Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of Finnertygreen2 sentences2025"The primary factor in bar discipline cases is 'the effect upon, and perception of, the public and the bar.'" Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. at 1041, quoting Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 829 (2008). 2017Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 829 (2008). | 2 | 2 |
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences2015The second and more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency — the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.” Gillette Co., 425 Mass. at 680 , quoting Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 169 . 26 Considering the first factor, we have no reason to conclude that application of the apportionment statute as we have interpreted it produces duplicative taxation of Gate’s income, given that Gate’s Massachusetts apportionment percentage for the tax year at issue *513 was approximately fifty-one per 1997The second and more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency — the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.” Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., supra. The Supreme Court has “long held that the Constitution imposes no single [apportionment] formula on the States . . . and that the taxpayer has the ‘distinct burden of showing by “clear and cogent evidence” that [the State tax] results in extraterritorial values being taxed’ ” (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Saferiangreen1 sentence2025Assuming arguendo that the defendant's appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to fully investigate the defendant's mental illness, we agree with the motion judge that the record raises no bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency to waive the right to counsel such that the failure to investigate "deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial 11 ground of defense." Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 6 6 Although we reject the defendant's structural error argument and his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel argument, we do no | 1 | 1 |
Uvello v. DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SEC.green1 sentence2023See Uvello v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 396 Mass. 812 , 815-817 (1986) (remand required where agency failed to make findings "on all material issues"). | 1 | 1 |
McKenna v. Andreassigreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Quinby, 318 Mass. at 444 ; Vigneault, 300 Mass. at 229 ; McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213, 218 (1935). | 1 | 1 |
Quinby v. Boston & Maine Railroadgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Quinby, 318 Mass. at 444 ; Vigneault, 300 Mass. at 229 ; McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213, 218 (1935). | 1 | 1 |
Bernier v. Boston Edison Co.green1 sentence2021See, e.g., O'Connor, 401 Mass. at 591 - 592 (citing Restatement [Second] §§ 430, 431, and 433); Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass. 372, 386 (1980) (citing Restatement [Second] § 435); Quinby v. Boston & Me. | 1 | 1 |
O'CONNOR v. Raymark Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2021See, e.g., O'Connor, 401 Mass. at 591 - 592 (citing Restatement [Second] §§ 430, 431, and 433); Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass. 372, 386 (1980) (citing Restatement [Second] § 435); Quinby v. Boston & Me. | 1 | 1 |
Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Incorporated v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence2015See also Cabinetree of Wisconsin v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011See Doggett, supra at 653 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. McCravygreen1 sentence2009See Kater, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997); Commonwealth v. McCravy, 430 Mass. 758, 765 (2000) (“even grossly improper statements by a prosecutor will not require a new trial when evidence of guilt is overwhelming”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 466 (2002) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Katergreen1 sentence2009See Kater, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997); Commonwealth v. McCravy, 430 Mass. 758, 765 (2000) (“even grossly improper statements by a prosecutor will not require a new trial when evidence of guilt is overwhelming”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 466 (2002) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Santiagogreen1 sentence2009See Kater, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997); Commonwealth v. McCravy, 430 Mass. 758, 765 (2000) (“even grossly improper statements by a prosecutor will not require a new trial when evidence of guilt is overwhelming”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 466 (2002) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Torresgreen1 sentence2009See Kater, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997); Commonwealth v. McCravy, 430 Mass. 758, 765 (2000) (“even grossly improper statements by a prosecutor will not require a new trial when evidence of guilt is overwhelming”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 466 (2002) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc.green1 sentence2001See Wang, 398 Mass. at 589 . | 1 | 1 |
Begelfer v. Najariangreen1 sentence1997L. c. 93A if the parties to the dispute are not parties in the same venture; the “trade or commerce” test is passed if the parties and their interaction meet the factor analysis in Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 190-191 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.green1 sentence1997Container Corp of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., supra at 164, quoting Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wisc., supra at 221. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989But, as the judge wrote in his memorandum, whereas “the Commonwealth has not adopted any blanket exception [to knock and announcement] based on a category of crime, such as drug-related crimes, . . . this does not mean that ease of destruction of small packets of drugs cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether a no knock warrant should issue.” We look to an additional factor or factors that in reason should tip the balance and justify particular “exceptions.” Thus in Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. at 418 , the court, adopting a passage in Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Ker v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Eugene Couser, United States of America v. Tyrone Allsberrygreen1 sentence1989But, as the judge wrote in his memorandum, whereas “the Commonwealth has not adopted any blanket exception [to knock and announcement] based on a category of crime, such as drug-related crimes, . . . this does not mean that ease of destruction of small packets of drugs cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether a no knock warrant should issue.” We look to an additional factor or factors that in reason should tip the balance and justify particular “exceptions.” Thus in Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. at 418 , the court, adopting a passage in Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Houghtlingreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Joseph Baldamar Cisnerosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maguire's Casegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Connolly v. Mirongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Laskey v. International Uniongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Gilbertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental Co.
green
1 sentence2021See, e.g., Quinby, 318 Mass. at 444 ; Vigneault, 300 Mass. at 229 ; McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213, 218 (1935). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum
green
1 sentence2021To counteract all of this criticism, it relies on a passing positive reference to the standard as "useful" in dictum in Matsuyama, 452 Mass. at 30 , which was focused on the utility of the standard when but-for causation cannot be established. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gillette Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue
green
1 sentence2015The second and more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency — the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.” Gillette Co., 425 Mass. at 680 , quoting Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 169 . 26 Considering the first factor, we have no reason to conclude that application of the apportionment statute as we have interpreted it produces duplicative taxation of Gate’s income, given that Gate’s Massachusetts apportionment percentage for the tax year at issue *513 was approximately fifty-one per | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rankin v. Right-On-Time-Moving
green
1 sentence2015Co., 336 F.3d 8 , 12 (2003) (indicating that a party’s “undue delay” in moving to compel arbitration is generally the primary factor in waiver analysis) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
green
1 sentence2013The third aggravating factor, whether the victim had financial vulnerability, is relevant where the defendant’s conduct resulted in economic harm to the victim, see BMW, supra at 576 ; as the harm here was primarily noneconomic, we do not consider this factor in our analysis. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jarosz v. Palmer
green
1 sentence2007Jarosz, 436 Mass. at 533-34 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Commonwealth v. McCra
green
1 sentence2006The fifteen year old in Commonwealth v. McCra, supra, was at the police station with his aunt, who was acting as his guardian; both were read Miranda rights and both indicated orally and in writing they understood these rights. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Moses
green
1 sentence2005State law does not require unanimity on the “evidentiary considerations” establishing the theory, as “[tjhey are analogous to the ‘means’ by which the element of extreme atrocity or cruelty can be satisfied.” Commonwealth v. Perez, supra. The law stated in Commonwealth v. Perez, supra, and in Commonwealth v. Moses, supra, remains correct, and the judge’s instruction to the jury on their assessment of the Cunneen factors was accurate. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Szalla v. Locke
green
1 sentence1997Szalla v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 451-452 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Commonwealth v. McDougal
green
1 sentence1989But, as the judge wrote in his memorandum, whereas “the Commonwealth has not adopted any blanket exception [to knock and announcement] based on a category of crime, such as drug-related crimes, . . . this does not mean that ease of destruction of small packets of drugs cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether a no knock warrant should issue.” We look to an additional factor or factors that in reason should tip the balance and justify particular “exceptions.” Thus in Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. at 418 , the court, adopting a passage in Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 1 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Commonwealth v. Scalise green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Maddox green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Commonwealth v. Cundriff
green
1 sentence1989But, as the judge wrote in his memorandum, whereas “the Commonwealth has not adopted any blanket exception [to knock and announcement] based on a category of crime, such as drug-related crimes, . . . this does not mean that ease of destruction of small packets of drugs cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether a no knock warrant should issue.” We look to an additional factor or factors that in reason should tip the balance and justify particular “exceptions.” Thus in Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. at 418 , the court, adopting a passage in Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 1 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Cobb v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Commonwealth v. Gove green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.