factor test in Illinois

2023Using the substantial factor test, a “defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury if the conduct was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 .

2014"Under the substantial factor test, the defendant's conduct is a factual cause of the plaintiff's injury if the conduct was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury." Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 .

2015The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that a “number of variations of the substantial factor test seem to exist.” Id. at 30 .

2015The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that a “number of variations of the substantial factor test seem to exist.” Id. at 30 .

2020See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (“[h]eadlong flight” when “unprovoked” is the “consummate act of evasion”); see also People v. Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 3 (defendant and companion “immediately broke apart and walked in different directions” on mere sight of a police car); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161104, ¶ 3 (defendant “ ‘walk[ed] briskly *** as if to avoid’ ” police officers on mere sight of the officers’ SUV in alley).

2020See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (“[h]eadlong flight” when “unprovoked” is the “consummate act of evasion”); see also People v. Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 3 (defendant and companion “immediately broke apart and walked in different directions” on mere sight of a police car); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161104, ¶ 3 (defendant “ ‘walk[ed] briskly *** as if to avoid’ ” police officers on mere sight of the officers’ SUV in alley).

2020See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (“[h]eadlong flight” when “unprovoked” is the “consummate act of evasion”); see also People v. Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 3 (defendant and companion “immediately broke apart and walked in different directions” on mere sight of a police car); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161104, ¶ 3 (defendant “ ‘walk[ed] briskly *** as if to avoid’ ” police officers on mere sight of the officers’ SUV in alley).

2020See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (“[h]eadlong flight” when “unprovoked” is the “consummate act of evasion”); see also People v. Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 3 (defendant and companion “immediately broke apart and walked in different directions” on mere sight of a police car); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161104, ¶ 3 (defendant “ ‘walk[ed] briskly *** as if to avoid’ ” police officers on mere sight of the officers’ SUV in alley).

2020See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (“[h]eadlong flight” when “unprovoked” is the “consummate act of evasion”); see also People v. Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 3 (defendant and companion “immediately broke apart and walked in different directions” on mere sight of a police car); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161104, ¶ 3 (defendant “ ‘walk[ed] briskly *** as if to avoid’ ” police officers on mere sight of the officers’ SUV in alley).

2020See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (“[h]eadlong flight” when “unprovoked” is the “consummate act of evasion”); see also People v. Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 3 (defendant and companion “immediately broke apart and walked in different directions” on mere sight of a police car); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161104, ¶ 3 (defendant “ ‘walk[ed] briskly *** as if to avoid’ ” police officers on mere sight of the officers’ SUV in alley).

2018Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 143 ; see People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 91 (2008) (“any improper inferences from the prosecutor’s comments were cured by the trial court sustaining defense counsel’s objections and the court’s instructions to the jury to disregard comments to which objections were sustained”); Harris, 225 Ill. 2d at 33 (in considering the possibility of prejudice, the court noted that “defense counsel’s objection to the comments was sustained and the jury was properly instructed that the arguments of counsel were not evidence that it could consider”). ¶ 77 Examining the State’s ent

2017Runge , 234 Ill. 2d at 143 , 334 Ill.Dec. 865 , 917 N.E.2d 940 ; see People v. Bannister , 232 Ill. 2d 52 , 91, 327 Ill.Dec. 450 , 902 N.E.2d 571 (2008) ("any improper inferences from the prosecutor's comments were cured by the trial court sustaining defense counsel's objections and the court's instructions to the jury to disregard *420 comments to which objections were sustained"); Harris , 225 Ill. 2d at 33 , 310 Ill.Dec. 351 , 866 N.E.2d 162 (in considering the possibility of prejudice, the court noted that "defense counsel's objection to the comments was sustained and the jury was properly

2008McGee, 373 Ill.

2008McGee, 373 Ill.

2002People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 125 (1991), citing Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 171 .

2002People v. Jackson, 145 Ill.2d 43, 125 , 163 Ill.Dec. 859 , 582 N.E.2d 125 (1991), citing Gleckler, 82 Ill.2d at 171 , 44 Ill.Dec. 483 , 411 N.E.2d 849 .

2002Leonardi stands for the proposition that "'an answer which denies that an injury was the result of or caused by the defendant's conduct is sufficient to permit the defendant in support of his position to present evidence that the injury was the result of another cause.'" Leonardi , 168 Ill. 2d at 94 , quoting Simpson v. Johnson , 45 Ill.

2002Leonardi stands for the proposition that “ ‘an answer which denies that an injury was the result of or caused by the defendant’s conduct is sufficient to permit the defendant in support of his position to present evidence that the injury was the result of another cause.’ ” Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 94 , quoting Simpson v. Johnson, 45 Ill.

2002Leonardi , 168 Ill. 2d at 94 . "[I]n negligence actions, the plaintiff must present evidence of proximate causation, which includes both 'cause in fact' and 'legal cause.' [Citations.] A plaintiff may show 'cause in fact' under the substantial factor test, showing that the defendant's conduct was a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the alleged injury. [Citations.] 'Legal cause' examines the foreseeability of injury -- whether the injury is '"of a type which a reasonable man would see as a likely result of his conduct."' [Citations.]" Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public

2002Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 94 . “[I]n negligence actions, the plaintiff must present evidence of proximate causation, which includes both ‘cause in fact’ and ‘legal cause.’ [Citations.] A plaintiff may show ‘cause in fact’ under the substantial factor test, showing that the defendant’s conduct was a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the alleged injury. [Citations.] ‘Legal cause’ examines the foreseeability of injury — whether the injury is ‘ “of a type which a reasonable man would see as a likely result of his conduct.” ’ [Citations.]” Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public

2020John Crane contends that under Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416 (2009), Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d 343 , and First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252 (1999), that the substantial factor test properly states Illinois law in cases involving multiple causative agents.

2009Thus, if an asbestos plaintiff chooses to establish cause in fact by using the substantial factor test, in order to have the question of legal causation submitted to the jury, the plaintiff must first show that the injured worker “was exposed to the defendant’s asbestos through proof that (1) he regularly worked in an area where the defendant’s asbestos was frequently used and (2) the injured worker did, in fact, work sufficiently close to this area so as to come into contact with the defendant’s product.” Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d at 359 .

2026“Questions regarding breach of a duty and proximate cause of the injury are issues of fact, reserved for the trier of fact to decide.” Cooke v. Maxum Sports Bar & Grill, Ltd. 2018 IL App (2d) 170249, ¶ 53 (citing Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill. 2d 215, 226 (2010)).

2014"Conduct is a material element and a substantial factor if, absent the conduct, the injury would not have occurred." Krywin, 238 Ill. 2d at 226 .

2018Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 143 ; see People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 91 (2008) (“any improper inferences from the prosecutor’s comments were cured by the trial court sustaining defense counsel’s objections and the court’s instructions to the jury to disregard comments to which objections were sustained”); Harris, 225 Ill. 2d at 33 (in considering the possibility of prejudice, the court noted that “defense counsel’s objection to the comments was sustained and the jury was properly instructed that the arguments of counsel were not evidence that it could consider”). ¶ 77 Examining the State’s ent

2017Runge , 234 Ill. 2d at 143 , 334 Ill.Dec. 865 , 917 N.E.2d 940 ; see People v. Bannister , 232 Ill. 2d 52 , 91, 327 Ill.Dec. 450 , 902 N.E.2d 571 (2008) ("any improper inferences from the prosecutor's comments were cured by the trial court sustaining defense counsel's objections and the court's instructions to the jury to disregard *420 comments to which objections were sustained"); Harris , 225 Ill. 2d at 33 , 310 Ill.Dec. 351 , 866 N.E.2d 162 (in considering the possibility of prejudice, the court noted that "defense counsel's objection to the comments was sustained and the jury was properly

2026“Questions regarding breach of a duty and proximate cause of the injury are issues of fact, reserved for the trier of fact to decide.” Cooke v. Maxum Sports Bar & Grill, Ltd. 2018 IL App (2d) 170249, ¶ 53 (citing Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill. 2d 215, 226 (2010)).

2025Colonial Inn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Gay, 288 Ill.

2024See People v. Foster, 43 Ill.