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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Effland v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2026“No one factor is determinative.” Effland, 240 P.3d at 874 . 3. 2026See Effland, 240 P.3d at 874 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Samspongreen2 sentences2026This inquiry (the factor analysis) involves several nonexclusive factors, including the following: (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during 2026This inquiry (the factor analysis) involves several nonexclusive factors, including the following: (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mathenygreen1 sentence2026This inquiry (the factor analysis) involves several nonexclusive factors, including the following: (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during | 1 | 1 |
Carpet Exchange of Denver, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the Stategreen1 sentence2020Claim Appeals Office, 859 P.2d 278, 282 (Colo. App. 1993) (holding that because most of the employer’s workers “were . . . not customarily engaged in the business independent of their relationship with the company . . . they were not engaged in an independent business and were, therefore, in covered employment”), abrogated by Softrock, ¶ 18. ¶ 26 Softrock rejected the use of the dispositive factor test exemplified by Carpet Exchange. | 1 | 1 |
Widmar v. Vincentgreen2 sentences2013See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 274 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 269 , 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) ("[University students] are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 180 F.3d 232, 289 (6th Cir.1997) ("Theh[ United States] Supreme Court has always considered the age of the audience an important factor in the analysis [of Establishment Clause casesl."); cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 , 127 S.Ct. 2618 , 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) ("The [Free Speech Clause of the] First 2013See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 274 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 269 , 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) ("[University students] are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 180 F.3d 232, 289 (6th Cir.1997) ("Theh[ United States] Supreme Court has always considered the age of the audience an important factor in the analysis [of Establishment Clause casesl."); cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 , 127 S.Ct. 2618 , 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) ("The [Free Speech Clause of the] First | 1 | 1 |
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeiergreen2 sentences2013Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 , 108 S.Ct. 562 , 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) ("[Elducators do not offend [the Free Speech Clause of] the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so 'long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."). 2. 2013Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 , 108 S.Ct. 562 , 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) ("[Elducators do not offend [the Free Speech Clause of] the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so 'long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Viner v. Sweetgreen1 sentence2011Ctr., 914 P.2d at 908 ; Graven, 909 P.2d at 520-21 ; see also Viner v. Sweet, 30 Cal.4th 1282 , 185 Cal.Rptr.2d 629 , 70 P.3d 1046, 1050-51 (2003) (under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 482, the substantial factor test subsumes the but-for causation test; however, it does not abrogate the requirement that the plaintiff must prove that but for the alleged negligence, the injury would not have occurred). | 1 | 1 |
Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge 27 v. City & County of Denvergreen2 sentences2002We have defined extraterritorial impacts as "those involving the expectations of state residents." Walgreen v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Colo.1991); accord Fraternal Order of Police, 926 P.2d at 590 . 2002We have defined extraterritorial impacts as "those involving the expectations of state residents." Walgreen v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Colo.1991); accord Fraternal Order of Police, 926 P.2d at 590 . | 1 | 1 |
Walgreen Co. v. Charnesgreen2 sentences2002We have defined extraterritorial impacts as "those involving the expectations of state residents." Walgreen v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Colo.1991); accord Fraternal Order of Police, 926 P.2d at 590 . 2002We have defined extraterritorial impacts as "those involving the expectations of state residents." Walgreen v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Colo.1991); accord Fraternal Order of Police, 926 P.2d at 590 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Public Highway Authority
green
1 sentence2026Argus Real Est., Inc., 109 P.3d at 608 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Hankins
green
1 sentence2026This inquiry (the factor analysis) involves several nonexclusive factors, including the following: (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during | 1 | 2026–2026 |
June v. Union Carbide Corp.
green
1 sentence2019Sharp, 741 P.2d at 720 . 9 ¶ 28 However, as the Tenth Circuit explained in June, the “substantial factor” and but-for standards of causation are not alternatives; but-for causation is a prerequisite to establishing the substantial factor test. 577 F.3d at 1241 . ¶ 29 In explaining the substantial factor test, section 432 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Sharp division did not consider, imposes a causation requirement at least as stringent as the but-for standard consistently applied by our supreme court: (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor’s negligent conduct is no | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Reigel v. SavaSeniorCare L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2019Thus, “the allegedly negligent conduct of the defendant must satisfy” a but-for test “before it can even qualify as a substantial factor under the other Restatement sections.” Reigel, 292 P.3d at 987 . 10 ¶ 30 Regardless of Lorenzen’s theory of liability — that the thirteen- day delay between the request for authorization and the surgery caused his impairment or increased his risk of permanent impairment or aggravated a preexisting condition — he had to show that (1) but for the delay, the injury (or the increased risk or the aggravation) would not have occurred; or (2) the delay was a necessa | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado v. Sharp
green
1 sentence2019Sharp, 741 P.2d at 720 . 9 ¶ 28 However, as the Tenth Circuit explained in June, the “substantial factor” and but-for standards of causation are not alternatives; but-for causation is a prerequisite to establishing the substantial factor test. 577 F.3d at 1241 . ¶ 29 In explaining the substantial factor test, section 432 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Sharp division did not consider, imposes a causation requirement at least as stringent as the but-for standard consistently applied by our supreme court: (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor’s negligent conduct is no | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Troxel v. Iguana Cantina, LLC
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 1055 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Morse v. Frederick
green
2 sentences2013See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 274 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 269 , 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) ("[University students] are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 180 F.3d 232, 289 (6th Cir.1997) ("Theh[ United States] Supreme Court has always considered the age of the audience an important factor in the analysis [of Establishment Clause casesl."); cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 , 127 S.Ct. 2618 , 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) ("The [Free Speech Clause of the] First 2013See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 274 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 269 , 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) ("[University students] are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 180 F.3d 232, 289 (6th Cir.1997) ("Theh[ United States] Supreme Court has always considered the age of the audience an important factor in the analysis [of Establishment Clause casesl."); cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 , 127 S.Ct. 2618 , 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) ("The [Free Speech Clause of the] First | 1 | 2013–2013 |
North Colorado Medical Center, Inc. v. Committee on Anticompetitive Conduct
green
1 sentence2011Ctr., 914 P.2d at 908 ; Graven, 909 P.2d at 520-21 ; see also Viner v. Sweet, 30 Cal.4th 1282 , 185 Cal.Rptr.2d 629 , 70 P.3d 1046, 1050-51 (2003) (under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 482, the substantial factor test subsumes the but-for causation test; however, it does not abrogate the requirement that the plaintiff must prove that but for the alleged negligence, the injury would not have occurred). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Graven v. Vail Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2011Ctr., 914 P.2d at 908 ; Graven, 909 P.2d at 520-21 ; see also Viner v. Sweet, 30 Cal.4th 1282 , 185 Cal.Rptr.2d 629 , 70 P.3d 1046, 1050-51 (2003) (under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 482, the substantial factor test subsumes the but-for causation test; however, it does not abrogate the requirement that the plaintiff must prove that but for the alleged negligence, the injury would not have occurred). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
City and County of Denver v. State
green
2 sentences2002Cf. City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 768 . ("[Where not only uniformity is necessary, but cooperation among governmental units, as well, and where action of state and county officials within the limits of the city is imperative to effectuate adequate protection outside the city, the matter will in all likelihood be considered a state concern." (quoting 1 Chester James Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 8.40 at 3-119 to 3-120 (1989))). 2. 2002Cf. City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 768 . ("[W]here not only uniformity is necessary, but cooperation among governmental units, as well, and where action of state and county officials within the limits of the city is imperative to effectuate adequate protection outside the city, the matter will in all likelihood be considered a state concern." (quoting 1 Chester James Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 3.40 at 3-119 to 3-120 (1989))). 2. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.