factor analysis in Pennsylvania

2017The substantial factor test for determining whether a party’s negligence was the proximate or legal cause of another’s injury is set forth in Wisniewski v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 226 Pa. Super. 574 , 323 A.2d 744, 748 (1974): This test provides that the actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if: (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and - 35 - J-A32041-16 (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in harm. [Id.] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §

2017The substantial factor test for determining whether a party’s negligence was the proximate or legal cause of another’s injury is set forth in Wisniewski v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 226 Pa. Super. 574 , 323 A.2d 744, 748 (1974): This test provides that the actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if: (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and - 35 - J-A32041-16 (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in harm. [Id.] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §

2016Co., 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n expert’s opinion that ‘every exposure to asbestos, however slight, was a substantial factor’ . . . would render the substantial factor test ‘meaningless.’” (quoting Lindstrom v. A-C Prod.

2016Co., 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[Ajn expert’s opinion that ‘every exposure to asbestos, however slight, was a substantial factor’ ... would render the substantial factor test ‘meaningless.’ ” (quoting Lindstrom v. A-C Prod.

2009See, Summers, 886 A.2d at 244 ; accord Lindstrom, [4] 424 F.3d at 493 (reasoning that if such an opinion were permitted to control, the substantial factor test would be rendered meaningless).

2007See Summers, 886 A.2d at 244 ; accord Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 493 (reasoning that, if such an opinion were permitted to control, the substantial factor test would be rendered meaningless).

2019Womer, 908 A.2d at 278 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

2007The court further stated: “[tjherefore, we conclude that Womer did not substantially comply with Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3 for purposes of Pa.R.C.P. 126’s application, and hold that the Superior Court erred in including Pa.R.C.P. 126 as a factor in its analysis as to whether the trial court correctly denied Womer’s request that the judgment of non pros be opened.” Id.

2017The method for determining whether negligent conduct is a substantial factor in producing the injury is set forth in Willard v. Interpool, Ltd., 758 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. Super. 2000) [, appeal denied, 775 A.2d 808 (Pa. 2001)]: The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another important in determining whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another: (a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (b) whether the actor’s conduct has created a fo

2005Wisniewski, 226 Pa.Super. 574 , 323 A.2d 744, 748 (1974) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 431 (1965)). ¶ 17 The method for determining whether negligent conduct is a substantial factor in producing the injury is set forth in Willard v. Interpool, Ltd., 758 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa.Super.2000): The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another important in determining whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another: (a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect which they

2017Id., quoting Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 425 (emphasis omitted).

2016Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 425 (emphasis added). [J-12-2016] - 27 injury, and in fact, we have consistently held that multiple substantial causes may combine and cooperate to produce the resulting harm to the plaintiff.

2009See, Summers, 886 A.2d at 244 ; accord Lindstrom, 4 424 F.3d at 493 (reasoning that if such an opinion were permitted to control, the substantial factor test would be rendered meaningless).

2009See, Summers, 886 A.2d at 244 ; accord Lindstrom, [4] 424 F.3d at 493 (reasoning that if such an opinion were permitted to control, the substantial factor test would be rendered meaningless).

1974Restatement (Second) of Torts §433 (1965); see Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140 , 226 A.2d 87 (1966) (section 433 of Restatement (Second) of Torts followed as to first consideration listed above).

1974Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965); see Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140 , 226 A.2d 87 (1966) (section 433 of Restatement (Second) of Torts followed as to first consideration listed above).

1974Restatement (Second) of Torts §433 (1965); see Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140 , 226 A.2d 87 (1966) (section 433 of Restatement (Second) of Torts followed as to first consideration listed above).

1974Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965); see Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140 , 226 A.2d 87 (1966) (section 433 of Restatement (Second) of Torts followed as to first consideration listed above).

2011However, whether there has been a fair apportionment is determined by whether the apportionment formula (1) “if applied in every jurisdiction, ... would result in no more than all the unitary business income test being taxed” if every state had assessed an identical tax statute and (2) “the factor or factors [here property, payroll and sales] used in the apportionment formal ... actually reflect how the income is being generated.” Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983).

2011However, whether there has been a fair apportionment is determined by whether the apportionment formula (1) “if applied in every jurisdiction, ... would result in no more than all the unitary business income test being taxed” if every state had assessed an identical tax statute and (2) “the factor or factors [here property, payroll and sales] used in the apportionment formal ... actually reflect how the income is being generated.” Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983).

2008Ake recognized two scenarios where state-paid psychiatric assistance for an indigent capital defendant could be required: (1) relating to the guilt phase—"[w]hen the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense"; and (2) relating to the penalty phase—"when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness." Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-84 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 .

2008Ake recognized two scenarios where state-paid psychiatric assistance for an indigent capital defendant could be required: (1) relating to the guilt phase—"[w]hen the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense"; and (2) relating to the penalty phase—"when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness." Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-84 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 .

2026Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 290 A.3d 674 , 2022 WL 17588520 , at *5-6 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum). 2 The Ibrahim court cited Commonwealth v. Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031 (Pa. Super. 2008), as an example of this policy.3 In Hudson, the trial court issued a curative instruction regarding the objectionable testimony.

2022For example, in Commonwealth v. Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 1034 (Pa.Super. 2008), the trial court granted a defense motion in limine seeking the preclusion of any evidence of Hudson’s prior convictions.

2019It may also consider other factors, such as the occasion and necessity for the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be attained and the consequences of a particular interpretation, and decide the relative weight to apply to each of them.2 See generally Trust Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1155-57 (Pa. 2017).

2019It may also consider other factors, such as the occasion and necessity for the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be attained and the consequences of a particular interpretation, and decide the relative weight to apply to each of them. 2 See generally Trust Under Agreement of Taylor , 640 Pa. 629 , 164 A.3d 1147 , 1155-57 (2017).

2024The court attempted to resolve whether motorists had operated their vehicles while impaired in violation of the 1959 version of the DUI statute and, in so doing, it defined “operate” as having “actual physical control.” [J-69-2023] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5 of the vehicle was a significant factor in the analysis, explaining responding officers “could reasonably infer that [the motorist] had driven to the spot where they found his car” and “that the car was where it was and was performing as it was because of [the motorist’s] choice[.]” Kloch, 327 A.2d at 384 (emphasis added).

2024See Sullens, 612 A.2d at 1352-53; see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 734 A.2d 864, 866-67 (Pa. Super. 1999) (appellant’s admission at sentencing that he received notice of his trial date was a relevant factor in the analysis).

2023See Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 362 (Pa. Super. 2015) (noting that “one factor in the ‘undue prejudice’ analysis [is] the Commonwealth’s need” to present the prior act evidence).

2021Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2010).

2021“The opportunity of the witness to view the actor at the time of the crime is the key factor in this analysis.” Commonwealth v. Spiegel, 457 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. Super. 1983).

2020The Note to Rule 4019 suggests, however, that where the aggrieved party’s motion is a 7 The Superior Court also discussed the factor test developed by its court in Croydon Plastics Co. v. Lower Bucks Cooling & Heating, 698 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 717 A.2d 1028 (Pa. 1998), which our courts have applied where a trial court grants a motion for sanctions that has the severe result of effectively or actually dismissing the action.

2020The factor test requires a balancing of the equities including, but not limited to, the following factors: “(1) the nature and severity of the discovery violation; (2) the defaulting party’s willfulness or bad faith; (3) prejudice to the [aggrieved] party; (4) the ability to cure the prejudice; and (5) the importance of the precluded evidence in light of the failure to comply.” Croydon Plastics Co., 698 A.2d at 629 ; see also Cove Centre, 965 A.2d at 261-62 ; Khamphouseane v. Thornton (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1881 C.D. 2016, filed April 17, 2019), slip op. at 8.

2020The factor test requires a balancing of the equities including, but not limited to, the following factors: “(1) the nature and severity of the discovery violation; (2) the defaulting party’s willfulness or bad faith; (3) prejudice to the [aggrieved] party; (4) the ability to cure the prejudice; and (5) the importance of the precluded evidence in light of the failure to comply.” Croydon Plastics Co., 698 A.2d at 629 ; see also Cove Centre, 965 A.2d at 261-62 ; Khamphouseane v. Thornton (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1881 C.D. 2016, filed April 17, 2019), slip op. at 8.

2020The factor test requires a balancing of the equities including, but not limited to, the following factors: “(1) the nature and severity of the discovery violation; (2) the defaulting party’s willfulness or bad faith; (3) prejudice to the [aggrieved] party; (4) the ability to cure the prejudice; and (5) the importance of the precluded evidence in light of the failure to comply.” Croydon Plastics Co., 698 A.2d at 629 ; see also Cove Centre, 965 A.2d at 261-62 ; Khamphouseane v. Thornton (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1881 C.D. 2016, filed April 17, 2019), slip op. at 8.

2019See M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding that “all that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations”).

2019We have held that “[S]ection 5323(d) requires the trial court to set forth its mandatory assessment of the sixteen factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.” C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 955 (Pa.Super. 2013).

2018See Wheeler v. Johns -Manville Corp., 493 A.2d 120, 122 (Pa. Super.

2017Compare Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2015) (stating that pre-sentence motions to withdraw guilty plea should be liberally allowed when petitioner provides fair and just reason and Commonwealth has not been substantially prejudiced); Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 39 (Pa.Super. 2017) (same); Islas, 156 A.3d at 1188 (same); Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 261 (Pa.Super. 2013) (same), with Hart, 2017 PA Super 355 at *4 (stating that after imposition of sentence, trial court may grant motion to withdraw guilty plea only to correct a manifest injustice); Kpou, 153 A