accepted standard of care has been found, the Court explained the sequential analysis that follows: [T]he first inquiry in the substantial factor analysis is whether there is evidence “demonstrating ... that negligent treatment increased the risk of harm posed by a preexistent condition.” [ Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108 , 574 A.2d 398 .] Once that requirement has been satisfied, the jury next must determine whether the increased risk was a substantial factor in causing the ultimate harm. [ Reynolds, supra, 172 N.J. at 282-83 , 798 A.2d 67 (emphasis added) (citation

2023The second and more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency—the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated. [Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983).] The litter tax is fairly apportioned, that is, it is internally and externally consistent.

2021Generally speaking, “the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.” Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).

2013“New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted ... the substantial factor standard—‘limited to that class of cases in which a defendant’s negligence combines with a pre-existent condition to cause harm—as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Battenfeld v. Gregory, 247 N.J.Super. 538, 549 , 589 A.2d 1059 (App.Div.1991)).

2013“New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted ... the substantial factor standard—‘limited to that class of cases in which a defendant’s negligence combines with a pre-existent condition to cause harm—as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Battenfeld v. Gregory, 247 N.J.Super. 538, 549 , 589 A.2d 1059 (App.Div.1991)).

2021New Jersey has adopted the substantial factor test, which holds a tortfeasor liable if his "negligent conduct A-1529-19 26 was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries . . . ." Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 419 (1996) (quoting Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 171 (1984)).

2021The substantial factor test is particularly appropriate for this legal malpractice case, where defendant’s “inadequate or inaccurate legal advice is alleged to be a concurrent cause of [plaintiff’s] harm.” Conklin, 145 N.J. at 420 .

2024We do not suggest that every mitigating factor will bear the same relevance and weight in assessing the character and condition of the defendant; it is the quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in the particular setting that matters. [Id. at 393-94.] "[T]he standard governing the downgrading of a defendant's sentence . . . is high." State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996).

2019The Evers Court also noted "demands for deterrence are strengthened in direct proportion to the gravity and harm[ful]ness of the offense and the deliberateness of the offender." Id. at 394 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 501 (1996)).

2021New Jersey has adopted the substantial factor test, which holds a tortfeasor liable if his "negligent conduct A-1529-19 26 was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries . . . ." Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 419 (1996) (quoting Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 171 (1984)).

1991Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. at 109, 574 A. 2d 398 ; see also Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155 , 484 A. 2d 1234 (1984).

2018Stryker Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 18 N.J.

2018Stryker Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 18 N.J.

2026We repeat that our courts have stated that a substantial factor "'need not be the sole or primary factor producing the injury'" and that the substantial factor test "'covers the situation'" as here "'where there may be several substantial factors contributing to the same result.'" Verdicchio, 179 N.J. at 24 -25 (quoting J.D.

2009The two-part substantial factor analysis asks "`whether the defendant's deviation from standard medical practice increased a patient's risk of harm or diminished a patient's chance of survival and whether such increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the ultimate harm.'" Verdicchio, supra, 179 N.J. at 24 , 843 A. 2d 1042 (quoting Gardner, supra, 150 N.J. at 376 , 696 A. 2d 599 ).

2002Nevertheless, these acts need not, of themselves, be capable of producing the injury; it is enough if they are a substantial factor in bringing it about. [Id. at 33-34, 280 A.2d 843 (citations omitted).] In Evers, supra, 95 N.J. 399 , 471 A.2d 405 , the Court articulated the substantial factor test in increased-risk cases.

2002Nevertheless, these acts need not, of themselves, be capable of producing the injury; it is enough if they are a substantial factor in bringing it about. [ Id. at 33-34 , 280 A. 2d 843 (citations omitted).] In Evers, supra, 95 N.J. 399 , 471 A. 2d 405 , the Court articulated the substantial factor test in increased-risk cases.

2025Super. at 607, prejudice cannot be A-1592-24 14 treated as a dispositive factor in the waiver analysis, see Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 419 (2022), but prejudice remains relevant within the overall totality of circumstances.

2022Under New York law, “the new business rule is not a per se rule forbidding the award of lost profits damages to new businesses, but rather an evidentiary rule that creates a higher ‘level of proof needed to achieve reasonable certainty as to the amount of damages.’” Int’l Telepassport Corp. v. USFI, Inc., 89 F.3d 82 , 86 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Travellers Int’l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, 41 F.3d 1570, 1579 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Blinds to Go (U.S.) Inc., v. Times Plaza Dev., L.P., 931 N.Y.S.2d 105 , 108 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that “[i]n the case of a ‘new business,’ there generally ‘d

2022In Sholtis, the Appellate Division looked to other jurisdictions for guidance in refining the substantial factor test in cases involving asbestos exposure that caused asbestos-related diseases. 238 N.J.

2022See Sholtis, 238 N.J.

2021In cases involving an alleged failure to procure insurance coverage, the measure of damages is "the amount that would have been due under the policy provided it had been obtained." Robinson v. Janay, 105 N.J.

2018We do not suggest that every mitigating factor will bear the same relevance and weight in assessing the character and condition of the defendant; it is the quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in the particular setting that matters. [Id. at 393-394 (emphasis added).] In State v. Nance, the Court reaffirmed the principles articulated in Evers: "The 'serious injustice' exception to the presumption of imprisonment applies only in 'truly extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances,' where the 'human cost' of punishing a particular defendant to deter others from committing his of

2018We do not suggest that every mitigating factor will bear the same relevance and weight in assessing the character and condition of the defendant; it is the quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in the particular setting that matters. [Id. at 393-394 (emphasis added).] In State v. Nance, the Court reaffirmed the principles articulated in Evers: "The 'serious injustice' exception to the presumption of imprisonment applies only in 'truly extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances,' where the 'human cost' of punishing a particular defendant to deter others from committing his of